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W.

Those who seek the Lord shall praise him; for in seeking him they shall find him; and having found him they shall praise him. (St. Augustine, p. 2.) And so Study is worship.

Why Shut Your Eyes? An Inquiry addressed to the Men of Science, Philosophers, and Divines of our Day. By the Writer. Matter & Form.

All comprehensive accounts of human affairs, from the remotest ages to the present day, contain the record of a class of phenomena, indicating an intelligence, or suggestive of faculties, transcending all that man could attain to through his known bodily senses. Sometimes these phenomena have been generally or partially admitted, and sometimes generally or partially denied. Always they have been more or less common. From the time of Pythagoras to the present day the same peculiarities in these phenomena may be remarked. While some fishermen were drawing in their net, Pythagoras told them the exact number of fishes which it contained. We have recently seen an account of a man in Germany who will let you grasp a handful of beans from a bag, and then tell you the exact number you hold. In the course of our inquiry, we shall show that there are abundant facts of this nature pointing to faculties which speculative philosophy, in its examination, has not sufficiently considered.

E. S.

There is one absolute, independent, eternal, self-existent Substance, underlying all matter and all Spirit, and this Substance is God. Whether we say God created the universe, or that it is an emanation from his essence, containing all the potentialities of being, is a mere dispute about words.

From this primal substance all forms of matter or manifestations of Spirit have proceeded and are proceeding.

Geological phenomena show that the matter of this planet (and inferentially we may say of all other planets and suns) has been, if not created, yet developed, dilated, expanded, through change after change, in time: therefore that the present state of things had its beginning in time.

God being eternally infinite, nothing can have been or can be added to or taken from the primitive Substance.

That substance may be the underlying force or support of new and changing properties and phenomena, such as are manifested in man and nature; but to that infinite substance itself nothing can be added, and from it nothing can be subtracted.

In one sense, therefore, man is not only immortal but eternal; eternal in that substance of which his body and soul are the visible and invisible expansions or compositions; immortal in his individuality and sense of identity.

"The true heaven," where God dwells," says Jacob Boehme, "is all over and in all places, for wheresoever he was before the creation, there he is still, namely, in himself, the essence of all essences; all is generated from him and is originally from him."

All souls must have existed from the beginning in the divine soul.

Sept. 10th, 1867.

The primary substance being God, the communicated substance of all forms and of all matter, visible and invisible, is a force we call life. This is the ground-work of all phenomena whether of mind or matter. All accidents, all attributes, all qualities have this as their basis. There is no such thing as deadness in the universe; since matter dissolved goes to compose the elements of which matter is again formed.

Life may be conscious or unconscious; intelligent or unintelligent; the difference (as Leibnitz says) between the two being as great as that between the mirror and the one who sees.

Communicated life is conscious or unconscious, originally or by development, according to the forms which are its recipients. These forms are, by the will of God, all the possibilities and varieties of being into which life can flow, from the mineral, the plant, the insect up to man.

The dissolution of forms releases the substantial life. This life is released either pure and disconnected, to mingle in the great reservoir of similar life, or it is released in an envelope or body so subtile as to be invisible to the normal human sense.

In the case of man, we have ample reasons for believing, that, for the preservation of his consciousness and individuality, the substantial life will be always connected with a body; that within this body, if it be liable to dissolution, there is always contained or evolved a body less gross suited to the new conditions of his being, and serving as a receptacle and form of life.

Will the same law hold in regard to animals, whose life, so far as we can get a knowledge of it, is unconscious or unintelligent, so far as its future destiny is concerned? Reasoning from the infinity and infinite exuberance of creation or nature, we might ask, Why not? But there are high reasons, promising to man a conscious immortality, which certainly do not exist in regard to animals.

E. S.

The spiritual and intellectual development of a man, healthy in body and soul, is not bounded even by the infirmities of age. The manifestations of mind may be less marked, but there is evidence that the powers remain. (See Strauss, p.)

(Before using the terms Spirit, soul, &c the meaning attached to the words should be fairly stated.)

Man is a progressive being to the very last. The brute enters into all his knowledge from the first; and not all the inventions and aids of man can lead him to make the least advance beyond what his blind animal instincts teach.

But there are moral reasons without number for the belief that the substantial life of man acts in a new body, on the dissolution of the old; reasons founded on the instincts of the soul, the justice of Deity, the revelations of seers, the instances of prevision and clairvoyance, the large body of facts, expressive of the agency of spiritual, invisible intelligences.

Si divinatio est dii sunt. This is one of the great proofs of Spirit; and if there are inferior spirits, why not one Supreme, infinite Spirit?

The substance of all matter and all spirit is a force proceeding from the divine will; or rather the divine will itself, constantly operating and constituting the very core of all things, animate and inanimate.

E. S.

Sept. 12th. A proceeding from the will of God, call it life or call it force, is the substance of all matter and Consequently of all Spirit; for Spirit is not a distinct Creation, but a result of the divine idea expressed in forms and organizations. Thus the substance of Matter and Spirit is identical, or rather there is no Spirit separate from form.

But for the perpetual efflux of the divine will, pervading all Matter, the whole universe would be an unsubstantial fabric; for this efflux makes not only the soul of Man but every orb and every atom, instinct with actual life.

Matter in its last analysis, whether this be physical or metaphysical, seems to lose the attributes by which we distinguish it as Matter and to pass into the domain of pure Spirit.

Nothing is taken from the Matter of the universe and nothing is added to it; and if we regard the Substance of Spirit as something distinct from that of Matter, then nothing can be added to, or taken from, Spirit. But if we regard Spirit as the result of form, then is every human being who comes into the world a veritably new creation, having its life direct from God and subsisting by the Constant operation of the will of God.

Sept. 13. Thus it is by the conjunction of substance with form that man becomes a living soul. The form comes proximately from parents under the operation of divine physiological laws. The substance is forever divinely communicated.

There is an analogy in the works of man. Every instrument, every contrivance of art, is it not a thing of organization and form? The steam-engine, the harp, the musical box, every machine for the employment of physical forces, have they not, (as far as transient and human things can be compared with immortal and divine) an analogy with the works of God? Are they not ideas expressed in the union of matter with organization and form?

Every truth is exhaustless and reflects infinity.

With what new and sublime responsibilities does this view invest man! In his own will lies, to a great extent, the plastic power which is to make him hereafter a shape of beauty or of deformity. For, as even in this life, the moral character gives to the face all it has of real, spiritual beauty, it cannot but be that in the next stage of existence, when moral agencies shall be more operative, the man will express more and more in his external form the inward goodness or evil. Let the perpetual dispute in regard to free will and human responsibility go on. Let the materialists contend that the development of the intellect is in proportion with the size, the shape, the chemical composition of the brain. No fact that materialism can possibly summon or conjecture can come in conflict with the system which has these simple postulates for its basis: the postulates, namely, of substance and form as here explained.

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Matter and Form. Sept. 29. No department of nature is void of appropriate inhabitants. Air, water, earth all have living beings fitted to occupy them wholly or partially. Can it be that the immense tracts of ether between us and the planets and fixed stars are left unfurnished with intelligent life?

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Oct. 9. In harmony with the foregoing views is a fact which Mr. T. B. Fox tells me was laid by Dr. Clark before the Examiner Club the other evening: the fact, namely, that the ultimate cells of the matter of the human organism vary in men of different races (the Caucasian and African, for example); and that these cells vary even in the practised and the unpractised limb. For instance, the cells in the arm of the person who has become a proficient on the piano-forte will differ from what they were before he had become so skilled: the man has, in a certain sense, made for himself a new arm. Apply the same facts to the variations in the cells which the microscope may (perhaps) show in the brain: Thus man, by his daily thoughts, habits, and employments, and by the operations, of his will, is daily modifying and moulding the arrangement of the atoms of his physical body. How much more (if we may be guided by analogy) will he be shaping the very pith and grain of his Spiritual body! Not at once – not abruptly – can the bad man be made good, or the foolish be made wise. The process of the formation of character is really working an organic change not only in our internal and psychical form, but in our external and physical. Follow this thought out to its consequences.

It is not in the dissecting-room nor in the charnel-house that it leaves the conscious individuality – the Ego, source of all our aspirations – no, it follows it, with assured steps to that border-land within whose purer ether and diviner air, it is received.
Nov. 5.

Whence? – Whither? – Where?
The Sadduceeism of the Day.

It cannot be denied that the tendency of a large part of the science of the day is towards a hopeless materialism. Those persons who have not traced and followed the current would be surprised to realize to what an extent it is invading the intellectual life of the present. Flowing from the philosophical abstractions of Hegel on the one side and from the anti-metaphysical system of Comte on the other, this two streams unite to undermine the foundations of some of the most precious beliefs of humanity.

While our theologians are bending their efforts to the elucidation of questions of Church discipline or of Biblical interpretation, men of Science are diligently seeking and classifying facts, the drift of which, as by them presented, is towards the unsettling of the whole basis of theology, if not of psychology. Even the Speculative philosophers, those of them who by pursuing too exclusively the Metaphysical Method, find themselves at a disadvantage when they have to cope with physicists fresh from the study of the most recent discoveries and the most daring deductions in Science so far as it relates to the nature of Man.

So obviously is this true to those whose attention has been patiently turned in this direction, that one of the ablest champions* of the evangelical party at the present day calls upon not only all Christians, but all theists, to come to the rescue of the common foundation of their faith. "When the question," he says, "relates to God, to the universal cause, we find ourselves at the common root of religion and philosophy, and distinctions, which exist elsewhere, disappear... If you think the most important of the discussions of our day to be that between natural and revealed religion, between deism and the gospel, you have not well discerned the signs of the times. The fundamental discussion is now between men who believe in God, in the soul, and in truth, and men, who, denying truth, deny at the same time the soul and God... The great question of the day is to know whether our desire of truth is a chimera; whether our effort to reach the divine world is a spring into the empty void... The unbridled audacity of those who deny fundamental truths is bringing ancient adversaries, for a moment at least, to fight beneath the same flag".

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* Ernest Naville of Geneva, Switzerland, author of "Lectures on Modern Atheism", &c.

These remarks will give some idea of the gravity of the position; and since these remarks were written the ranks of the ultra materialists have had new accessions.

X There are moments, says De Stael, when skepticism is necessary to the progress of the sciences.

* * *

The universe is a grand work-shop for the elaboration of spirit. To this wonderful end every clod, every lichen, every worm is conducing. No life is useless.

E. S.

Neglected Facts – in the – History of Mind.

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"There is no matter without force, no force without matter." Such is the inscription which Dr. Buchner puts on his banner in the cause of atheism and annihilation.

But if the power productive of mental phenomena be a force, then it must still inhere in matter even after the visible dissolution of the mortal body. Is there any thing irrational then in supposing that the matter in which this intelligent force will find its new correlation will be a body corresponding to what we have in this world, though having enlarged faculties suited to a different sphere of activity?

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Is spirit a product of organization; or is the germ of organization spiritual?

Here we are thrown back on the inquiry, What do we mean by Spirit? and What do we mean by matter?

Science tells us that the fundamental form of organic being is a globule enclosing a globule in process of formation.

Philosophers have made a distinction between spiritual substance and material substance; and yet who can say that such a distinction exists otherwise than in thought looking at results rather than at original essences?

The first distinguishable form of the future man is a little drop of germ-like fluid: the same in the nettle, the reptile, the elephant, and in man.

May not the principle or germ of life in this drop, though beyond the reach of the microscope, still be a form of matter – invisible, infinitesimal, if you will, but as material as electricity or magnetism? The origin of endless disputes lies in our unsettled notions in regard to matter.

Here is the vesicle or globule around which gather the material accretions which form the foetus. The principle which attracts these accretions, is it material or is it spiritual? It is invisible; it is too subtile to be identified, and we know it only in its effects.

Is it a spiritual substance or a material substance – this principle? Using the words in their popular acceptation it must be one of these two; that is, it must be either an immaterial or spiritual force, or it must simply be a material particle inaccessible to sense and too delicate for science to test.

The question, after all, turns upon our definition of spirit and matter; i. e. our notions of the immaterial and the material. Are the invisible, imponderable forces material or immaterial?

Mind we can only trace by its effects; and so electricity we can only trace by its effects. Is it not almost as metaphysical as mind? Is it irrational to suppose that

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God, the first cause of matter as well as of mind, may have made matter, under certain conditions, develope those attributes which we call spiritual? (See remarks of Thomas Hope, M.S. vol. 2, p. 247.)

"It is no more difficult", says Scherer, "to admit that matter in man has been organized (yes – but organised by what or by whom? or through what?) for thought and consciousness than it is to admit that it has been organized in the plant for living, and in the animal for sensation and motion." "When one says that thought can be a property of an organized body because this body is material, one reasons like him who explains by a supernatural cause the facts which he cannot immediately explain. He imagines that he knows all the forces of nature. The dualist seems to believe that he knows all the properties of bodies. Matter, at the summit of the animal scale has been so organized by the Creator as to be capable of thought: here is a fact, a fact which is neither more nor less explicable than another, but a fact which reposes upon irrecusable inductions, and which nothing, in good logic, obliges us to elude by the supposition of an occult force."

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For answer to this, See Des Mystères de la vie humaine par Montlosier pp. 71, 72, &c.

The material principle itself – may not that be properly called the occult force?

Does not the difficulty arise just here? The spiritualist believes that there must be an immaterial principle, if he is to have an assurance of something surviving the dissolution of the body. The materialist believes that all that there is of substance (or call it materiality if you will) is what he can see, weigh, and handle in the human body.

But how many facts will science point us to showing that the most tremendous forces in nature are the imponderable and invisible? May not the visible body be the envelope of one of a more subtile nature, but still in a certain sense material, though beyond the reach of our mortal senses?

Would the attributes of mind be lessened in their dignity by being indissolubly connected with an organism? Why may not the properties of Spirit be transferred to matter and yet lose none of their intrinsic character? Why may not an organism be the means for the manifestation of Spirit in another life as well as this? (See p. 137 1st M.S. vol. Scherer.)

"The duality of the soul and the body," says Scherer, "is only the natural illusion of the thinking Subject, who, by the very fact that he thinks, recognizes himself as an immaterial principle." (May we not compare it to the reflection in a mirror? Is not the reflection immaterial, though produced by the effect of matter on matter? E. S.)

But in one sense the dualists are right, in spite of Scherer. "There is no matter without force, no force without matter," say the modern atheists. Of course then, there must be a duality in matter.

That there are gradations of matter from finer to coarser in the same body, I suppose no anatomist or chemist will deny. Science tells us that all living beings, whether animals or plants, are composed of four chemical elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen which are combined in various proportions. May not the degrees of matter in the same body range from coarse to fine, from visible to invisible?

We will suppose that under certain conditions of light and heat, quality and form, maternal adaptability, &c., this incipient globule develops into mind - into spirit.

If matter may be so organized or compounded as to give rise to the phenomena of instinct, intelligence, affection, &c. in du. b animals, why may it not be so organized or compounded as to be productive of the highest mental phenomena manifested in man?

Whence and Whither? or,
The Science of the Soul
The Soul's Search for Itself.
Whence & Whither; or The Seekers.
Nora, Bella (Conversational) Alice, Ernest, Philip, Arthur

Every careful observer of the drift of modern thought must have noticed the effect of the anti-metaphysical system of Comte at the present day in throwing discredit on psychical inquiries. The tendency, it is true, is a mere repetition of what has occurred at all epochs when thought was active and free in civilized communities.

But generally the activity of Skepticism and unbelief has been the natural rebound from the undue constraint which bigotry or credulity has attempted to impose. (a)

They tell me, Soul, that thou art not; that the Saints and sages of all time, who have declared that thou art, have been under an imbecile hallucination and have imposed on the human mind a mischievous delusion.

Let us take counsel together, O Soul! Let us learn if thou canst give no proof of an existence independent of visible and ponderable matter. Let us inquire if thou dost not as positively declare thy self in thy effects as light, heat, and electricity reveal their own specific agencies.

(a) Not such would seem to be the case now. Generally these periods of eclipse have followed those interludes periods when physical science has been so neglected that some movement in behalf of the material and the tangible seemed to be needed to rouse the best intellect of an epoch from abstract speculation and untimely reveries. Not such has been the case now. Never were the physical sciences more faithfully cultivated side by side with literature and philosophy and art.

Still the skepticism that is sincere, ~~generous~~ and thoughtful should be at all times welcomed, since it must always be one of the most important agencies in the disengagement of pure truth. There is often a sounder substratum of genuine faith in the most daring skepticism than in the humblest genuflection to authority. The man who attempts to point out a fallacy in what we have been accustomed to regard as a sacred and fundamental truth, is he not, if sincere, acting more honorably in the interests of truth than we who shut our ears to his reasonings or put a mean construction on his motives?

Even in the skepticism that doubts the divine existence and the human soul, there is an element of faith, if the skepticism be the result of thought; for since to think is to pursue the truth, he who thinks (sincerely) must have faith in the abstract principle of thought, — in the existence of absolute truth; and if we follow that principle to its last analysis, we shall find it nowhere but in the attributes of God. "It is more honorable", says Ancillon, "to seek truth without finding it than to find it without taking the trouble to seek it."

There is always a latent quality of distrust in the faith which shrinks from opposition. The dogmatism which claims a monopoly of earnestness or of divine light generally hides under its loud clamor a timid heart. It is the serenely sure who are the magnanimously tolerant. Our equanimity towards difference of opinion in matters pertaining to God and the soul is generally proportioned to the depth and stability of our own convictions.

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Here is an acorn; we remove its shell; here is the kernel; we cut it open. We know that if placed under the right conditions in the soil it may be the germ of a mighty oak. ~~acorn~~. That little germ therefore contains three ~~two~~ principles, which no power of the microscope can see the trace of: the principle, namely, of life or of the evolution of life; ~~and~~ the principle of form, or of the evolution of form, and the principle of development. Now whether these principles are anterior to the organism, or the organism to the principles, whether either is the effect or the cause of the other, may be a question the answer to which must always be conjectural.

Whether these principles, invisible and

imponderable as they are, are matter or spirit, who shall say? Or is it a correlative force in nature, electricity or some subtler agent, which gives to the seed the soul where lies latent the future tree?

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Consider the waste of material, the abortive efforts which Nature allows before she produces her best forms and types. Of the thousands of blossoms on a pear-tree in Spring, but five or six perhaps may issue in perfect specimens of fruit. Of the young of birds how many perish in the shell! The hardiest only seem to survive.

In the generation of human beings, how many are lost in the fœtal stage! How many men and women, capable of generating and bearing offspring, are prevented by accident or by choice from doing so.

If life is a blessing in the eyes of the Creator, as well as in the estimation of the recipients, why all this waste of the materials and opportunities of life?

In regard to human beings we may believe that those who die in the infantile stage carry with them into the invisible world the principle of immortality. But how in regard to those who perished in the ante-natal stage? How in regard to those who might have been conceived, but were not, or were purposely cheated of existence?

The potentiality of the mind of a Newton was once involved in a little germ-like globule. If by any accident it had been checked or rendered abortive, what would have become of the principle that already contained within itself such intellectual possibilities? Would that potential Newton be resolved back into blind matter or blind force; or would it be made the informing life of some other human embryo? If utterly lost, then the immortal soul would seem to be the product of material development, of the action of natural forces, of growth and time.

Can it be that when the appropriate forms are ready there is a pervading force in nature which imparts the principle of life and mind?

Can we derive no light from the analogies of vegetable life? Here again is the acorn: Invisibly lodged within its molecules, or else spiritually present, lies the possible oak. That embryonic form is not something imparted after the acorn is planted in the earth; though it may be something developed from its own nature. The soul, then, is not something superadded by the agency of the conditions of heat, electricity, &c., to which the planted acorn is subjected. It may owe its development to these conditions. It doest not derive from them its individuality as an oak.

In respect to the origin of the human being must it not be that the essential man lies latent in the impregnated ovum? just as the oak does in the acorn?

But Science tells us that at an early period of the human foetal existence there is no brain, but only the spinal marrow, so that the embryo of man then resembles one of the lowest orders of animals; the brain is perceptible about the second month and is evidently formed by a prolongation of the spinal cord. The extremities begin to shoot out like the buds of a plant in the 6th week. (See Nat. Cyc. Art. Fœtus.)

Whatever may be the stages of progress, it does not alter the relation of the potentialities of the original germ to the subsequent existence.

It is a little impregnated ovum, then, that is the starting-point of the human being. Impregnated with what? With the principles of development, of form, of life. Swedenborg tells us that the soul comes from the father.

May not the foetal growth be a type of the spiritual growth from man up to archangel? May not the man of highest culture be as far below the higher spiritual intelligencies as the embryo, undistinguishable from that of the brute, is below the developed man?

God allows, it is true, the destruction of many forms of life before they have developed into the highest tendency of their natures; whether there is an immortal principle lodged in the embryo, more developed in the foetus, is one of the mysteries of the Creator. Perhaps the life there begun is not wasted. Perhaps the infinite resources of Providence can find a way through which any purpose of being may not be utterly defeated. Perhaps what may seem to us an abortion may be, in the processes of Omnipotence, the preparation for a new trial; that a better form of life may be shaped from the old material.

"Imagine for an instant", says Auguste Guyard, "that the human ovule were gifted with sensibility and intelligence; would it not take, for symptoms premonitory of its end, the painful rendings of the ovulary organization in itself? Would not the approaches of its end give to it, as of ours to us, both the doubt of continuous life and the terrors of annihilation? Error! delusive apprehensions! The ovule becomes a foetus; that is to say, it evolves or passes from an inferior to a superior life; for the foetus has an organization and lives a life of its own quite distinct from those of the ovule and of the infant.

"Now, let us suppose that the foetus, equally with the ovule, has intelligence and self-consciousness, and let us see what it would think when, after the nine months of its fœtal life, it should experience the consequences of the pains of child-birth. Would it not suppose — it also — that the convulsive claspings of the uterus were the very embrace of death itself? And the doubt and the fear of annihilation, would they not assail it also? Error again, and vain fears! For that which it has taken for its death-cry and its last adieu to existence, is the first wailing of a new-born child and the joyful welcome to a new existence!

"And so the death of an ovule is the birth of a fœtus; the death of a fœtus, the birth of a man. So the end of one life is the commencement of another life less imperfect; in other words, the death of the man is the birth of a genius, of an angel, of a new being, by whatever name we may call it; of a being more complete than man, of whom, however, it is the continuation, development, aggrandizement, as the fœtus is of the ovule, as the man is of the fœtus.

"It is in this manner doubtless, by a series without end of evolutions or of deaths that we shall realize from more to more the divine destiny revealed to us and promised by our aspirations, by our infinite desires.

"If man be not eternal by his substance, immortal in his personality, infinite in his destiny, since he is so in his desires, then there is neither a Being of beings, nor omnipotent goodness, nor infinite love, nor eternal justice; then, in brief, there is no God."

Quintessences, par Auguste Guyard, p. 204.

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"Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"

May it not be that it is not till a man arrives at the consciousness and actuality of free will, that his individuation is complete? May it not be that what comes out mis-shapen or incomplete from the moulding, may be made to struggle, in its substance, through new forms till it has reached a true individuation? (Re-incarnation?)

This lavishness of life and of death, does it not point to the great fact, that after all nothing is wasted, no progress of matter or spirit is an aimless, abortive progress?

The acorn may be thrust into the earth, and in time become an oak, receiving and assimilating aeriform substances, converting fluids into solids, and exercising the functions of organic life.

Or the acorn may be left above the ground to decay; but are its possibilities therefore wasted?

We know that it lends something of vitalizing power to the soil. Something it may also lend to those aeriform substances which go to form other oaks.

. . We know that the oak must derive most of its bulk from aeriform substances. Science has proved that the soil in which the tree is placed contributes little to its bulk and weight.

May it not be that the soul is also made to receive and assimilate Spiritual Substance? That this spiritual substance is but a higher grade of material; from which it differs only in degree? Nay, that the same element of God-imparted life which individualizes and sustains the oak, also individualizes and sustains the human soul?

Sir J. E. Smith, the eminent English botanist (ob. 1814) believed in the identity of the vital principle of animals and vegetables; and that this vital principle, which seems independent of material organization, is a proof of the immediate agency of Deity. The modern doctrine of the correlation and conservation of forces would, I suppose, reduce this vital principle to a mere fluctuation or change of force, always attendant on matter. Buchner & the modern atheists repudiate the notion of a vital force.

Whence & Whither – or the Seekers.
Natural Tokens of the Immortal Life. } (or Nature's Evidency of

Ernest. "Now spring returns, but not to me returns the vernal joy;" – Sister, are you here? I thought I was alone. Have I been sleeping long?

Alice. – Less than half an hour.

March 22d 1868. The present drift of my psychological thinking is toward the notion of the existence of the soul or soul-principle as a simple substance or monad, endued with peculiar powers. (See Drossbach's def. Lon. Sp. Mag. Jan. 1868 p. 44.) This monad, inasmuch as it is indivisible, indestructible, and unchangeable, must be different from all that we conceive of matter or of the changing forces developed through matter. It cannot be a more subtile or attenuated form or quality of matter, because all that is matter implies change, correlation, &c.

Because it cannot be destroyed or changed in essence, the presumption is that the soul-monad has existed with God from eternity.

The soul-monads are infinite in their varieties and their degrees, as they are in their numbers.

(It may be a matter for thought, however, whether these monads must not be primarily and essentially equal.)

In these monads exists a principle of organism; also the principle of consciousness or of the ego; and these principles are co-existent with the monad as the substratum of all future development of being. These principles may require conditions for their development; and the monad requires conditions, for its centralization and capacity of developing energy, and these conditions are in matter, made germinal by conjunction with the monad, with the added conditions of light, heat, electricity, and spiritual influx from God and from God's subordinate agencies.

Thus the eternal monad, by certain laws of affinity or of development, becomes incarnated in time, and attains to the development of consciousness or the ego through bodily organs and form (a corporeal organization)

The peculiar qualities of the monad are, that being at once substance and consciousness, it holds eternally (or rather perpetually, for what it receives in time cannot be called eternal) all that it receives; all the thoughts, impressions, experiences of the earth-life.

It is the central force from which (under conditions) the material body is evolved; and, as it will henceforth need a body for its conscious life, it is the central force of the spiritual body which, for all that we know, may differ only from the material in the more etherial, electrick and abiding character of its elements.

Amidst all the flux of matter and of material forces there is, therefore, something eternal and substantial, the monad.

Indestructible and incorruptible, it may pass through myriad forms of being, acquiring ever new experiences, sometimes eclipsed, but never extinguished; sometimes surrounded by defilement, but, diamond-like, never inherently defiled; sometimes held an unwilling prisoner, but always outliving and escaping from its captors, to renew, perhaps, under more favorable conditions, its eternal progress.

Its course of progress being spiral, it may sometimes seem to retrograde, but this it does not in fact.

Though nothing is added to, or detracted from its × actual substance, one of its peculiar properties is to contain the inexhaustible possibilities of growth and development in wisdom, goodness, and energy for the organisms and [individualities] of which it is the only possible centre, epitome, and eternal continent. (This needs explanation: though the organisms may change from lower to higher, the individualities are the same; or rather there is but one individuality, and of that the monad is the equivalent and the sum.) (Another consideration should be, that though the substance may not change, so far as addition or subtraction imply change, yet it may improve in its capacity of elective affinity with the germs of higher and higher organisms.)

Locke says: "The substance in which our ideas are deposited remains the same from youth to age; but the matter of our bodies is perpetually changing; therefore the human soul is not material." This "substance" must be the soul-monad; and this, let it be remembered is the soul not only of the material body, but of the spiritual body, which exists (even as St. Paul tells us) along with the natural body.

Whether these monads are scintillant from Deity in ever-flowing abundance, or, whether eternally co-existent, would seem to be questions involving the same idea virtually. In the revolving cycles of eternity these monads may have been making the circuit of the universe, alternately sent forth and returned, particles in the great procession proceeding from Deity, and ever attracted again to their Source.

(Swedenborg tells us that the soul is from the father, and the clothing from the mother; that the soul is heavenly, and receives influx immediately from the Lord; that the soul is the man himself &c. He also says: Man cannot think & will, unless there be a subject, which is a substance, from which and in which he may think and will.)

"As an everlasting monad the human mind passes through a series of progressive phases, in which it gradually develops the basis of its nature, until it attains it's perfect form." I. H. Fichte.

"From its acts of feeling and thinking, Heinrich Ritter concludes that the soul is phenomenon to itself, and that other things are phenomena to it. Hence it follows, as phenomenon is only possible in and by means of substance, that the idea of substantiality must be attributed to the soul. In distinction therefore to its manifestations, it is in itself a substance imperishable, spontaneous, and independent..."

See continuation of Ritter's theory in Lon. Sp. Mag. for Jan. 1868. p 44.

God being eternal, all the substances of his creations must be eternal. The soul is a substance: the soul is eternal. But though substances are eternal, forms are new and transitory. So long as the soul is in a state of progression, it must belong to the transient or changing, in its manifestations or incarnations.

The substances of the earth are eternal. The earth herself is new (formed in time).

The soul-monad, attracted by the needed conditions, becomes the principle of development in the germinal beginnings of the body, under . . .
In the words of Dr. Doherty, "The Spirit (soul-monad) forms the body in utero, by collecting and associating particles of matter from the blood of the mother to form organs; and it sustains the physical organism during life by a constant interchange of atoms with the external world."

As to how the soul-monad may be attracted by the needed conditions, see accounts (p. 276 MS. vol.) of the "tendance élective" shown in the generation of fishes in ponds, &c.

"The soul proceeds from God the original and eternal centre of all causation, and the soul originates by energies with which God has endowed it, its outer covering or body adapted to its condition in a physical state of being." Lon. Sp. Mag. Jan. 1868.

What Do They Mean?

An Inquiry into the Significance of the phenomena of Somnambulism, animal magnetism, Spiritualism, &c.

"This Life = One of Many."
Man's Part = In his own Individualization.
A theory of man's nature and destiny.

An intellectual being, endowed with the principle of individuality and free will, must be to a great extent, under Providence, his own Creator.

Is the doctrine of pre-existence so incredible when we consider, that, in the necessity of things, + man's free will must be self-generated, and cannot be given gratis even by Deity himself.

Thus being man's work, what wonder that it should require a long succession of existences for man to develop this free will power, and confirm himself in good?

May not this be of necessity the divine process for producing moral and intellectual individualities? for making man truly man, and potentially angel?

We speak of man's being nothing in himself - absolutely destitute of all individual merit - and deriving every thing from God. In one sense this is undoubtedly true. Inasmuch as man derives his fundamental life from God, he may be said to owe Him all that he may ever attain to. But if our free will and moral responsibility be not a delusion and a snare, there must be distinctions of merit before God as well as before man - Swedenborg to the contrary.

Could even Omnipotence create a moral and intellectual being, free and yet perfect, and incapable of error or of sin? Are not conditions, analogous to those of our mortal life, indispensable to the generation and growth of all free will and individualism? Would not [created] a being created perfect and impeccable be a mere *medium* of the will of the Creator; an automaton, without individuality or merit of any kind?

Whence comes this sense of free will and responsibility, if not from the depths of our own nature, as the result of self-evolved power?.

Pythagoras, Plato, Origen, Herder, Lessing, Pierre Leroux, Fourier (badly mixed), Jean Reynaud, Allan Kardec, Pezzani, Dumesnil, (L'Immortalité, par Alfred Dumesnil). Saint-Simon (V. Doctr. de Saint-Simon, Exposition, p. 12), Prosper Enfantin (V. La Vie éternelle, passée, présente, future), Victor Hugo (probably), Giordano Bruno, Van Helmont, Schopenhauer (?), Schubert, Lichtenberg, Schelling, Porphyry, Virgil.

The infinity of the universe is a pledge of the immortality of man.

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If the material elements of which man is constituted are eternal, why not the Spiritual?

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All that gives value to the universe is thought. What would be the Starry universe, what all the wealth of nature, without thinking beings to see and to admire?

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Science tells us there could be no such thing as sound without an ear to hear it; no such thing as light without an eye to see it.

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The evening time draws nigh – but where's the light?
Is it not time for Thought to fold his wings
And brood Content upon some resting-place?
Or must we to the end grope in the dark?
Send down thy light, O Fountain of all light!
Send down thy peace, O Fountain of all peace
For truth is peace, and truth is thine alone
The Author and the Life of all that's real! E.S.

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This Life, one of a Series.

Human history is full of phenomena for which no hypothesis of materialism can offer a reasonable solution. From the period of the earliest authentic records and traditions down to the present time, these phenomena have been occurring; all presenting certain marked resemblances; all taking place under analogous conditions, and all, for the most part, baffling the scrutiny that approaches their investigation with hostile prejudice or supercilious incredulity.

As a type of the persistency with which the dominant Science of the last two hundred years has rejected facts that have been tested and vouched for by thousands of competent witnesses, we need but glance at the manner in which the phenomena of witchcraft have been dismissed to the realm of delusion.

Without pausing to consider whether certain occurrences are the work of preternatural agents, or the effects of abnormal conditions on the part of individuals in the flesh, it will be enough for our purpose to show with what relentless opposition the facts themselves — facts authenticated by all that there is of solemn and impressive in human testimony — have been assailed.

The excesses to which good and pious men were led through too unquestioning a faith in the Satanic theory respecting the origin of these phenomena, naturally led to a reaction in public opinion which involved therefds in the discredit that was due only to the barbarous x religious fanaticism which they seemed to rouse and exasperate: x interpretation that was put on them.

An elaborate work on "Salem Witchcraft", by Charles W. Upham of Salem, Mass., has been recently published. His conclusion is that the wonderful phenomena, so strongly attested by grave and intelligent citizens, may be referred to the category of tricks and delusions. All the evidence adduced, establishing in the minds of judges, juries, clergymen, and magistrates the genuineness of the manifestations, is dismissed by this author as grossly and contemptibly false, the product of malice or of an excited fancy.

Children through whose mediumship some of the most remarkable and inexplicable occurrences took place are set down simply as impostors who had "by long practice become wonderful adepts in the art of jugglery and probably of ventriloquism".

And yet at the very time Mr. Upham was preparing his volumes for the press there lived in his own city of Salem a well-known and somewhat celebrated person, Mr. Charles Foster, in whose presence and through whose mediumship all the most astonishing phenomena which Mr. Upham ignores or discredits were daily reproduced. Many thousands of intelligent persons both in America and Europe —

Placed on this little isthmus of time between two eternities, and in the centre of that infinite space whose centre is everywhere, and circumference nowhere, can it be that man has no relations other than those of unsentient matter to the rest of the Universe? Can it be that conscious intelligence is necessarily limited to frail, perishing creatures of a day, finite, fallible and ignorant, shut up in these prisons of flesh, subject to diseases and accidents without number, and occupying planets similar to our own?

Shall we make our own minds and conditions
x the measure of those of this infinite universe?

Planchette
The Despair Of Science
With
An Account Of The Phenomena
(Called Spiritual)
Of the last Twenty Years;
A Review of the Present State of the Question, &c.

My own dim life should teach me this,
That life shall live for evermore;
Else earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is. Tennyson.

Boston;

V. L'Ame. demonstration de sa realité. Par M. Ramon de la Sagra. Paris: Germer-Baillière.

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Whether an indivisible eternal monad, or whether an emanation (in time) from the eternal substance of the great Causal Energy, the soul or fundamental substance of man must have been equally pre-existent and eternal in the enlarged sense.

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The one necessary, essential Being, was it, or is it, rather, intelligent force, or unintelligent matter, or a union of both as in D'Holbach man? . . . D'Holbach says: "Matter has existed from all eternity; its forms alone are evanescent. . That wh. exists supposes existence essential to its being. That wh. cannot annihilate itself, exists necessarily; it is impossible to conceive that that wh. cannot cease to exist, or that wh. cannot annihilate itself, could ever have had a beginning. If matter cannot be annihilated, it could not commence to be." "Thus it is matter, it is nature, of which no particle is ever in an absolute state of rest, wh. has always existed."

Clarke (Samuel) says: "There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable & independent being". D'Holbach replies: "This being then must, himself be subjected to necessity. Nature is not more to be accused of mutability on account of the succession of its forms, than the eternal being is by the theologians, by the diversity of his decrees."

D'Holbach asks: "Why should not matter wh. is [self existent] indestructible be self-existent? Those who make matter coeternal with God do no more than multiply beings without necessity." (See Ashburner.)

"In short, we must conclude, that every thing related of the Divinity, either proves him material, or else proves the impossibility in which the human mind will always find itself, of conceiving any being different from matter; without extent, yet omnipresent; immaterial, yet acting upon matter; spiritual, yet producing matter; immutable, yet putting everything in activity," &c.

Clarke says: "The self-existent being must be necessarily eternal." D'Holbach replies: "Why shd. not this be matter? The human mind has no means of conceiving how matter should originate from that wh. is not itself matter."

Clarke: "The self-existent being must be of necessity infinite & omnipresent." .. D'Holbach: .. in this sense (unlimited) we may call him infinite. .. To penetrate matter, it is necessary to have some correspondence with matter, consequently to have extent." (See Ashburner.) "Now to have extent is to have one of the properties of matter.

Clarke: "The self-existent and original cause of all things, must be an intelligent being." D. Holb. "But has the great whole a peculiar intelligence wh. moves it, which makes it act, wh. determines it in the mode that intelligence moves & determines animated bodies; or rather is not this intelligence the consequence of immutable laws, a certain modification resulting from certain combinations of matter, wh. exists under one form of these combinations, but is wanting under another form? This is assuredly what nothing is competent to prove. . . .

"Man denies this quality to matter (nature) because he considers her a mass of ignoble matter, incapable of self-action, although she contains and produces intelligent beings."

"It is in the earth that is engendered those living animals called worms; yet we do not say the earth is a living creature.? (Oken says it is.)

"God who has made the eye, shall he not see, &c.. Should we not say with equal foundation, that the God who has made matter is himself matter; that the God who has fashioned the body [is himself] must possess a body; (So he may – and something else); that the God who has made so many irrational beings, is irrational himself – (irrationality is deprivation, negation); that the God who has created man who sins, is liable himself to sin?" &c. &c. D'Holbach P. 215.

"If God has infinite power, man ought not to have the power of doing evil." Perhaps, and perhaps not, Mons. D'Holbach. "If man is free to sin, God himself is not a free agent."

D'Holbach: "The idea of *perfection* is an abstract, metaphysical, negative idea, which has no archetype or model, exterior to ourselves" But why not, Mons. D'H.? I have a little knowledge – can I not conceive of One whose knowledge is infinite and infallible. I love a little, can I not conceive of One, whose love is all-embracing? I do good a little, can I not conceive of one whose goodness is all-embracing and universal? I am a little provident, can I not conceive of a universal Providence? But you say, "It is always relatively to ourselves, and to our mode of feeling, and of thinking, and not in itself, that a thing is perfect or imperfect. . . Is God perfectly good relatively to men?" &c. That remains to be seen, M. d'H.! *Perhaps* he is.

"What is this but a pure spirit who creates and who moves matter?" But we know, that spirits can move matter. See Ashburner's will-theory. "Spirituality is a mere negation of corporeity." .. Clarke asks: "*Can we assert that whatever is not matter is nothing?*" D'Holbach: "Constituted as we are, that of wh. we have no ideas has no existence with relation to us. Thus, there is no absurdity in maintaining that all wh. is not matter is nothing." D'Holbach is weak here, and gets into a pet about it. See p. 223.

"Dr. Clarke founds the existence of God upon the necessity of a power that may have the ability to begin motion. But if matter has always existed, it has always had motion, wh. is as essential to it as its extent, and flows from its primitive properties. ib.

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Theology has only personified the principle of mobility inherent in matter; in giving to this principle human qualities it has only lent its intelligence, thought – perfections wh. can in no wise be suitable to it. D'H.

These human qualities are modes of being, or modes wh. only belong to particular beings & not to the whole wh. contains them. D'H.

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Clarke says (& to this, D'Holbach's reply is very unsatisfactory. (p. 223): Are our five senses, by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing, all and the only possible ways of perception? And is it impossible and contradictory there should be any being in the universe endued with ways of perception different from those wh. are the result of our present composition? Or, are these things on the contrary purely arbitrary; and the same power that gave us these may have given others to other beings, and might, if he had pleased, have given to us others in this present state?"

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Descartes says: "God cannot be said to have extent but as we say of fire contained in a piece of iron, which has not properly speaking any other extension than that of the iron itself." D'H. truly remarks on this, that it is pure

Spinozism: indeed it was from Descartes that Spinoza drew his system.

X Hobbes says: "As the universe is every thing that wh. does not make a part of it is nothing, and can be no part."

This God wh. I strive to distinguish from Nature or to place out of its bosom will always return into it necessarily and in despite of me. D'Holb.

For want of being acquainted with the power of Nature we ascribe the honor of her work to a being of whom we have much less knowledge than of her. ib.

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E. S. God is the one necessary, infinite, eternal and immutable Being. God is substance, and [the universe is his sphere.] God is Creative Power, and all the bodies in the universe are the creations of his will. His will is the force from which all other forces proceed. His life sustains the life of the universe even as the Sun does the planets of our system.

God is at once Substance and Cause, at the summit of being and at its humblest degree, infinite and finite, at once God, nature and humanity (See Cousin - 1. 113.)

If God is not in every thing, he is in nothing. God is the supreme personality - indeed the only real personality - since he alone is absolute and independent and underived. (ib)

God is free; for among other proofs it would be absurd that there should be less freedom in the first Cause than in one of its effects, humanity. ib.

But between justice and injustice, good and evil, reason and its contrary, God cannot deliberate, and, consequently, cannot will after our manner. ib.

God creates by virtue of his creative power: he draws the world not from nothing, which is not, but from himself who is absolute existence. ib.

God is in the universe as the cause is in its effect. God being in the world remains not less entire in his unity and his eternal essence after having produced it. . . The universe is then an imperfect reflection but a reflection of the divine essence. ib.

God is not absolutely incomprehensible for the manifest reason that being the cause of this universe he passes into it, and is reflected in it as the cause in the effect. . . . The heavens declare his glory; and the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. . . His power is recognised in the bodies of the universe; his intelligence in their harmonious laws; and finally that which there is in him most august in the sentiments of virtue, of holiness and of love which the heart of man contains. But beyond the universe and beyond man, there remains of God the unknown, the impenetrable, the incomprehensible. God is therefore to us incomprehensible, but of this + incomprehensibility we have some idea. Reason explains not the inexplicable: it conceives it. ib.

Mingled with everything, and yet separated from every thing, manifesting himself in universal life, and yet [manifesting only a faint shadow of his glory,] communicating himself without cessation, and yet remaining incommunicable, he is at once the living God and the God concealed. V. Cousin

It is the consciousness of ourselves as beings, and at the same time limited beings, which raises us immediately to the conception of a being, who is the principle of our being, and who is himself without limits.

If the being which we possess forces us to recur to a Cause which possesses this same being to an infinite degree, whatever we shall possess of being, that is, of substantial attributes, will equally claim an infinite cause.

Hence God will no longer be simply the infinite, abstract, and indeterminate being which reason and the heart cannot lay hold of; he will be a real and determinate being [which reason and] like ourselves, a moral personality like ours; . . . one with whom we can sustain a real relation, whom we can comprehend and feel, and who, in his turn, can comprehend and feel our efforts, our sufferings, our virtues, our miseries, because, after all, that God is in ourselves, in our cause and in our eternal substance; made in his image, guided even to him by a ray of his being, there is between him and us a living and a sacred tie. V. Cousin.

All germs are pre-existent. The germ-Soul precedes the body, and the latter becomes only gradually subjected to the efforts of the former; on this account even instinct awakes before it is fully furnished with the means of expressing itself. (G. H. Schubert) except 2 first lines.

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The inner Spiritual power with its impulses toward intelligent understanding and activity comes not from the perishable body and the arrangement of its parts, but belongs to the spirit and is one with its essence. . . . For this reason it exists, and the impulses dwelling therein manifest themselves, even when the condition of the body is unfavorable to its activity, and in a high degree obstructive; and we may thereby see that the spirit will continue when the body is no more, even as it is active before the body exists. (Refers to Laura Bridgman's case.) ib.

* * *

As in the material world, at the right time a hunger finds its food, and every awakened want its supply, So it is in the Spiritual world. The sound and honest impulse toward Knowledge is under the care of the same Providence that directs the force of animal instinct to its goal. ib.

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Were there not a sort of fountain of light in our seeing nerve we could see no light; were not the thinking spirit itself of an eternal and divine nature it could know & apprehend nothing of God & eternity. ib.

E.S. In the Godhead co-exist two eternal principles, positive and negative, masculine and feminine, mind and matter, God and the universe.

From the union of these has been eternally going on a procession of animated worlds with their evolutions of organic forms from lower conditions.

Nature is not God, and God is not Nature, and yet the two are eternally related and inseparable, and from this union comes an overflow of life into all possibilities, or possible recipients of life.

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May not ~~he~~ man be a Duality in the sense that the wingless larva is a Duality? The latter changes into a winged insect.

(J. J. Murphy, p. 287 of "Scientific Bases of Faith", remarks: "The analogy of the wingless larva changing into a winged insect, tends to make it, not perhaps more credible, but certainly more imaginable, that we are larvæ; – that as some insects never acquire wings but remain all their lives without any metamorphosis, while others acquire wings at their last metamorphosis, so no animal acquires an immortal nature except man alone. It is an obvious objection to this, that the analogy, if it has any relevancy at all, tells not for but against immortality: for a Resurrection is nothing if it is not the entrance to immortal life: & the plant wh. develops out of the seed, and the butterfly into wh. the larva is transformed, are neither of them immortal; on the contrary the plant gives birth to new seeds, the winged insect gives birth to new larvae, and both die. This is true and it deprives the analogy of any value as evidence. But the analogy is notwithstanding a much better and closer one than those were aware of who first saw it. They no doubt believed, as the greater part of mankind still believe, the process of birth, reproduction, and death, goes on in an unending circle: but we have seen convincing reasons for believing that it is not so: that there is organic evolution and progress, so that every living being does not always produce seed or young after its kind, but all forms of life have ultimately sprung from simple germs, and winged orders of insects are descended from wingless ones. . Note. All winged insects acquire their wings by metamorphosis, though some undergo more metamorphosis than others: – no insect leaves the egg with wings. . . Thus the theory of evolution makes the analogy better than it formerly appeared).

To these objections by Murphy it may be replied, that all that is desirable is to carry the analogy so far as to indicate the possibility of an evolution of one state from another – of a duality resident in unity of substance or matter. That the butterfly is mortal does not affect the argument thus limited. According to Murphy: "Psychology gives no ground for the belief in a distinct mental substance, but shows mind as a concomitant of nervous action; that it is impossible to draw any line of separation between the mental and the bodily functions; while dynamical physics have shown that force, or energy, is as real and indestructible as matter, and that matter is capable of being understood only as a function of force; thus suggesting a spiritual conception of the universe of matter."

Modern science tends to confirm the following view: Given the idea of a self-existent, all-perfect One, ~~and~~ intelligent and conscious, and the universe of mind and matter, as proceeding from Him, is conceivable: For— Science tends to show that all the phenomena of matter may proceed from motion — nay, that matter itself may be condensed or compacted motion — that motion, in its last analysis, may proceed simply from the will-power or energy, or force of the One. Thus the objection of a creation out of nothing may be met — thus Theism and Pantheism may be reconciled.

"Mind," says Murphy, "is not a distinct substance from matter or body; it is a concomitant of nervous action. That which attracts is the magnetized iron; that which thinks is the vitalized brain." Now grant all this to the fullest extent. But may there not be one form or principle of matter giving birth to the outward Corporeality; and another form, or grade, or principle of matter, fixing the Spiritual organism, tethered as it were to the mortal, and released at death? Is there anything in this view contrary to a scientific notion of unity of substance, and thus meeting the Pantheistic craving for unity?

The sensible indicator of heat in the candle is the flame. "If we put out a candle," says Geo. Thomson, "remove the sensible indicator of heat in it, the flame, does the heat cease to exist in the candle? So, in like manner does a Spiritual existence require a sensible medium to indicate its existence to us; it requires to be brought in contact with an animal before it can manifest and develop its existence to us; but when the sensible indicator of its existence, the animal, has been removed, does this prove that it ceases to exist? Then we have no cause to wonder that we cannot know of the existence of a Spirit when the animal is dissolved that indicated its existence.

"The heat does not cease to exist in the candle when the flame is put out; the spirit does not cease to exist when the animal is said to die."

A duality of manifestation need not imply a duality of substance. Grant to the most extreme materialism all that it claims; that it is the brain that secretes thought as the liver does bile, &c., still as behind body there is life; and behind mind there is consciousness, so behind the outward form there may be an inner form, none the less real because invisible to our material sense; and to this inner form the eternal Ego may retreat, and in it find its instrument and its home, when the physical is dissolved.

From the male parent (as Swedenborg tells us) comes the germ which is to form the material body; the divine influx gives it life.

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Spirit, soul is the one primary, unchangeable substance, the stuff of things. All matter and all force are from spirit. God is the one, the substance, the primal and eternal reality, the Spirit, and the only source of spirit. Matter being a resultant of force, and all force a resultant of motion or of an impulse of the divine will, what is spirit, soul as manifested in man? Is it a substance, and not, like matter a mere phenomenon, or like force, mere motion? Is mind, consciousness, merely a form of force like electricity? Nay, spirit, soul, mind, consciousness, the Ego, without which the Universe would be a meaningless show, is the one thing divine, real, permanent. Whether it comes up to development in man by evolution from lower organisms, (until in the form of man there is & a fitting receptacle for it) or whether it is an endowment imparted by God, it is not a mere phenomenon, it is the root of being of an immortal, conscious personality. According to Pantheism it is God. According to Theism it is a creation by God. But is it a creation in the sense in which matter is a creation? Is it one with matter? Nay, matter is merely phenomenal. The soul is not a mere force that to-day may be mind and tomorrow heat. Matter is a mere resultant of motion from will, and subject to flux and reflux, dissolution and transformation. Soul, the substratum of being, the ground of mind, of form, of consciousness, must be subject to other laws than matter.

Can it be a spiritual substance distinct from God? Well, if God be in us, and we in God, how shall the question be answered? "Flat Pantheism" again! Reason which ever way, from whatever direction we may, do not all roads seem to converge towards that?

But is there then dualism? Are matter and mind distinct entities? Nay, the only entity is mind. Matter is a phenomenon of mind. There is therefore unity. Mind is the reality, the substantial, the enduring, the Self-existent. Matter is the dependent, the relative, the changing. The spiritual is ever seeking a recipient, a fitting form. Mind clothes itself with matter, manifests itself through matter, is one (through) with matter, and yet is d in a sense separate and distinct, since matter is change, and mind (spirit) is substantial and enduring.

The Evangel of Facts. Th.

Proposition I. There is a faculty in man, transcending his normal consciousness, and developed in certain states and under certain conditions, and by it he shows his ability to attain to supersensual knowledge and to manifest phenomena not explicable by the agency of any law or force which general science has yet acknowledged.

Demonstration.

The faculty referred to is exhibited in certain states of somnambulism, whether spontaneous or induced by the extraneous influence known as mesmeric; in certain states of trance or ecstasy, and sometimes in states hardly distin-
~~In these States the patient has~~
guishable from the ordinary and normal.

Persons thus gifted or impressible have been called by the various names of somnambules, clairvoyants, sensitives, psychics, and mediums. The most common and easily tested of the supersensual phenomena which they manifest is that of thought-reading, ~~and~~ of reading written or printed
"perceiving the contents of a closed letter, or a sealed packet or box!"
matter without the instrumentality of the eyes; reading in utter darkness, or reading from pellets so closely folded or rolled that the possibility of distinguishing any marks upon them is wholly excluded.

Other phenomena exhibited by this class are those of the prevision of death, disease, and other occurrences; the exaltation of the mental faculties so that persons of very ordinary education show an astonishing knowledge on subjects with which in their normal state they are but slightly acquainted;

such an exaltation of the sensitive capacities of sight, hearing, and feeling, as points to a finer organ of the mind than those which the scalpel can disclose.

As this transcendent faculty is developed by many persons in certain states, and under certain conditions, it may be fairly assumed that it is inherent, though undeveloped, in the nature of all. Thus it differs from the "Ecstasy" of Plotinus, which was not supposed to be a faculty common to all men; and it differs from the "Intellectual Intuition" of Schelling, which was held as the endowment of only a few of the privileged. (Yet they may have meant the same thing.)

The elevation or "ecstasy" of Plotinus was not effected by thought, but by a higher faculty. See Ueberweg, vol. 1. p. 250.

The faculty does not seem to be the result of any superior mental or moral ~~development~~ endowment. It is often powerful in persons of very ordinary mental acquirements and deficient in the moral sense; though it is not unfrequently exercised by persons estimable both morally and intellectually.

(The evidence of the supersensual character of this faculty and of its near approach to what we understand by spiritual powers will be found in the subjoined facts and observations.)

The facts of double consciousness and of ~~a~~ "unconscious cerebration" are in place here. Somnambulism shows that there may be a state of consciousness distinct from the ordinary or normal; by which is meant that the individual may, in his somnambulic state, know a variety of things, of which he is wholly unaware when out of this state. He may entertain opinions quite at variance with those he may ordinarily hold. He may deplore moral defects in himself, which he does not recognize as such when he is awake.

(Those who would explain all clairvoyance by thought-reading would account for an apparently inexplicable phenomenon by one still more incomprehensible. Gregory, p. 188. Yet both the phenomena are true.)

Although in most cases somnambulism would seem to be an elevation of all the faculties, percipient, moral and mental, yet there are instances in which only a portion of the faculties would seem to be illumined; instances in which the lower faculties only would seem to be active; instances in which a person who would have shrunk from a theft, or other immoral act in his waking state has committed it in a somnambulic. Such exceptions are no violation of the general fact, but are explicable in various ways. The somnambulism being partial, the subject may be in a state of defect or sleep in reference to his moral nature; or he may be under the influence of spirits external.

The facts which the phe

The facts established by the phenomena of Mesmerism or Animal Magnetism, and which contribute to the demonstration of Proposition I, are: First, that one individual may exercise a certain influence on another, even at a distance; Secondly, that one individual may acquire a control over the motions, sensations, memory, emotions, and volition of another; Thirdly, that the magnetic sleep (somnambulism induced by mesmerism) is a very peculiar state, often with a distinct and separate consciousness; Fourthly, that in this state, the subject often possesses a new power of perception, the nature of which is unknown, but by means of which he can see objects or persons, near or distant, without the use of the external organs of vision; Fifthly, that he often possesses a high degree of sympathy with others, so as to be able to read their thoughts; Sixthly, that by these powers of Clairvoyance and sympathy, he can sometimes perceive and describe, not only present, but past, and even future events; Seventhly, that he can often perceive and describe the bodily state of himself or others; Eighthly, that he may fall into trance and extasis, the occurrence and duration of which he often predicts accurately; Ninthly, that every one of these phenomena has occurred, and frequently occurs, spontaneously, — Somnambulism, Clairvoyance, Sympathy, Trance, Extasis, Prevision, and Insensibility to pain, having often been recorded as natural occurrences. (Tenthly, that not only the human body - see Gregory, p. 384).

Many of the phenomena of mysticism are explicable only under the admission of Proposition I. These phenomena include

Somnambulism proves that memory may be suspended without being impaired, and that the identity of the individual is not affected by such suspension.

Proposition II.

There are sufficient reasons for concluding that the higher faculty, proofs of the existence of which have been given, inheres in ~~a~~ an indestructible monad or substratum of being which remains after the dissolution of the visible, physical or material parts of terrestrial man, and which is the informing principle of a new organism for the individual's use.

Proposition III.

The powers claimed for man in Propositions I and II are supra-sensual and spiritual; and are proofs that what is called his death is merely phenomenal, and that the substantial man will carry his best faculties, his individuality, his memory and his affections into the next stage of being.
See X below

Proposition IV.

The belief in spirits is common to all tribes of men; and the well-attested phenomena of all ages as well as of the present time indicate that spirits do really exist and manifest themselves, and that man, after the dissolution of the body through which he has manifested himself in this world, has a continuation of life in a spiritual body.

Add to Prop. III.

But by the word spiritual we do not here mean merely the negative of

"Give me a great thought!" was the ~~adjuration of~~ exclamation of a great man in his dying moments.

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The supreme thought of man when he meditates on ~~realizes~~ ~~confronts~~ the brevity and uncertainty of his mortal life, must ever be, "Will death be the end of my conscious individuality? Is this visible, ~~body,~~ tangible, corruptible body the all of me which will remain?"

The question will be variously met according to the moods or the idiosyncrasies of the individual. Under the pressure of a great bereavement, if ~~he be~~ his emotional faculties are strong, reunion with the beloved object will be such a necessity of his nature that to doubt it will seem almost like a profanation.

"Sorrow takes us deep down to the divine root of our common humanity; and the mourner will feel that our highest moods are not mere delusions sent to mock us with unreality. Rather are they glimpses of the sublimest truth." Tayler

X "I want no argument now," says the mourner to whom the hope of another and a higher life has become a spiritual necessity.

Still the very earnestness of our hopes in reference to a future life may sometimes awaken the doubt whether they are destined to be realized; and then comes the craving for assurances more real and stable than speculation can offer, or any mere processes of unaided thinking can supply. A great fact, or a great analogy, is needed.

There is a class of minds that look slightingly on this craving for facts; that would disparage those confirmations of immortality supplied by phenomena indicative of powers transcending the senses or suggestive of an active intelligence outside of the visible body.

We are prone to undervalue what we do not believe in. It is not a matter of surprise, therefore, to find a writer who makes light of those evidences "which infer a future life for all men from traditions of a single miraculous resurrection"; attempting, in the same breath, to belittle the evidences supplied by the phenomena of clairvoyance, seership and mediumship. (See Johnson's Oriental Religions).

Undoubtedly there are minds that rest in satisfactory convictions on the subject of a future life, which are independent~~ly~~ of tradition, of revelation, and of psychological facts. Let all such persons felicitate themselves on being so happily constituted that they can dispense with facts and authorities; but let them not pronounce as "crude and imperfect" the evidences that are required by a different class of minds.

To gain our assurances of immortal life, we are told, by these repudiators of facts and traditions, to "live in the Whole", to "discern the soul as real being", to "know one's self as one with necessary life"—all which may be an easy matter to metaphysicians of a certain school, but which, to many minds, is like pointing to a fog-bank and telling them to see there a revelation of the eternal world.

"I have been long convinced", says Garth Wilkinson, "by the experience of my life as a pioneer in several heterodoxies which are rapidly becoming orthodoxies, that

"The terms Spirit and Soul have only a negative meaning; they just imply non-corporeity (or non-materiality?) and no more than that. Fichte. See p. 112 R. I. A.

Voltaire says: "Je n'entends pas comment on se représente une substance immatérielle." See Chaseray p. 41.

Thus spirit is not substance, but it is the law of substance; not force, but the revealer of force; not life, but it makes life exist; not thought, but the consciousness of thought; not reality, yet in it and by it realities are defined and differentiated, and consequently exist. Papillon. See Pop. Science Monthly, Sept. 1873. Instead of saying that Spirit is a property of Matter, we should say that Matter is a property of Spirit. Plotinus says the soul is not in the body; but the body in the soul.

Il se peut qu'il y ait en nous une monade indestructible qui sente et pense. Voltaire. See Chaseray p. 39. "La raison est d'accord avec la révélation pour nous apprendre que cette âme est immortelle. Voltaire.

Mr. Gratiolet a écrit: "Le système qui satisfait le plus le sens commun est celui qui admet l'individualité des âmes et leur existence indépendamment d'un certain corps."

Ne procèderions nous pas plus sûrement en distinguant dans la nature ce qu'il nous est possible de percevoir par les sens de ce qui leur échappe? Qui nous donne le droit d'admettre que les limites de la nature ne dépassent pas celles de nos organes?
Schroeder van der Kolk. Chaseray p. 68.

Renan says: "L'homme religieux est celui qui sait trouver en tout le divin, non celui qui propose sur la divinité quelque aride et inintelligible formule." ib. 71.

Il n'appartient qu'à des natures d'élite de vivre honnêtement et de pratiquer le bien avec la conviction qu'on marche vers le néant. Quant à moi je ne me sens pas capable d'une pareille vertu. Chaseray p. 70

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There is a universal breath from Deity pervading all things. In the vegetable and animal world it flows into fitting receptacles, and produces life and intelligence according to the nature of the recipient forms. In the human embryo it is the substratum of being, the peculiar characteristics and individuation, however, being produced by form.

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Nearly all truth is temperamental to us, or given in the affections and intuitions, and that discussion and inquiry do little more than feed temperament." There is profound truth in this for those who believe in "affections and intuitions"; but for those who ~~do~~ have them not, there is nothing that will meet their want but facts.

And even facts are rejected or received, to a great extent, according to the temperament of the individual. ~~And then~~ It is not till the facts become wholly irrestible that they are admitted into the uncongenial mind; and perhaps even ~~then they are~~ ~~when~~ ~~admitted~~ then their real significance may not ~~be felt at first~~ be felt till in some supreme moment the light begins to dawn, and belief is reluctantly born.

How long it was before the Copernican doctrine of the earth's sphericity and rotation could get admission into minds to which it seemed like blasphemy to contradict Aristotle and Ptolemy. Bruno, who was not a man of scientific method, espoused the Copernican theory from his temperamental bias, and because it harmonized with his Pantheistic notions. For this and other heresies he was burnt at the stake.

The facts of mesmerism have now been before the world for a century and more. The cognate facts of clairvoyance, mental exaltation, witchcraft, and somnambulism have been common throughout all time of which we have any record. The astonishing phenomena of "Modern Spiritualism" have been ~~befor common~~ known for a quarter of a century; and though the recipients are many they are not so numerous as the ~~magnitude of the~~ facts ~~would seem~~ are great, significant, and momentous.

But if the detection of truth is a question of temperament, where ~~shall~~ and how shall we seek the truth? Plainly by the induction of facts and by experimental inquiries, carefully conducted and aiming at the inward certainties ~~truth~~ of nature, independently of all preconceptions, biases and *a priori* ~~assurances~~ opinions.

"Facts," says Bacon, "often appear incredible only because we are ill-informed, and cease to appear marvellous when our knowledge is further extended. ... Man, the minister and interpreter of Nature, can act and understand in as far as he has, either in fact or in thought, observed the order of Nature; more he can neither know nor do."

It is by the observation of facts that we may arrive at the grand induction that man still lives ~~after~~ a man after the dissolution of the terrestrial body; that our exterior senses are not the measure of the ~~facts~~ potencies and the resources of Nature; and that ~~great~~ ~~p~~ invisibility is the most insufficient of all proofs of non-existence.

[Opposed to these conclusions there is a formidable array.]

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As the last quarter of the nineteenth century drew near it was apparent to all reflecting persons that a great change in the religious thought of Christendom was going on.

Not only had men learnt to look upon the differences between various creeds and sects as trivial ~~and~~ or merely verbal, but science in its advances had shaken the very foundations of all religious belief.

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God's world is infinite – therefore there must be a place and a mode for my continuance as an individual if I crave it. E. S.

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The basis of matter and ~~of~~ the basis of spirit being alike divine, why all this dispute as to whether man is a duality or a unity? See Huxley's remark p. ...

Ponton.

Life

Mungo Ponton F. R. S. E. (author of The Beginning Its When & Its How, London, Longman 1870) writes;
"Our consciousness informs us that our life exists in a *somewhat* distinct from the material ultimates composing our organism. These ultimates are always changing – one set continually entering the system, and another continually departing from it; so that the human frame does not consist of the same individual ultimates for two consecutive minutes of time. Even the entire organism undergoes great changes, particularly during the periods of growth and decay. Yet we never cease to be conscious of the persistence of our individuality; and memory helps to confirm this conviction. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the property of life, as it exists in man, is possessed by a *somewhat* altogether distinct from the matter composing his organism, and essentially different from it in nature. Physiology informs us that to this living *somewhat* are to be traced all the phenomena exhibited by the organism; for it is only during its presence that the phenomena are observed, or that the organism itself continues to exist. The moment the living *somewhat* departs, the organism begins to be resolved into its constituent elements, in virtue of their chemical affinities. It is thus evident that the living *somewhat* is the organizer of the organism. ... This organizing faculty the organizer receives with its life from the living Creator."

"Descending to the lower animals we must draw the same conclusion with regard to them." p. 302.

... "Even in the case of the human species, it is not uncommon to find offspring resembling some remote male ancestor, such as a great-great-grandfather, more closely than any of the intervening parents. Such resemblances sometimes extend not only to the external organization, but also to mental qualities. It is evident, then, that there is a *somewhat* wh. has been transmitted from the remote male ancestor, and wh. has thus affected the organization of the offspring; and seeing it is impossible to imagine that *somewhat* to be one or more material ultimates, the only supposition wh. can be reasonably entertained, is that of its being an indefinitely extensible and divisible offshoot from the immaterial organizer of the ancestral organism." ib. p. 311.

... "Another striking proof of the influences exerted by the immaterial organizer on the organization of the progeny is furnished by the effects of any strong external impression exciting emotionally the pregnant parent. ..

These organizers cannot be themselves material, seeing they possess properties inconsistent with materiality, namely, penetrability & indefinite extensibility and divisibility. They are also endowed with volition, emotion, instinct, imagination, & memory, reason, consciousness — powers wh. it is idle to attribute to the material ultimates themselves. ... The circumstance that volition is exercised consciously, and organizing power unconsciously is not enough to warrant our regarding these two as being exerted by wholly distinct essences.

"Now as regards the evidence in favor of the existence of the organizer, it is precisely of the same nature as that we have for the existence of the organism itself, or of any material object whatever. In both the evidence is phenomenal.

Ponton.

"Prof. Huxley labors to prove life to be a mere property of matter, like gravitation or magnetism — manifested whenever the four elements carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen combine in such proportions as to form the substance which he calls protoplasm — a glairy material much akin to albumen, wh. he regards as the physical basis of life. . . He strives to establish the non-existence of any other basis of life whatever, save this protoplasm. . . . He tries to prove the same of protoplasm and its movements in plants and animals — any difference which exists being one of degree not of kind. . . . The nucleated corpuscle of protoplasm is the structural unit. He contends for the general uniformity of character in all protoplasm. . . . Protoplasm he regards as matter, and even human thought as nothing but manifestations of chemical changes in our protoplasm.

"But Mr. Huxley endeavors to repel the charge of his being a materialist. . . . The progress of science he holds ever to have been towards the extension of the province of matter and causation, and the banishment of such notions as those of spirit and spontaneity.

He anticipates that it will be proved that thought, knowledge, emotion, and action are all properties of matter and of the purely physical forces, — there being no such thing as soul, spirit, or mind. Yet this is not materialism. Oh no! for matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary basis of different groups of phenomena." (See Locke passim).

He considers it as indifferent whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter, seeing matter may be regarded as a form of thought, or thought as a property of matter. But in the interests of science he prefers the materialistic terminology. ... Mind, matter and force being thus banished from the world of reality ..., there remain nothing whatever but phenomena.. He is not a materialist, but simply a phenomenalist.

"Mr. Huxley evades the real question at issue, namely what is it that constitutes the difference between protoplasm while it is alive, and the same protoplasm when it is dead... How can he know whether life be a mere property of protoplasm or not? ... The two classes of phenomena being so entirely different, is it reasonable to conclude that the unknown bases of both classes must be one and the same?

(The theory of Huxley has been confuted by Dr. James Hutchison Stirling in his essay 'On Protoplasm', and by Dr. Beale in his work 'On Life, Matter & Mind'.)

Stirling argues, with "the most eminent German physiologists & philosophers," for a "non-material somewhat wh. is the antecedent of the organization....

"There can be no such thing as a gradual transition from matter to thought, or from dead matter to that in which life is present, seeing life is in every case antecedent to organization."

... Ponton says: "Nothing, or mere space, being incapable of proving the existence of anything else, the ubiquity of matter is our only proof of the ubiquity of spirit; nor can the presence of spirit be inferred, except from its influence on spirit, or on matter, or on some one or more of the physical forces."

"But this belief" (belief in immortality of the soul) says Mr. M. Ponton (writing in in the interests of the dominant Christian theology); "while reasonable, is not founded on mere reason. All analogy is against it. Indeed, it seems inexplicable how such an idea as that of the immortality of the soul could ever have entered the human mind, except as a conviction wrought in it by the spiritual influence of the Creator. Only on that conviction, strengthened by God's promise, and the testimony to the individual resurrection of his Christ, can we rest our hope that, when our present bodies shall have mouldered into dust, each individual organizer of our species shall be, after a time, re-endowed with formative power, in virtue of which it shall organize a nobler and everlasting human frame". And yet Mr. Ponton is much shocked at what he calls the "materialism" of Mr. Huxley!

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Schopenhauer "A man at rest will argue with you, by way
The Will of pastime (just as he would play at draughts), but let his Will be roused; then appeal to his logical notions, and you will find how much he really cares for them! Tell the theoretical democrat or leveler, when he acts as a tyrant, that his conduct is 'inconsequent.' He will laugh at you. He always was at heart a tyrant; he now can show it, and does so.

egel. "For every form or degree of existence, we may find the motive in that which, apparently, follows. Thus, we may say, matter exists for the sake of life, and life as a manifestation of the mind. But that for the sake of which a phenomenon takes place, must be, in truth, though not in appearance, prior to the phenomenon, and, moreover, it must be the substance and the truth of the phenomenon. This is the Hegelian doctrine of nature, and—whether true or false—it can never lead to Materialism." Outlines of German Literature by Joseph Gostwick and Robt. Harrison. New York: Holt & Williams, 1873. p. 501. . . .

"Hegel concludes his 'Encyclopaedia' by quoting, as expressive of his own doctrine respecting the Absolute, the well-known and sublime passage in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' (XI, 7), ending with the words,—

Τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

The final result is, that in the End is found the True Beginning—God, who is before all things and in whom all things have their being. The Mind, after all research, finds rest nowhere but in the thought of Infinite Power, Wisdom, and Love concentrated in One—

Whose everlasting purposes embrace
All accidents, converting them to good. ib.

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Schelling in his latest teaching (1841-54) asserted a doctrine of Monotheism, as distinct from both Theism and Pantheism. It had been asserted that, instead of the idea of a Supreme Personal Being, Fichte had substituted an immanent moral government of the world, and it was afterwards declared as a perch that Hegel had reduced the same idea to an immanent intellectual process. In opposition to this negative philosophy as he called it, Schelling asserted the *transcendence* of the Divine Mind.

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Schelling "The blindest of all fanatics," says Schelling, "are those whose zeal is purely negative. All that is truly positive occupies the mind and gives satisfaction; but men whose zeal is destructive find a vacancy in their own minds, and, therefore, must seek beyond themselves for objects on which they can employ their powers." p. 378.

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Schopenhauer Johanna Schopenhauer (novelist and mother of Arthur, the philosopher) disliked so much his gloomy theory of human life that she refused to dwell in the same house with him. 'Your lamentations,' said she, 'about this stupid world and the miseries of mankind deprive me of rest at night and give me bad dreams.' Arthur told her that his own books would be read when her novels were forgotten, and the prediction has been fulfilled.

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Leibnitz Leibnitz, in opposition to the doctrine of Spinoza, regarded power, instead of substance, as the basis of all phenomena.

In opposition to Locke's rejection of innate ideas, Leibnitz asserts that the mind has innate ideas, but these are, when viewed apart from experience, *virtual* and not *explicit*. In other words, thoughts contain elements not derived from the senses, but developed by means of sensation.

p. 163

Zeno Zeno argued: "The whole is more than a part; we are capable of wisdom, and are part of the world; therefore the world is wise." See Montaigne p. 279.

* * *

"I know by myself," says St. Bernard, "how incomprehensible God is, seeing I cannot comprehend the parts of my own being."

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There are moral, political, literary, and social persecutors, not to mention others, who long to destroy the happiness of such as differ with them in opinion, and often succeed. Samuel Bailey. Essays &c. p. 294 note.

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Schleiermacher. The justificatory letters of Schleiermacher on the immoral "Lucinde" of Schlegel, 1800, were of a nature to be used, and unfortunately not without ground by Gutzkow in countenancing the "rehabilitation of the flesh" which was then taught by this writer, and in casting reproach upon the sacredness of wedlock. — In his "Discourses on Religion," 1799, which breathe a Spinozistic spirit under the drapery of poetic rhetoric Schleiermacher declares also evil as belonging to, and co-ordinate in, the beauty of the universe. . .

Schleiermacher maintains (in opposition to Kant) that every man is to represent humanity in a *peculiar* manner, and that, accordingly, it is the X very opposite of correct to propose to one's self simply the question, "whether this my maxim is adapted to be exalted into a law for all men."

See Wuttke's "Christia Ethics" p. 362. vol. 1.

I sent my soul through the invisible
Some letter of that after-life to spell
And after many days my soul returned
And said, Behold my*self* am Heaven and Hell.

There was the door to which I found no key
There was the veil thro' which I could not see
Some little talk awhile of Me and Thee
There was — and then no more of Thee and Me.

Rubáiyát (quatrains) of Omar Khayyam, the astronomer-poet of Persia — pub. (in the translation) by Bernard Quaritch, London.

See Boston Daily Adv. Nov. 25. 1873.

Socrates In Plato's Symposium, Socrates surpasses all the others in drinking. In Xenophon, Socrates goes with a friend to a *hetaera*, who is sitting as a model for a painter, and instructs her in the art of enticing men... Of family love he seems to have been destitute. When his wife comes, with her child, into the prison, to take leave of her husband, after his condemnation to death, Socrates simply turns to his friends, and says dryly, "Let some one, I pray you, take the woman away from here to her house." and she is led out by a slave; and in his last long farewell speech to the world Socrates bestows upon wife and children not a single word.

Ethics of Socrates The ethics of Socrates is a coldly rational calculating; it has not, as has Christian ethics, an historical basis and presupposition, but is invented purely *a priori*. Man is by nature thoroughly good (in the system of Soc.) — is, in his freedom, not simply at first as yet undecided, but he has by nature a decided tendency to the good, just as reason has a natural affinity for the truth. Evil is by no means to be explained from mere volition, but only from error. The human understanding can err, and the act resulting from error is the evil; without error there would be no evil, and it is absolutely impossible that man should not also will that which he has recognized as good. It needs, therefore, only that men be brought to a knowledge of the good, and then they will also act virtuously. . . Self-knowledge, the gnothi seauton, is the presupposition of all morality. . . There is, properly speaking, only *one* virtue, and this is wisdom, that is, knowledge; and all other virtues are only different forms of this one virtue.

Dr. Adolf Wuttke's Christian Ethics p. 70.

Plato . . . The recognition of love under *every* form, even under that of unnatural (sexual) vice, is so characteristic of the Greek, that even Plato attempts a philosophical justification thereof, which is far from complimentary to Greek ethics.

In his "Republic," wedlock proper is inadmissible; on the contrary the citizen is obligated to the begetting of children in the interest of the State; in this connection personal love has no validity, but only civic duty.

ib. p. 85.

Maine de Biran.

Maine de Biran

L'idée de cause est un effet de l'imagination, et ne renferme aucune autre relation que celle d'une succession habituelle. La proposition 'Il n'y a pas d'effet sans cause', a la même valeur logique que cette autre proposition: 'Le soleil va d'Orient en Occident.' M. de B.

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L'idée de cause nous vient, dans l'origine, de l'exercise de notre propre action, et se transporte du moi à la nature. Maine de Biran.

Contradiction ici. See above.

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Bacon divise la doctrine de l'âme en trois parties: doctrine de la substance de l'âme, — doctrine de ses facultés, — doctrine de l'usage et de l'objet de ses facultés.

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Le moi est cause: voilà le principe de causalité. M. de Biran

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Ernest Naville's summary of M. de Biran's thoughts in his "l'Essai sur les fondements de la Psychologie".

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See Ueberweg Vol. 2. p. 341

M. de Biran compare l'oeuvre qu'il se propose d'accomplir à l'oeuvre de Lavoisier. En découvrant le principe générateur des acides, L. a transformé la chimie. S'il existe un principe générateur des faits intellectuels, et que ce principe soit méconnu, le reconnaître et le désigner, sera transformer la psychologie. Le problème est donc de découvrir le principe générateur etc. Il doit être un fait, un élément réel et observable. Quel pourrait être ce principe sinon le sujet en soi, toujours présent dans l'acte de la connaissance, élément fixe combiné avec une matière qui varie? Si le sujet est une fois déterminé, l'objet de la connaissance le sera aussi par cela même, il sera, pour ainsi dire, mis à nu, et les combinaisons deviendront observables.

... La conscience est le caractère essentiel et permanent du sujet; si l'on réussit à déterminer sa condition, on aura trouvé par là même le fait qui constitue le sujet lui-même. Or, il est un fait condition de la conscience, de la personnalité, du moi, et par suite de toute connaissance. L'homme peut vivre sans le savoir, comme il arrive dans les cas de sommeil absolu et de défaillance, par exemple; il n'est pour lui-même, il ne se dit moi qu'en raison du sentiment d'une activité intérieure qui lui révèle sa propre existence. Etre, pour lui, c'est agir. Le moi n'a pas de fondement dans un mode quelconque de la sensibilité, comme le pense l'école de Locke; il ne se manifeste que dans l'action. L'action est donc le fait cherché, la condition de la conscience et de la personnalité.

Mais l'acte continu qui fait l'existence humaine n'est pas un acte pur, et la conscience n'est pas le sentiment abstrait d'une force qui ne se connaît que comme force. L'acte fondamental de l'existence humaine est un effort, c'est-à-dire une action indivisiblement liée à une résistance; et le sentiment de la force ne se manifeste que dans le sentiment de cette résistance même. Effort, résistance, les deux termes sont inséparables, puisque l'un des deux étant supprimé, l'autre s'évanouit en même temps.

L'homme donc se sent et se sait double primitivement. Au moyen de ses sens extérieurs, il

Duality of Man

il apprendra qu'il a un corps étendu, figuré, doué de telles qualités sensibles; mais sans avoir vu son corps, sans avoir promené la main sur sa surface, il a la connaissance immédiate et purement interne d'un organisme qui résiste et cède a son effort. Ce sentiment est inséparable de celui de son existence: l'âme et le corps se manifestent à la fois et indivisiblement. Si nul ne peut méconnaître la résistance des muscles dans le fait de la locomotion, une réflexion exercée réussit à rompre le voile de l'habitude et à discerner dans l'acte de la pensée la plus abstraite en apparence, le sentiment immédiat d'un terme organique qui résiste.

Tel est le fait primitif de la connaissance, dualité absolue, irréductible, qui est celle d'une cause agissante et d'un terme résistant, non celle d'une substance et d'un mode.
Le *moi*, en effet, ou la personne constituée pour elle-même, ne doit pas être confondu avec l'âme substance, concept objectif qui peut devenir la base d'une foule d'assertions hypothétiques, précisément parce que c'est un concept objectif et non un fait donné par la conscience.

Les deux termes du fait primitif ne tombent pas sous la loi de la succession et du temps; il n'y a entre eux ni avant, ni après, puisqu'ils sont constitués l'un par l'autre. L'analyse philosophique est insuffisante si elle ne remonte pas jusqu'à cette dualité fondamentale; elle devient abstraite, c'est-à-dire qu'elle s'égare en s'éloignant de la source de toute réalité, dès qu'elle prétend remonter au delà.

… L'idée-mère et véritablement la pierre angulaire de toute la philosophie, c'est l'idée de cause. … Hume l'a compris, et la vivacité de ses attaques contre le principe de causation (causalité) suffirait au besoin pour nous révéler toute l'importance de ce principe. p. 41x. …

Mais l'homme, en effet, n'est constitué dans la réalité de son existence que par la combinaison du sujet avec un élément étranger.

Cet élément étranger au moi, mais partie constitutive de notre être dans sa totalité, est une vie inconsciente par laquelle l'homme se rejoint à la nature, dont la conscience de son activité propre le distingue. Cette vie est celle dont la physiologie étudie les conditions organiques. Elle se compose d'impressions sans conscience et de mouvements de réaction sans conscience aussi, et bien différents des mouvements volontaires. C'est la vie de l'animal, une vie obscure dans laquelle l'être devient véritablement les modifications dont il ne se distingue pas. Là se trouve en quelque sorte la matière brute des phénomènes de l'esprit humain: des affections qui deviendront des sensations agréables ou douloureuses, lorsque la conscience sera présente; des intuitions ou images organiques qui serviront de base aux représentations externes; des mouvements instinctifs dont la volonté pourra s'emparer; des instincts, des appetits aveugles qui seront la source de désirs.

Mais ce ne seront point là les modifications d'un d'un principe se transforment tout en demeurant le même dans son essence. La vie obscure qui résulte du jeu des organes, vivants, ne se transforme pas; elle se réjoint à la conscience, élément d'une autre nature, et qui ne sort en aucune manière du précédent. Au moment où la conscience s'éveille dans le mystère d'un premier effort voulu, la force personnelle trouve une matière préexistante au sein de laquelle elle se développe; elle agit sur cette matière, elle s'en empare, elle n'en procède point.

La vie humaine est double, a dit Böerhave: Homo simplex in vitalitate, duplex in humanitate. Cette parole résume la théorie vraie de l'homme. Deux éléments d'origine distincte et de nature différente, se rencontrent dans la conscience: l'esprit humain, le sujet, principe de toute connaissance, et ces éléments d'une vie obscure qui ne se manifestent que lorsqu'ils sont éclairés d'ailleurs, pareils à l'ombre que la lumière seule rend visible.

Après l'éveil de la conscience, la vie inférieure ne continue pas moins à subsister avec ses lois propres. Quel homme habitué à s'observer, ne sent perpétuellement surgir, au sein de la vie de l'intelligence et de la volonté, cette vie qui est en lui, sans être lui? cette vie, principe de désirs que la raison n'avoue pas, de joies et de tristesses, qui, sans cause extérieure, naissent du jeu spontané des organes; d'images enfin, de fantômes qui se produisent d'eux-mêmes sur le théâtre intérieur.

L'intelligence et la volonté dominent à des degrés divers ces éléments étrangers; mais que l'activité du *moi* soit suspendue, la vie inférieure reprend son empire. La rêverie, l'entrainement de la passion, les songes du sommeil, le délire, la folie representent, à des degrés divers, cette domination de la vie animale et de ses lois sur la force personnelle qui abdique. Ainsi, l'homme ne saurait être expliqué par les transformations d'un élément identique; il présente au contraire le spectacle de la lutte de deux principes opposés, dont les combinaisons variables expliquent seules les états divers qu'on peut observer dans son développement.

En partant de ce point de vue, M. de Biran reconnait dans l'homme des états notablement divers, qu'il réduit à quatre, et auxquels il donne le nom de *systèmes*.

Le système *affectif* est la vie commune à l'homme et à l'animal, l'ensemble des impressions et des mouvements instinctifs qui résultent du jeu de la machine organisée. Cette vie, contemporaine de l'existence, précède l'éveil de la personne consciente. Le *moi* n'étant pas présent aux phénomènes, les phénomènes ne peuvent être observés que du dehors par un spectateur étranger.

(Do not the facts of somnambulism contradict or rather *modify* this assumption? Do they not show that there is a faculty which may observe the play of the organism from a higher plane than that of the normal consciousness? E. S.)

Ils laissent des traces dans l'organisation, mais aucun souvenir. (Somnambulism contradicts this.) . . .

Le *moi* s'éveille avec l'effort, au sein des ténèbres de cette vie primitive, et l'observation intérieure commence. Le simple degré d'effort qui fait l'état de veille sans un déploiement expres d'activité, caractérise le système *sensitif*. Le *moi* est le spectateur des phénomènes; le sentiment de l'identité personnelle apparait; les modes de l'existence connus par le sujet qui les éprouve donnent lieu à la réminiscence. . . .

Le *moi* présent ou absent établit une ligne de démarcation absolue entre le système affectif et le système sensitif. . . .

Les sensations rendues plus distinctes deviennent des perceptions, c'est-à-dire des actes de connaissance auxquels le *moi* concourt par déploiement exprès d'activité: c'est le système *perceptif*. . . .

Le dernier système, le système *réflexif*, est le résultat du plus haut degré de l'effort, par lequel le *moi* s'abstrayant lui-même de tous les éléments adventices, se connait et se contemple dans sa pureté. . . Le sujet s'isole de tout ce qui n'est pas lui. . . . La réflexion enfin donne à l'âme la conscience claire de son pouvoir d'agir, et cette conscience, combinée avec l'idée du temps, rend possible la prédétermination des actes futurs, complément de la liberté morale.

Liberty

Dans l'acte de la reflexion, ce qui apparait à l'état pur, c'est le *moi*. Or, "exister pour le *moi*", c'est sentir son corps. L'erreur des métaphysiciens est de croire que la liaison, ou la relation de l'âme et du corps est le grand mystère de l'humanité. C'est leur séparation réelle ou possible qui est le mystère. Quant à la liaison, elle est donnée immédiatement par le fait de conscience, puisqu' elle constitue le sujet même qui s'apperçoit.

Dans l'ordre *sensitif*, la sensation s'accompagne de la croyance à une cause indéterminée, *non-moi*, qui la produit; mais cette croyance n'est pas une connaissance. Ce n'est que par l'exercice du toucher proprement dit, résultat d'une activité expresse, que le corps étranger se manifeste dans sa nature propre, comme résistance externe à l'effort. Dès lors le corps étranger est connu dans son essence, il devient le support substantiel de tous les modes sensibles, et la science de la nature s'ouvre à l'esprit humain. . . .

Si nous faillissons à notre destinée, si la force consciente, infidèle à sa mission, sommeille dans notre sein, nous redescendons l'échelle de la vie proportionnellement aux degrés de son abdication.

Sleep . . . A ses yeux, le sommeil est le résultat de la suspension momentanée de la volonté, ou puissance d'effort; il peut être complet ou incomplet; il ne saurait être partiel ou général. LXXI. p.

. . (Maine Biran objects to the *âme* *substance* of Descartes; since the *moi*, simply stated in its elements, by the way of interior observation, raises no questions, and favors no hypothesis. Leibnitz, in substituting the idea of *force* for the idea of *Substance*, has drawn nearer to the facts of interior experience, and has made a great advance in Science.)

Mais la force, telle qu'il la conçoit dans l'absolu, n'est pas la cause individuelle, *moi*, qui est le vrai point de départ de toute science réelle. La force de Leibnitz est encore une abstraction réalisée, qui entraine son système loin des voies de l'observation et de la réalité. .. La philosophie *a priori* (Kant) abstrait trop, et dépassant le fait primitif dans son analyse, arrive à s'enlever toute base de fait et tout moyen d'observation. Elle place le possible avant le réel, elle prend son point de départ dans des concepts qui ne sont plus la représentation des faits. .. Elle construit des théories, produit de la logique seule.

.. Si la philosophie *a priori* pèche par excès d'abstraction, la philosophie de l'expérience abstrait trop peu.. Bacon proscrit la reflexion. Locke réduit la science à la classification des idées; Condillac, par ses artifices de langage, ne peut tirer de la sensation que ce qu'il y a mis indûment, comme ces alchimistes sortant de leurs creusets l'or qu'ils y avaient préalablement introduit. ..

L'expérience intérieure est profondement distincte de l'expérience sensible. Le fait premier de la connaissance est d'un ordre suprasensible, ainsi que le proclame la philosophie *a priori* ; mais c'est un fait, ce n'est pas un concept arbitraire, abstrait, et par là même indéterminé. . . La science de l'homme, solidement fondée sur la base de l'expérience interne, est preservée des écueils du matérialisme et du scepticisme . . .

Dans la science intérieure le sujet et l'objet s'identifient . . . La conscience de soi, la manifestation de l'homme à lui-même est un fait *sui generis*, un fait unique. Dans la science intérieure, le sujet et l'objet s'identifient, et c'est le seul cas où il en soit ainsi. L'étude de l'homme étant dans une condition exceptionelle, doit avoir une méthode exceptionelle. Elle s'égare dès les premiers pas, si elle adopte les procédés de l'observation de la nature, comme le demande Bacon, et comme le pratique son école. Elle s'égare pareillement si, recourant à des procédés empruntés aux mathématiques, comme le font Descartes et Leibnitz, elle substitue au sujet *moi*, pour lequel l'être et le connaître sont indivisibles, le concept abstrait d'une substance ou d'une force, concept dont on étudie logiquement le contenu et les conséquences. La voie unique d'une étude réelle de l'homme, c'est l'étude du fait même de la conscience, dans lequel l'homme manifeste sa nature, en dehors de toute analogie avec des connaissances d'un autre ordre.

Humani generis proprium est odisse quem læseris.

Tacitus.

Maine de Biran.

Duality

Avant que l'homme, par le progrés successif de sa pensée, se soit élevé à l'idée d'une substance spirituelle, avant qu'il ait réuni ses observations extérieures pour concevoir l'idée générale du corps solide, étendu, coloré, il se fait force active unie à un terme resistant. Ce fait primitif est au début de toute pensée, puisqu'il est la condition de tout acte intellectuel. Le contester, c'est mettre la pensée en revolte contre son origine même, c'est ruiner le fondement de toute certitude. Ce qui est certain pour l'homme, avant tout et plus que tout, c'est qu'il est double, et que celui des éléments de sa nature avec lequel il s'identifie, agit sur l'autre élément qui cède à l'effort en lui resistant. LXXXII p.

... "La supposition d'un état affectif sans volonté, sans *moi*," écrit-il, "et tout ce que j'en ai déduit, paraitra se réduire, aux yeux de plusieurs, à la valeur d'une pure hypothése." Mais il est des hypothéses nécessaires, et M. de Biran croit que celle-ci est du nombre.

... Entre la pensée et le mécanisme, il y a la vie, et toute théorie qui méconnait la réalité de cet intermédiare est condamnée par cela même. Cette vie qui n'est pas la matière et qui n'est pas l'esprit est mystérieuse sans doute... C'est ce principe intermédiare que Leibnitz a rétabli dans la science, par la théorie. Ici M. de Biran s'appuie de Leibnitz, de Buffon, de Bossuet.

Maine de Biran.

Condillac est plus près de l'idéalisme qu'on ne le sait à l'ordinaire. C'est bien lui qui déclare que: "Soit que nous nous élevions jusque dans les cieux, soit que nous descendions dans les abîmes, nous ne sortons point de nous-mêmes, et ce n'est jamais que notre pensée que nous apercevons."

... L'idée de cause est, par opposition, la base commune des conceptions théistes. ... "La question entre la substance et la cause est celle de la vie et de la mort." Or, M. de Biran est le défenseur et l'apôtre de la causalité.

M. de Biran dit: "Ceux qui n'admettent pas la personnalité de Dieu, ou qui nient que Dieu entende ce qu'il est, sont athées, alors même qu'ils attribuent la plus haute intelligence ou la pensée infinie à Dieu, comme au grand tout."

... La manière dont l'homme se conçoit lui-même détermine la manière dont il conçoit Dieu et l'univers. ... M. de Bonald dit: "L'homme est une intelligence servie par une volonté."

Force & Substance

... "Que reste-t-il d'un sujet quand on en a séparé toutes les qualités ou modifications qui lui sont attribuées et dont il est supposé former le substratum, le lien ou la copule? Car le moi, sujet de toutes les attributions actives, reste seul, tant que l'effort subsiste, et même à vide et sans aucun autre mode; comme la résistance subsiste nue, sans aucune des modifications passagères à qui elle donne une base fixe." M. de Biran. "Voilà les deux idées mères de toutes les notions abstraites de force et de substance". ib.

Maine de Biran:

Substance & Force

"Les idées de substance et de force prises en nous-mêmes, ou conçues en regardant en nous et non en dehors, ont toute la réalité et la vérité du fait de sens intime; mais cette évidence s'altère et s'obscurcit lorsqu'en les déplacant de leur base naturelle, on les transporte aux choses du dehors." M. de B. Idées de substance et de force Part 1. Sect II. Fondements de la Psychologie.

... "L'unité est entière et indivisible dans le moi, qui se reproduit ou s'aperçoit constamment dans l'effort sous la même forme une. Dans le moi seul est l'unité première de la substance, de la cause ou de la force, de l'existence enfin. . . . Otez le moi, il n'y a plus d'unité nulle part.

... "L'identité de la substance est conclue ou déduite de celle du moi, qui est vraiment primitive.

... "Aussi, tant que la même personne reste, nous sommes nécessités même à admettre, dans le point de vue ontologique, que la même substance pensante reste, et la première identité est le seul criterium intérieur que nous puissions avoir pour juger de la seconde ou celle de la substance." p. 280. vol 1.

... "Celui qui renie sa liberté pourrait tout aussi bien renier son existence ... je me sens libre, donc je le suis.

Bonnet on sensitiveness of plants

... "Charles Bonnet incline fortement à penser que la faculté de sentir, ou d'être affecté par des impressions, s'étend à des degrés plus bas que tous ceux que nous imaginons, et que les plantes mêmes ont leur manière de sentir ou de jouir de l'existence.

Barthez (Éléments de la science de l'homme) dit: "Le Zoophyte est composé de deux parties distinctes: l'animale et la végétale, qui ne se confondent point, mais qui sont unies par un rapport intime, non pas de contiguité, mais de correspondance harmonique dans les développements et les fonctions de cet être vivant"

L'union des deux parties ou forces, végétale et animale, dans le polype, représente très-bien soit l'union de la vie animale et de la vie active du moi, soit celle de la deuxième vie de l'homme avec une troisième vie plus haute, qui est toute spirituelle. M. de. B. 3, 517. ... L'homme tient peut-être, en effet, dans l'échelle des esprits, le rang qu'occupe le polype dans celle des êtres sentants. Il est même plus près de l'animal que le polype du végétal.

× "Il n'est pas une partie de notre corps, il n'est pas un de nos organes qui ne puisse s'exercer contre notre volonté ou sans le moi; ils ont chacun leurs passions propres qui les éveillent ou les endorment sans notre congé." Notre expérience (dit M. de Biran) la plus constante et la plus intime peut vérifier à chaque instant cette observation. . . .

Aussi le charme, l'attrait, le dégout ou l'ennui attachés aux divers instants de notre vie dépendent presque toujours de ces dispositions intimes et profondément ignorées de notre sensibilité. Nous portons en nous la source du bien et du mal, et nous bénissons ou accusons les hommes, la nature, le destin propice ou contraire. Eh! n'est-il pas en effet comme le destin, cet agent invisible et mystérieux de la vie qui opère en nous, sans nous, et dont nous subirions toujours les lois, alors même que ce qui est le *fatum* dans le physique deviendrait prévoyance dans le moral? vol. 2. p. 18.

... La puissance du *destin* qui fut un des plus puissants ressorts dramatiques, n'est peut-être que l'expression de ce fait du sens intime qui nous manifeste au fond de notre être une sorte de nécessité organique opposée à la liberté morale. . . .

Il y a donc là deux puissances ou deux forces, l'une complètement aveugle et fatale dans ses déterminations instinctives, l'autre éclairée et prévoyante dans ses actes libres. Chacune d'elle a son propre domaine; elles prédominent ou cèdent tour à tour. . . . Cette sorte de dualité est elle-même un fait du sens intime.

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De Tocqueville Of the idea of unity, M. de Tocqueville says: Non seulement il en vient à ne découvrir dans le monde qu'une création et un créateur, cette première division des choses le gêne encore, et il cherche volontiers à grandir et à simplifier sa pensée en renfermant Dieu et l'univers dans un seul tout. Un pareil système quoi qu'il détruise l'individualité humaine, ou plutôt parcequ'il la détruit, aura des charmes secrets pour les hommes qui vivent dans les democraties; toutes leurs habitudes les préparent à le concevoir et les mettent sur la voie de l'adopter. Il nourrit l'orgueil de leur esprit et flatte leur paresse.

(These remarks are not made with De T's customary sagacity. We have no proof whatever that democracies favor the Pantheistic belief.).

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Ravaisson Or, si l'on remonte à la cause première, à l'infini de la volonté libre, comment comprendre que quelque chose qui serait hors d'elle, qu'un rien, un néant, par conséquent, pût en quoi que ce soit l'empêcher et suspendre un seul instant son action? Il semble donc qu'on ne saurait comprendre l'origine d'une existence inférieure à l'existence absolue, sinon comme le résultat d'une détermination volontaire, par laquelle cette haute existence a d'elle-même modéré, amorti, éteint, pour ainsi dire, quelque chose de sa toute-puissante activité. Felix Ravaisson La Philosophie en France au XIXe siècle. p. 262.

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The love of tyrants, ter-thieves, etc. Vous m'aimez, dites-vous? Mais avant de me témoigner votre amour, épargnez-moi le plus sanglant des outrages; n'oubliez pas que je suis comme vous une âme faite à l'image de Dieu et qui doit lui rendre compte de ses actions et de ses pensées; ne substituez pas votre responsabilité à la mienne, et ne commettez pas sur moi un meurtre moral, aussi coupable que celui qui trancherait ma vie. Ad. Franck. Philosophie et Religion, p. 446.

David Friedrich Strauss.

The most accurate knowledge of the essential soul-organism reveals to us only matter in motion: but between this material movement and my feeling pain or pleasure, experiencing a sweet taste, seeing red, etc., with the conclusion *therefore I exist*, there is a profound gulf; and it remains "utterly and forever inconceivable why to a number of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, &c., it should not be a matter of indifference how they lie, or how they move; nor can we in any wise tell how consciousness should result from their concurrent action." Dubois-Reymond. See Strauss's "The Old Faith & the New" p. xxi.

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We being men … must not therefore conclude that natural works of a like description (to our own) can only have been produced by the corresponding agency of an intelligent Creator. This by no means x follows, and Nature herself proves the fallacy of the assumption that adaptation can only be the work of *conscious* intelligence. Kant already, in regard to this, pointed to the artistic instincts of several animals, and Schopenhauer justly remarks that the instinct of animals generally is the best exposition of the teleology of nature. Just as instinct is an activity apparently displayed in obedience to a conscious aim, and yet acting without any such aim, so is it with the operations of Nature. Strauss. The Old, &c. p. 134.

(Strauss goes on to make light of the argument for the existence of Deity drawn (by Kant) from the moral law: that the absolute stringency with which the moral law manifests itself in our conscience, proves its origin from an absolute Being, &c. ii – the idea of a future life based on God's adjustment of the balance never attained in this life, &c.: of which Strauss says: This prov. is, so to speak, the spare room in wh. God, reduced to passivity in the rest of Kant's system, may still be decently housed and employed. (p. 135, ib.)

... "You attribute personality and consciousness to God," said Fichte, when accused of Atheism, "but what then do you call them? That, no doubt, which you have found in yourselves, and distinguished by that name. But if you will only give the slightest attention to the nature of your conception, you will see that you do not and cannot conceive of this without limitation and finality. By attributing that predicate to this Being you therefore make it finite like yourselves." p. 136 ib.

Hegel From the whole spirit of his (Hegel's) system, another party inferred that all that was intended to be postulated by it was, that Becoming and Development were the essential momenta of the Absolute, and further that thoughts, that the consciousness of the divine in man, were the ideal existence of God opposed to Nature as the real existence. Strauss.

Future life ac. to Strauss ... Man would not perish when he dies, therefore he believes that he shall not perish. This, undoubtedly, is a sorry reason, and that is why it is bedizened in every possible way. ib. Here, above all, the idea of recompense is invoked; we have not only the wish, but in so far as we have been pious and just, the right also, to prolong our existence after death.

The destiny of man, it is argued (and this is Goethe's argument) in favor of immortality, is the development of all his faculties; but this is attained by none in the present life, which, therefore, must be followed by another existence admitting of it. . . . Do we then, on the whole, observe that Nature is contrived to afford full development to every faculty, every germ? See the small apples and pears fallen ere they were yet ripe; know that if the spawn of fish invariably attained full growth, all the rivers and seas would not suffice for them, &c. Experience, therefore, teaches the exact opposite in regard to Nature. It must be proved that Nature makes an exception in regard to man. But here . . we shall be forced to own that most of the old people known to us are complete. . Nay, even of a Goethe, we must concede that in spite of his activity up to the last, in his 82 years he had lived out his life. (Voilà un opinion, M. Strauss!) . . . He who does not inflate himself is well aware of the humble measure of his capacities; and while grateful (grateful to whom, pray, Mons. Strauss?) for the time allowed him for their development, makes no claim for its prolongation beyond the duration of this earthly life; nay, its eternal persistence would fill him with dismay. (How do you know that? Speak for yourself alone, Sir!)

The capacity existent in every human soul, is it infinite and inexhaustible, and only to be completely realized in eternity? Straus p. 149.

Straus's notion of the "completion" of old people is contrary to all the higher facts of human nature — wholly contradicted by the facts of somnambulism, &c.

The argument from immateriality

But the soul is immaterial and simple — exempt, therefore, from dissolution and death. This was the ancient psychology, already exploded by Kant. All those alleged properties of the soul, whence its immortality is deduced, are most arbitrarily attributed to it. . . . The so-called soul cannot exist without the brain, &c. The so-called spiritual functions grow, decay, suffer from cerebral disorders, &c., and the derangement of certain mental functions corresponds to that of certain parts of the brain. But a thing so closely and completely bound to a physical organism can as little exist after the latter's destruction as the centre of a circle after the dissolution of the circumference. . . . How are the souls of the departed to be disposed of, &c.?

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. . . A somewhat crazy but all the more ingenious father of the Church has said: "Naught is immaterial but what is naught."

The Cosmos

. . . The Cosmos is simultaneously both cause and effect, the outward and the inward together. . . The personal image that meets our gaze there is but a reflection of the wondering spectator himself.

! !

. . . At any rate, that on which we feel ourselves entirely dependent, is by no means merely a rude power to which we bow in mute resignation, but is at the same time both order and law, reason and goodness, to which we surrender ourselves in loving trust. . . . Pride and humility, joy and submission intermingle in our feeling for the Cosmos.

But Schopenhauer says, the Cosmos is something wh. had much better not have existed. p. 168.

Strauss.

!! We consider it arrogant and profane on the part of a single individual to oppose himself with such audacious levity to the Cosmos, whence he springs, from which, also, he derives that spark of reason wh. he misuses. p. 167.

(Is Strauss joking here? Is he trying to say funny things in a grave way, like Mark Twain?) . . .

"We demand," he says, "the same piety for our Cosmos that the devout man of old demanded for his God." p. 168.

. . . Kant calls the world "a phœnix, which but consumes itself to rise rejuvenated fr. its ashes."

. . . Metamorphosis of the animal into the man! Strange that not only laymen, but naturalists even, should believe in the incarnation of God, but find the metamorphosis of the animal, the progressive development of monkey to man, incredible! p. 11, vol. 2.

. . . Carl Vogt says that the admission of a special spiritual substance "is a pure hypothesis; that not a single fact points to the existence of such a substance;" and &c. How from an extended, non-thinking thing, such as the human body, impressions can be conveyed to a non-extended, thinking thing, such as the soul is alleged to be; how impulses are re-transmitted from the second to the first; in short, how any communion is possible between them, — this no philosophy has yet explained, and none ever will.

Schop. "It is just as true," says Schopenhauer, "that the percipient is a product of matter as that matter is a mere conception of the percipient, but the proposition is equally one-sided."

"If the eye," says Trendelenburg, "in the course of formation were turned towards the light, we should at first suspect that this precious organ was formed by contact with the luminous ray. We should seek the efficient cause in the force of light. But the eye develops in the obscurity of the womb, in order to correspond, when born, to the light. The same holds good of the other senses. There is a pre-established harmony between the light and the eye, sound and the ear; and this seems to point to a power enveloping the different members, of which the Alpha and Omega is the idea." p. 24. vol. 2.

But Helmholtz remarks—that here "that which can be effected by the labor of countless successions of generations under the influence of the Darwinian law of development, tallies with that which it would be possible for the forethought of the highest wisdom to plan." p. 28. vol. 2.

Strauss thinks Modern Science will by & by make a man.

Let us call to mind the Kantian "Give me matter—I will show you how a world shall be evolved thence"; an undertaking wh., altho' considered possible to carry out in regard to the world of inorganic matter, he said must yet be necessarily wrecked upon a caterpiller. Modern science, altho' it has not as yet achieved this, has yet found the right direction *in wh. it will one day be able to achieve, not merely the* !! × *caterpillar, but even man!*

... Nature *felt* herself already in the animal, but she wished to *know* herself also. p. 58. v. 2.

Schopenhauer "It must be an ill-advised God," says Schopenhauer, in controverting Pantheism, "who should be able to devise no better pastime than to transform himself into so hungry a world as ours, to appear in the form of innumerable millions of living, but at the same time terrified and tormented beings, who can only exist for a space by mutually devouring each other, and enduring measureless and objectless ills of anguish, misery, and death."

Hartmann And thus the author of the Philosophy of the Unconscious (Hartmann): "If God, previous to the creation had been aware what he was doing, creation would have been an inexpiable crime; its existence is only pardonable as the result of blind will; the entire Cosmic process would be an equally unfathomable folly, if its only possible aim — self-development, had existed without it." Maxims, of wh. the first reminds one of Schelling's doctrine of the × creation as being the work of an undeveloped reason in God, the second, of Hegel's remark on the significance of universal history. Strauss. p. 31, 2.

... Strauss's Religion: "Ever remember that thou, and !! everything thou beholdest within and around thee, all that befals thee and others, is no disjointed fragment, no wild chaos of atoms or casualties, but that it all springs, according to eternal laws, from the one primal source of all life, all reason, and all good: this is the essence of religion". p. 55. v. 2.

... No fundamental ingredient is to be found in organic bodies which is not already present in inorganic Nature; that wh. is special to it is the motion of matter.

Strauss.

Strauss's Compensations for taking away belief in God and a future life.

Strauss winds up as follows: "Perhaps the longest dissertation will be expected of me concerning the compensation which our conception of the Universe may offer, in place of the Christian belief in immortality, but a brief remark must suffice here. He who cannot help himself in this matter is beyond help, is not yet ripe for our standpoint. He who, on the one hand, is not satisfied in being able to revive within himself the eternal ideas of the Cosmos, of the progress and the destinies of mankind; who cannot, within his own heart, × render the dead he loved and worshipped immortal in the truest sense; who, amid his exertions on behalf of his family, his labors in his calling, his co-operation with others in promoting the prosperity of his country as well as the general welfare of his fellow-creatures, and lastly, his enjoyment of the beautiful in art and nature — who, amid all this, I say, does not become conscious that he himself is only called to participate in it for a span of time, who cannot prevail upon himself finally to depart this life in gratitude (gratitude to whom, Mons. Strauss?) for all that was given him (by whom?) (with others) for a time to perform, enjoy, and suffer conjointly with others, yet, nevertheless, glad also to be freed from the toil of the long day's work that must at last exhaust, — well, him we must remit to Moses and the prophets who themselves knew nothing of immortality, and yet were Moses and the prophets still."

Strauss. The Old Faith & the New. p. 214. v. 2.

With the exception of the line underscored on the preceding page, Strauss makes no reference whatever to that argument for immortality founded on the affections — on wh. Thomas Buckle lays so much stress.

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Origin of Belief in a Future Life.

Strauss says, p. 141, vol. 1st, — "Man sees all living creatures around him, his fellow-creatures included, succumb to death; he knows that, sooner or later, the same fate awaits him also; how happens it that, for himself and his kind, at least, he does not acknowledge death to be complete annihilation? In the first place, assuredly, because the survivor retains the conception of the deceased. (!) The image of the departed husband or child, of the friend and companion, but of the troublesome enemy as well, continues vividly present with the surviving one, hovers round him in his hours of solitude, and meets him with delusive reality in his dreams. The primitive nature of this belief in immortality corresponds to its origin. As it is but a phantasm of the deceased which hovers round the survivor, and which, even when apparently most tangible, reveals itself as an evanescent delusion as soon as the sleeper awakes from his dreams; so in Homer, Hades is nothing but an assemblage of shades who must quaff the blood of victims ere they can gather strength sufficient for recollection and speech, and who, like the image of a dream, elude the hands of the living outstretched towards them with longing love. In this earliest conception of a future life, the leading features of which are the same in the Old Testament (Not so!), the reality lies entirely on the side of the present life. Man's true self is his body, which after death has been consumed by the flames of the funeral pyre, or has mouldered in the grave, or has been devoured by dogs and birds of prey; the soul which survives it is but an empty phantom. It follows from this the existence after death was so little prized that, as we know, the soul of Achilles would rather have been the most miserable hind than the monarch of the universal dead; and one must needs have been as plagued as Job to wish to be in the world below. p. 141. vol. 1.

Darwinism According to Strauss, Darwin, at least in his early works, supposed the intervention of Deity in the production of the primitive cell – the parent germ of all future generations of animals. Lamarck, however, attributed that primitive cell to spontaneous generation.

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The use of nature is to individualize Man; and the use of the physical man is to individualize the Spirit. A. J. Davis

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Man is a concentration and organization of every thing below him in nature. ib.

Deity is a substance engaged in moving substance. The human Spirit is an organized substance engaged in moving an organized substance – the body. ib.

Somnambulism. Dr. Hufeland says: "Whoever, then, undertakes to govern and direct this mysterious power attempts a very bold and responsible task. Let him consider well that he is probably penetrating, as far as is possible, into the most elevated laws of Nature. Never let him enter this sanctuary without reverential fear, and without the most profound respect for the immortal Principle which he attempts to set in operation." Quoted by A. J. Davis in The Great Harmonia. Vol. 3. p. 241.

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The Soul — Homer on.

Il. xxiii. 103.

'Tis true, 'tis certain; man, though dead, retains
Part of himself; th' immortal mind remains:
The form subsists without the body's aid,
Aërial semblance, and an empty shade! See Ramage, pp. 28, 84.

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- The following is from Lord Derby's translation, vol. 2 p. 345:

— as he slept,
Sudden appeared Patroclus' mournful shade,
His very self; his height, and beauteous eyes,
And voice; the very garb he wont to wear;
Above his head it stood, and thus it spoke: . . .
Thus as he (Achilles) spoke, he spread his longing arms,
But nought he clasped; and with a wailing cry
Vanished, like smoke, the spirit beneath the earth.
Up sprang Achilles, all amazed, and smote
His hands together, and lamenting cried:
"O Heaven, there are then, in the realms below,
Spirits and Spectres, unsubstantial all;

For through the night Patroclus' shade hath stood
Weeping and wailing, at my side, and told
His bidding; the image of himself it seemed.
p. 347.

Euripides.

Permit then that the dead
Be in the earth entombed. Each various part
That constitutes the frame of man, returns
Whence it was taken; to th' etherial sky
The soul, the body to the earth: of all
Nought, save this breathing space of life, our own:
The earth then, wh. sustained it when alive
Ought to receive it dead. See Ramage p. 28

Aeschylus

No; the devouring flames, my son, that waste
The body of the dead, touch not the soul;
That lives, and knows its destined hour to shew
Its wrath: yet for the dead our sorrows rise.
Ramage.

Hesiod.

Aërial spirits, by great Jove designed
To be on earth the guardians of mankind:
Invisible to mortal eyes they go,
And mark our actions, good or bad, below
The immortal spies with watchful care preside,
And thrice ten thousand round their charges glide:
They can reward with glory or with gold,
A power they by Divine permission hold.

Ramage. See p. 151 of "Beautiful Thoughts from Greek Authors." London: Liverpool: 1864.

Somnambulism.

Colquhoun The state of somnambulism is one totally different from that of ordinary life, — a state in which the animal sensibilities undergo an essential change, — a state in which the ordinary activity of the corporeal faculties is suspended for a time, and the internal instinct — the immaterial principle — the very soul itself — displays its unfettered energies, independently of the material organs. Colquhoun's Isis Revelata.

... A German writer, quoted by A. J. Davis, p. 244, v. 3 of Gr. Harmonia, says of the somnambulic phenomena, — "If there be any bridge — any connection — between this and another world — any transition from the temporary life of the soul to the eternal life of the spirit, these phenomena must be capable of giving us some insight into the subject. ... Somnambulism affords us at least, in its already admitted facts, the incontestible proof that higher powers reside in man, which stretch beyond the narrow sphere of this rude sensual existence, and transcend the horizon of the human understanding entangled in its abstractions."

See p. 245, 3d vol. Davis's Gr. Har., an account by Mr. Braid of a somnambule who could accompany any one in the room in singing songs in *any* language, giving both notes and words correctly — a feat she was quite incompetent to perform in the waking condition. Mr. Schwabe played and sang a German song in wh. she accompanied him correctly, giving both notes and words *simultaneously* with Mr. Schwabe. She also accompanied Jenny Lind, in the same way, in many Swedish and Italian songs.

The girl when aroused had no recollection of any thing which had been done by her.

... In almost all cases the external eyes of the somnambulist are either exactly closed, or else open and staring - destitute of expression and sensibility. "From the decisive experiments that were made," says a French physician, "in a great variety of instances, it appears clearly to be made out, that the faculty of sight neither was, nor could possibly have been, exercised through the medium of the usual organs of vision."

All the other senses - hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, &c. - are generally dormant or entirely suspended.

... A. J. Davis says (p. 249 ib) that by the facts of somnambulism the double nature of man is proved to a demonstration.

... See p. 249 Dr. Adam Clarke's account of his sensations in drowning.

... See p. 257 an interesting account by Dr. Gregory, where the fact of vision into another apartment (without the aid of the bodily eyes) is proved unmistakably, to have occurred at the house of Dr. Schmitz, rector of the High School.

... From the universal exhibitions of a system of duality or twofold organization, it is but common sense to infer that the outer organs of vision, like all the other senses, are but the external form of interior correspondential principles, as words are the forms of thought. A. J. Davis p. 259.

Leslie Stephen~~s~~.

Scepticism of the Age. "We all make-believe as hard as we possibly can; we go to church with the most praiseworthy punctuality; we shake our heads at the preacher's lamentations over the progress of rationalism; and some of us go home to lunch and treat the whole history as Socrates treated the polytheism of his time.

"Freethinking & Plain speaking" by Leslie Stephen~~s~~.

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Be a Roman Catholic or you are sure to become an atheist, is simply an argument for atheism. ib.

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If preaching is bad at the present day, it is because it generally resembles an egg-dance, where the performer is afraid of coming into collision at every step with one of the Thirty-nine Articles. ib.

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The commonest advice now administered to the French people is . . . that they should cling to any fragments of belief which remain amongst them, as though dogma acted like a charm even when it rested not upon conviction, but upon a persuasion of its convenience. The way to national salvation, it seems, is not to be found by looking facts in the face and daring to speak the truth, but by invoking the help of ecclesiastical puppets, and trying hard to imagine them to be more than mere rags and wood. ib.

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Darwinism &c. A man of science says (possibly he makes a mistake, but that is not to the purpose), Mix such and such elements under such and such conditions, and a living organism will make its appearance. The theologian sometimes meets this statement as if it were equivalent to an assertion that life is nothing but an arrangement of matter. The man of science has really said nothing of the kind; he does not know what is the essence of life or matter; he has merely to do with the order in wh. phenomena occur, and has absolutely no concern with the occult substratum in wh. they are supposed to inhere. ib. p. 87.

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Materialism, in the proper sense of the word, has died because it is too absurd a doctrine even for philosophers. .. Modern men of science have abandoned it as completely as metaphysicians.

× If human knowledge be merely relative, and we are restrained by the law of our nature from penetrating to the absolute essences of things, it comes to much the same whether we call everything matter or everything spirit; for in each case, we only assert that everything is some unknowable X or Y. ... This Materialism is not a necessary or legitimate consequence of Darwinism. ib. pp. 89, 90.

... To say that intellect is made of phosphates is not so much error as sheer nonsense. If it were discovered that the presence of phosphates in the brain were an essential condition of genius, there would be nothing really more degrading in the discovery than in the familiar fact that the presence of air in the lungs, or food in the stomach, is an essential condition of genius as of life. ib.

Leslie Stephens.

. . . Instead of saying, He that made the eye, shall he not see? we confine ourselves to remarking that the development of eyes is a part of the great process of the adaptation of the organism to its medium. (By an impersonal force?)

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God is not an external ruler, a part of the series of phenomena, but in some mysterious way an all-pervading essence. It is often said, and I believe truly, that if you persist in following the theological argument to its legitimate conclusion, and refuse to blind your eyes by using the word 'mystery' where you ought to say 'nonsense', you cannot stop short of Spinozism, or, in other words, of identifying God with the universe. With such a theism, which may be called the most exalted form of theism, [Pantheism] Darwinism is perfectly compatible. ib. p. 101.

Whether God, so considered, be a fitting object of our love and reverence, or too vague an object to attract human emotion, is undoubtedly a most important question, and it is one to wh. Darwinism has no direct relation. . . .

The doctrine of final causes implies contrivance and therefore a limitation of the divine energy. ib.

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"Nobody thinks," says Voltaire, "of giving an immortal soul to a flea; why should you give one any the more to an elephant, or a monkey, or my Champagne valet, or a village steward, who has a trifle more instinct than my valet?" The difficulty of drawing the line is enhanced to the imagination when we assume that the flea is the remote ancestor of the village steward, and believe that one has melted by imperceptible degrees into the other. ib. p. 102.

... After all, it would not be a very terrible result if we should be driven to the conclusion that some kind of rudimentary soul may be found even in the lower animals. ib.

On Spiritualism.

The persons who call themselves Spiritualists in the present day sometimes claim to be providing an excellent substitute for our old superstitions. They really show how a belief in another life may be twisted into the service of a most grovelling form of materialism. ib. p. 104.

... After all why is the belief in a personal immortality supposed to be so essential to the happiness of mankind? ib. p. 104. (The writer seems to be of the opinion that we can get along very well without it. E. S.)

Let us shake the dust off our feet, and taking reason for our guide, and Mr. Darwin for the best modern expounder of the universe, go boldly forwards to whatever may be in store for us. ib. 111.

... To condemn human nature as corrupt has a very strong tendency to increase the corruption of human nature. ib. p. 143.

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Argument fr. design

Mr. Herbert Spencer pleasantly disperses our dreams of universal benevolence of design by the case of the loathsome parasites which torture, and, so far as we can tell, purposely torture the nobler organisms.

Leslie Stephens – Martin Payne.

...As Omar Khayyam puts it in one of the most impressive poems ever written—

"The eternal Saki from his bowl has poured
Millions of bubbles like us, and shall pour." ib.

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Shaftesbury, like Butler, insists upon the necessity of regarding the universe as a half-understood scheme. We cannot, he says, understand the part without a competent knowledge of the whole.

The "licentious stanza," omitted by Pope, in his "Universal Prayer" began,—

"Can that offend great Nature's God,
Which Nature's *self* inspires?" ib.

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When poor Wesley was rash enough to publish those accounts of miracles with which his journals are so curiously stuffed, the episcopal wrath knew no bounds... exaggerated the sphere of the miraculous beyond all other writers. ib.

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Of Truman Henry Safford, at present (1870) the Astronomer for the Observatory at Chicago, it is related, that at the age of ten years, for the purpose of testing the reach of his mind in computation he was asked to multiply *in his head* 365,365,365,365,365,365 by the same. He flew round the room like a top, pulled his pantaloons over the tops of his boots, bit his hand, rolled his eyes in their sockets, until, in not more than one minute, he said 1334918502085 669250166582999 41583225; which was written down while being delivered. What was still

more wonderful he began to multiply at the left hand, and to bring out the answer from left to right.
v. Martyn Paine's Physiology of the Soul. p. 104.

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The greatest characteristic of mind is a *perpetual consciousness* of its own *self-acting* nature. The Materialist, therefore, is constantly reasoning in opposition to his own strongest convictions. ib.

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"A chemist," says Locke, "shall reduce Divinity to the maxims of his laboratory, explain morality by *sal*, sulphur, and mercury. .. Let a man be given to the contemplation of one sort of knowledge, and that will become every thing." ib. p. 111.

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"Physiology," says Liebig, "has sufficiently decisive grounds for the opinion that every thought, every sensation, is accompanied by a change in the composition of the substance of the brain; that every motion, every manifestation of force, is a result of the transformation of the structure or of its substance." 113.

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This unceasing action of the muscles of respiration, of the heart, of the intestines, &c. is decisive against the chemical doctrine of waste; nor is there any better fact necessary to show the absurdity of the interference of Chemistry with Physiology. Dr. Paine. p. 116.

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Locke

Locke was indifferent as to the Soul's materiality or immateriality, or even whether the brain itself be not endowed with the mental faculties. .. He was an undoubting advocate of a distinct, intelligent Soul; and he considered the soul to be immaterial. ib. p. 126. But Locke says: "All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the Soul's immateriality."

Locke says: "From our not having any notion of the substance of Spirit we can no more conclude its non-existence than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of the body. (Locke adds, "For we have no clear and distinct idea of the Substance of matter." ib.

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St. Pierre says: "Our Minds may be considered an emanation of that Divine Mind which governs the world, in the same way as our body is made up of elementary substances, and affected in its operation by those influence wh. regulate the works of Nature at large." Harmonies of Nature. St. Pierre. p. 129.

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"Thought force, like muscular force, comes from food," says Prof. G. F. Barker, Yale college. p. 148.

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Müller says: "There is nothing in the facts of natural science wh. argues against the possibility of the existence of an Immaterial Principle independent of matter though its powers be manifested in organic bodies."

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Liebig says: "In the animal ovum as well as in the seed of a plant we recognize a certain remarkable force, the source of growth or increase in the mass, and of reproduction, or of supply of the matter consumed — a force in a state of rest."

Liebig on the Vital Force

"The vital principle", says Liebig, "must be a motive power, capable of imparting motion to atoms at rest, and of opposing resistance to other forces producing motion, such as the chemical force, heat, and electricity." "Every thing in the organism goes on under the influence of the vital force, an immaterial agent wh. the chemist can not employ at will." p. 166. Vogt and Büchner are quite furious against Liebig for this admission of a vital force.

Liebig further says: "In the formation of vegetable and animal substances the vital principle, opposes, as a force of resistance, the action of the other forces." p. 167. "Vital power in vegetables accomplishes the transformation of mineral substances into an organism endowed with life." ... "Death is the condition in which all resistance on the part of the vital force entirely ceases."

Liebig in some of his works contradicts himself on this subject of a vital force. See p. 169 Paine.

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Buffon

"All organised nature, plants, all animals, and men, owe their primary existence to an infinity of living organic atoms, or molecules, everywhere floating, and to certain inferior forms or matrixes (moules intérieures) ready to receive them and adopt them. If these produce not new organized beings, it is because there is already a sufficient number of existing beings to receive & absorb them.

All production, all generation, all development and growth suppose the concourse and reunion of a great quantity of these organical atoms. They animate all organized bodies, and are successively employed for the nourishment and generation of all beings. Should a great part of these beings be suddenly suppressed, we should see new species appear, because these organical atoms, indestructible and ever active, would in that case reunite to compose other organized bodies; but when entirely absorbed by the inferior forms of already existing beings, no new species can be formed, at least in the first great classes of nature." 175.

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Prof. Tiedemann says: "The first origin of organic matters and living bodies is altogether beyond the range of experiment."

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Dr. Carpenter says: "Organization and vital properties are simultaneously communicated to the germ by the structures of its parent. Those vital properties confer upon it the means of itself assimilating, and thereby organizing and endowing with vitality, the materials supplied by the inorganic world. p. 171.

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Spencer Herbert Spencer says: "Some four or five thousand compounds, once regarded as exclusively organic have now been produced artificially from inorganic matter."

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Wallace Wallace, in his "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection" abandons all hope of showing that man was developed out of animals, & argues ag. the assumption. p. 207.

Pritchard – Metcalfe – De Biran – Parker.

Dr. Pritchard says: "We may, if we please, call the cause which governs the organization and vital existence a *plastic principle*; but it is a principle endowed with intelligence and design". p. 235.

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Authorities for the theory of the direct agency of God on Nature.

Dr. S. L. Metcalfe says: "The truth is, that elementary fire is the only appropriate representation of the Divinity; because it is everywhere present, and performs every operation in the physical universe".

And Metcalfe quotes several distinguished Divines as having "maintained that God is the immediate cause of all the mechanical, chemical, and vital operations of nature – a doctrine wh. is wholly irreconcilable with the metaphysical notion of an immaterial and superessential First Cause." The divines Dr. M. quotes are: Cudworth, Baxter, Saml. Clark, Dr. Dwight, Whewell, &c.

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M. de Biran on Somnambulism

From Maine de Biran's remarks (pp. 488-491 of his Anthropologie, vol. 3 of Naville's edition of the Œuvres Inédites) on somnambulism, it is apparent that he knew very little of the subject.

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Th. Parker on Spiritualism

Theodore Parker said of modern Spiritualism: "It has more evidences of its wonders than any historic form of religion hitherto known. It is throughout democratic, with no hierarchy, but inspiration open to all. It does not claim to be a finality, and it admits all the truths of morality and religion in all the world's sects." Quoted by Octavius Frothingham

Is Soul dependent wholly on brain matter?

"Our thought is dependent on a corporeal apparatus, especially on the brain and nervous system", says Strauss. "More competent observers than Dr. Strauss," says the Ed. Rev. Oct. 1873, do not seem to accept these rash statements. No authority could well be higher than M. Flourens, and he decides in favor of a "force libre." (Etudes sur le Cerveau, p. 53). See Chaseray "Sur L'Ame", p. 156.

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Unable to appraise the interesting discoveries of modern physical science at their true worth, dazzled by the glamour and novelty of its revelations, and forgetful of the serious mistakes and gaps in the record, these men have, in ludicrous fashion, entirely lost their heads. They announce that Kant and Darwin have struck a blow at all the old systems, and preach that life is a piece of mechanism, religion a fable, immortality a dream founded on a wish. Ed. Rev. on Strauss

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To the 3rd question, What is our conception of the Universe? the answer is: We conceive of it as a huge machine, without purpose, without reason, without Consciousness, worked by some blind Destiny, wherein, for no imaginable object, Consciousness has emerged for a little space in man, soon, however, to be submerged again, and possibly never more to re-appear. Ed. Rev. on Strauss. Oct. 1873.

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Persons & things

All existing beings must be either persons or things, and no pedantries or sophistries can deter us from the invincible persuasion, which all human creatures possess, that persons are superior to things. . . . .

Ed. Rev. 1873, on Strauss, &c.

No desciptions of forces, cataclysms, &c. .. will ever convince us that man is not a force in himself—a new and unique force, at least as indestructible as heat, gravitation, electricity, or inertia. And yet after inviting us to feel _related_ in our inmost nature to that on which we are dependent you (Strauss) would now turn upon us with the dogma that our supreme and adorable _Relation_ is a piece of clockwork, and would bid us worship an Orrery!—would have us believe that this Universe is not only a work of mechanism, but a mechanism wholly self-constructed. Ed. Rev.

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Can Personality come from Impersonality?

The important question is this: Are we the helpless sport of blind, brute, unconscious, irrational Destiny? or are we the Children of God? Are we to cower, like dogs, beneath the lash of some unknown Fate or Chance, or both together, which may, any day, take some horrible turn against us? or may we know to a moral certainty that all is well? Is it possible that we ourselves can be personal while yet the great unknown Power from whose bosom we came is impersonal? Are we—alone in this tremendous Universe—conscious of our fate and its laws? Is man, therefore,—strangest surely of imaginable hypotheses—the highest known being in existence, yet condemned—by some ludicrous irony of mischief-working Fate—to adore and practise "joy and submission" towards things lower in the scale of being than himself? ... ib.

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... And if once this point of the consciousness or personality of God is conceded, then all is virtually conceded. The reign of God the Father (as Hegel would say) is secured. ib.

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Hartmann Hartmann (Gott und Naturwissenschaft, p. 54) says in effect: "We make our own brains by repeated acts of free will (Entschlüssen) and are responsible for so making them" — But how are we free under a system of Destiny? and to whom are we responsible under a system of Atheism? ib.

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St. Aug. on Miracles. St. Augustine says of miracles: "Voluntas tanti conditoris conditæ rei cujusque natura est. Portentum ergo fit, non contra naturam sed contra quam est nota natura". De Civ. Dei. ib.

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Bastian Two years ago scientific orthodoxy was clear that spontaneous generation had not occurred within all experience and was in short impossible. But Dr. Bastian has now seen with his own eyes the gradual evolution of life from dead matter. ib.

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Maudsley Maudsley says (p. 133 Body & Mind) "Life is not a contrast to non-living Nature; but a further development of it. ... There is a world into which the senses of man cannot yet enter". ib.

Strauss – Virchow

Miracle is no longer regarded by any competent thinker as a violation of the laws of Nature. id.

The most ancient strata of the earth's crust show no traces of living beings; later strata contain such traces. Strauss.

... Could not an organic cell be naturally produced from inorganic matter, which was previously the sole existing thing?

Virchow ... "All known facts" (says Virchow, microscopist) "are opposed to the theory that spontaneous generation now takes place. But as nevertheless we see life at some time making its appearance for the first time in the course of the earth's development, what must our conclusion be if not that under quite unusual circumstances at the time of vast terrestrial revolutions, the miracle has actually come to pass."

Strauss ... The existence of the crudest form has since been actually demonstrated. Huxley has discovered the Bathybius, a slimy heap of jelly on the sea-bottom; Häckel, what he has called the Monera, structureless clots of an albuminous carbon, which although inorganic in their constitution, yet are capable of nutrition and accretion. ..

By these the chasm may be said to be bridged from the inorganic to the organic. Strauss.

Virchow ... Virchow says: Life is only a special, namely the most complicated, kind of mechanics. A part of the sum total of matter emerges from time to time out of the usual course of its motion into special chemico-organic combinations, and after having for a time continued therein, it returns again to the general modes of motion."

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M. de Biran

According to Maine de Biran, the soul is a *cause*, a force, an active principle. The dynamical theory of the universe is the one grounded on the most solid and philosophical basis. He yields assent to the spiritual monadology of Leibnitz – a dynamical spiritualism. . .
The notions of *cause*, of *will*, of *self*, we find to be fundamentally the same. . . . He threw a doubt over the notion of *substance*, as being a purely rational idea, and proposed to account for it under the notion of *Cause* or *force*. See Morell, p. 640.

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Ashantee belief in Spirits.

The debased divinities of the Ashantees are called by Europeans *Fetish*, from a Portuguese word for witchcraft; but the Ashantees themselves call them Bosum, Suman, or Tano, wh. means *sacred*. . . The notion of a future state universally prevails. It is believed that after death the soul passes into another world, where it exists in a state of consciousness and activity. They say it is like the wind, and can come into a room when the doors are closed, and there is no visible entrance. They firmly believe that the spirits of dead persons frequently appear to the living; that the spirits of their departed relatives exercise a guardian care over them. . . They believe that the future world will exactly resemble this. The fetish men & women (priests & priestesses) are a numerous class. See Art. on Ashantee Superstitions in Every Saturday Dec. 13, 1873; cop. fr. All the Year Round.

As to Moleschott's dogma "Without phosphorus there is no thought," Liebig remarks that "upon that hypothesis the bones should be regarded as the source of thought since they contain four hundred times more phosphorus than the brain." M. Paine p. 286.

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The more I reflect upon it, the more am I impressed with the idea that in the phenomena of somnambulism will be found the most consistent explanation both of the nature of man and the nature of God. By this key may we open doors [opening] to outlets less obscure and labyrinthine. That union of naturalism (Pantheism) with theism, sought by Schelling is made more reconcilable to the understanding by the analogies of somnambulism. Schelling maintained that Naturalism seeks to "conceive of God as ground of the world (immanent) "while theism would view him as the world's "cause (transcendent): but the true course is to "unite both determinations. God is at the same "time ground and cause. It no way contradicts "the conception of God to affirm that so far as he reveals "himself he developes himself from himself, advancing from the imperfect to the perfect: the imperfect is in fact the perfect itself, only in a state of "becoming. It is necessary that this becoming should "be by stages, in order that the fulness of the perfect "may appear on all sides.

"If there were no obscure ground, no nature, no "negative principle in God, we could not speak of a "consciousness of God. So long as the God of

" modern theism remains the simple essence which ought to be
" purely essential, but which in fact is without essence, so
" long as an actual twofoldness is not recognized in God,
" and a limiting and denying energy (a nature, a negative
" principle) is not placed in opposition to the extending
" and affirming energy in God, so long will science
" be entitled to make its denial of a personal God.
" It is universally and essentially impossible to conceive
" of a being with consciousness, which has not been
" brought into limit by some denying energy within
" himself — as universally and essentially impossible
" as to conceive of a circle without a centre." (See Schwegler's Hist. of Phil. Am. ed. p. 338).

We will assume with Holy Writ that man is created in God's image. In man we find a higher and a lower consciousness as revealed in the facts and phenomena of somnambulism. Indeed there may be said to be three grades of consciousness, each in a manner distinct: 1st the normal, our every day waking state, subject to the facts of our external experience; 2d the abnormal, when the individual cognizes from a higher stand-point the facts of his own physical being, detects the movements, &c of the interior bodily organs, practises a limited clairvoyance in reference to his bodily surroundings, and those of his fellows, previses the moment of death, &c. 3d the ecstatic or lofty spiritual state, when the spirit is so unshrouded in vision as to pierce to the essences of things, commune with disembodied spirits, and draw nearer to the Infinite Source of things. If there are these three grades of consciousness in man, why not in God? 1st, God as He becomes immanent in Nature, and is self-limited, so as to be only partially conscious – God manifest (to finite intelligences) in the phenomenal and transient – God as the soul of Nature, of the bodies, organic and inorganic, of the universe; God as love – 2d. God as conscious of His lower hypostasis – God as abstracted from the (God in his relations to the spiritual world) physical universe, and viewing it from the more spiritual height – God as intelligence; – 3d. God as transcendant – transcending the universe and all subordinate existences – God as pure Being, First Cause, absolute Love, Intelligence, and Power – supremely Personal and Conscious. E. S.

See Philosophy of Lammenais, p. 534 Morell.

By some such order of thought as this (here very crudely and imperfectly sketched) may not Theism and Pantheism be reconciled in one comprehensive, harmonious system, in which the philosophical and scientific objections made to each singly, may be merged? E. S.

In his lower hypostasis, then, God is the intelligent Nature-principle of the Materialists. In his middle state he partakes of the lower and the higher nature; and in his 3d (highest) state he is transcendent Spirit, the First Cause, the God of Theism, aloof from the world while upholding and surveying it.

To reconcile the Theistic with the Pantheistic idea seems to have been the great object of Schelling; and if he had, in his synthesis, followed the analogies of somnambulism, he would, I think have issued into a far more harmonious and rational system – one that could have been wonderfully strengthened by ~~the~~ its consistency with the greatest facts of human nature – those of somnambulism and what is now known as modern spiritualism. (E. S.)

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Why not planetary body, spiritual body & (3) spirit or soul?

Body, Spirit, Soul – In man there is the external, normal state, in which he is limited by what is called matter – that is, a limit adapting him to the answering relations of this earth and the phenomena of space and time – this lowest state is that of Body [terrestrial = planetary.

But contemporaneous with this outermost or exterior, and developing with it, is the Spirit, ~~inner most~~, interior or spiritual body of a nature differing ~~in this~~ from the ~~terrestrial~~ planetary body in this respect, namely, that whereas the elements of the latter partake the qualities of matter and ~~die~~ continually undergoing change, deprivation, and the preliminaries of dissolution, the spirit or Spiritual body persists and, though wholly undiscoverable as yet by any processes ~~known to~~ of Science, and [known] only by its supersensual phenomena, is the continent and refuge of the actual, immortal man in the sloughing or death of the [terrestrial] husk or body. The triune nature of man does not terminate with this catalysis.

The Soul (limited, however, in its work by the material conditions) is the eternal Monad which is the principle of evolution of all forms, bodies and individualities. Once humanized in the life of a ~~terrestrial~~ planetary body its tendency is to preserve its individualization through successive stages of being, corresponding with the planetary spheres of the universe, or with their Spiritual Zones.

Thus in man there is outermost body, interior body (Spirit), and abiding principle (Soul). (Ac. to Origen a spirit strictly means a body.)

In God there is (1) God as embodied in the material universe, and the principle of life in the whole creation; ~~(2)~~ God as outflowing love, but in a manner unconscious; (2) God as intelligence, but circumscribed by the self-limitations of his higher state, in his relations to the universe; (3) God in first principles as pure, independent being; not immanent in the universe but transcendant.

Thus we have a trinity of states and relations in man, and a trinity of states and relations in God. E. S. (See Tertullian.)

Thus there is (1) God in the phenomenal and shifting (God in the material universe).
(2) God in the conscious and abiding (God in his relations to intelligence, mind, &c.)
(3) God in the absolute (God as independent of all relations, unlimited, omnipotent, and self-sufficient.)

Thus there is man (1) as limited by the mortal, planetary body; (2) man as existing in the spiritual body; (3) Man as Soul or the principle which clothes itself with successive bodies, — the basis of all finite existence, including corporeal matter itself. (See Plotinus - in Nourisson).

Rauch.

Psychology, or a View of the Human Soul, including Anthropology, being the substance of a course of Lectures, delivered to the Junior Class Marshall College Penn., by Fred. A. Rauch. N. York: M. W. Dodd 1840. The Rev. F. A. R. was born in Hesse Darmstadt, 1806, came to America 1831, died 1841, aged 35. He was a favorite pupil of Dr. Chas. Daub of Heidelberg, who died 1836. The following are fr. Rauch:

The Lower animal organisms

There are animals that consist of a single organ. ... In viewing such a being we may see what kind of life a single organ is capable of producing, and what its share must be in the constitution of man. So we know, that in muscles and snails, the liver and heart alone are fully formed; in many insects the wind-pipe; in others the lungs; in the polypus the stomach; in infusoria the gut. Nature, according to this view, contains all the parts of man, but not as man has them. In the lowest animals, single parts are sufficient to form the whole being; more of them become united at the higher stages of animal life, until finally all appear well-proportioned in man, the tree, whose leaves are scattered throughout nature; and as a machine can be known only when its parts are viewed singly, so man can be understood only, when we are acquainted with the inferior tribes in nature, which present to our inspection the different parts composing his system.

Thus it is likewise with the psychological life of man. In viewing the nature of instinct we may see what kind of mental life sensation and perception, independent of reason and will, are able to produce, and thus we may learn how to value reason and will as we should. . . The nature of plastic power in the vegetable world, and that of instinct in animals, will accordingly teach us more concerning Psychology, than any other portion of human science. Rauch.

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Sensation and Perception

In sensation we depend wholly on the presence of external objects, and are determined by them. But after we have once had a sensation, we may have perceptions of the objects of sensation, and these perceptions are possible without the presence of the objects. . . . Yet perceptions are impossible without previous sensations.

The lower animals have sensations and perceptions. The hunter's dog dreams of the chase. But man has

Apperception

apperceptions, which the lower animal has not.

The objects of apperception are the kind, the species, and the individuals of things.

(The dog reasons, however. E. S.)

Instinct

Instinct presupposes, what is not found in the sphere of vegetation, sensation and perception.

Instinct will direct the animal to its proper food. . . . Hence it is that the sheep, without choice or consideration, will select salt from amongst arsenic, wh. would be impossible to man . . . Analogous to it is the attractive power in the magnet, which from among many thousand grains of different substances, attracts none but iron filings.

The fact, however, that instinct presupposes feeling, sensation, and perception, raises it above the power in the magnet, and gives it a higher character than that of the root which also seeks and finds its nourishment.

* * *

The most beautifully formed crystal does not fill us with as much wonder as the cell of the bee, merely because the former is considered by us as the direct product of nature, but the latter as that of the design and calculation of the animal. And yet both rest on the same general ground, with only this difference, that the one proceeds directly from the laws of nature, and the other through the medium of a living individual.

... Man is separated from the animal by reason, but on the one hand he is formed by the same plastic power, and on the other instinct still appears in the new-born child, whose lips long for nourishment, and in many of the actions of savages. ... Instinct mingling with our desire for knowledge constitutes with it talents and natural capacities.

* * *

Dreaming Johnson, in his dreams, frequently disputed with an opponent, and felt chagrined that he had himself the poorest arguments. An old Professor dreamed that he was again a student, and when examined could not answer the question to which his classmate, sitting near him, fully and readily replied. In both these instances it is evident that the dreamers had no self-consciousness (?). And so it is in all our dreams, for if we were clearly conscious of ourselves, we should not dream, but be awake. Without personality there can be no liberty, no volition, no will. In dreaming then, we are incapable of willing decidedly. (?) . . . Melancthon says: Somnia sunt alia physica, alia divina, alia diabolica.

Prophetic dreams

. . . The dream of Mr. Williams of Cornwall is fully related in the London Times of Aug. 16th 1829. He saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer killed in the vestibule of the House of Commons, and having had the same dream thrice in one night, he communicated it to many of his acquaintances all of whom were living when the Times gave the account. Afterwards it was ascertained that on the evening of the same day Mr. Perceval was assassinated by a certain Bellingham. . . .

The Rev. John Dodd, one evening, when already undressed, felt an unaccountable agitation of mind. It seemed to him he ought to visit straightway a friend who lived a mile or two off from him. He went, dark as it was, and though his family tried to dissuade him from going. On arriving at the house of his friend he found him ready to commit suicide. His unexpected visit and counsel prevented the deed forever. . . .

Schiller once when passing through a pine wood and between high rocks was seized by a feeling that some person must be buried there. He subsequently learnt that it had been the scene of the murder of a wagoner.

. . . Jacob Boehme, in the hour of death, heard beautiful music, which was inaudible to every one of the bystanders.

Rauch.

Personal Identity

That which is wanting to individuality, in order to make it personality, is a soul capable of thinking and willing.

... In the thought contained in the word I, subject and object are perfectly the same, for it is I that thinks and I that is thought of. There I am active, because I think, here I am passive, because I am the subject of thought. ... But the identity between the thought and its subject, expressed by I, is such that the being of one is that of the other also; the one cannot be separated from the other, for the one is the other. This it is that we call *personal identity*. I can possess nothing else in the same way that I possess myself. The same that I express by this term in my youth, I express by it at the most advanced age, and even in the hour of death, neither form nor contents being in the least change.

... There is but one thinking power in man. The mind is neither a multitude of faculties, nor is it a simple identical activity, but it is a *union* that not only comprises the manifold, but produces it by unfolding its life organically.

... Whatever develops itself, changes, yet it does not become anything else than it was when undeveloped... Developing itself, it becomes *in reality*, what before it was *according to possibility and energy*. So the bulb of a hyacinth may be said to be and not to be the hyacinth. It is the hyacinth according to energy, and nothing can grow forth from it, that is not in it; and again it is not yet the hyacinth for it has not yet grown forth. The growing forth is the development of the energy slumbering in the bulb. ... Thus the soul is an energy, that in developing itself, remains the same that it was, and yet becomes different. It remains the same, for nothing is added from without, all comes from within; it is different, for it exists in a developed state. ... Thinking is an activity wh. generalizes. .. It seeks everywhere for the true nature of things, for their generality and necessity, for their real and genuine truth. ...

Reason is nothing else than will with prevailing consciousness, and will is reason with a prevailing practical tendency.

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Relations of Soul and Body

Views of the relation of the soul to the body are quite various, the one comprising those who admit of two different substances, the other, those that either consider the soul as the efflorescence and result of the body, or the body as built by the soul. The former keep soul and body so separate, that it is difficult to see how they can act in unison. According to it the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter as the engine the steam. ..

A dualism that admits of two principles for one being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is ~~that~~ that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third, By the second theory, a soul becomes superfluous, an Materialism in its rudest form prevails. The theory of Stahl, Treviranus and others is that the body is *built* by the soul. As the caterpillar spins & weaves a texture for its future metamorphosis, so the Soul, like a mason, builds its own tabernacle.

The first of these opinions is too gross, and the last spiritualizes the whole existence of man too much. Without entering into a scientific refutation of them, we advance one that seems nearer to the truth:

The general idea connected with the term *body* is that of an external frame animated by life. Ac. to this view the body and soul are wholly different, and as opposite to each other as life and death. Yet this view must be erroneous, as it not only brings the soul and body in opposition, but also the bodily life and the external frame.

The Body
Chemically
onsidered

The body chemically consists of nine different substances, gases, earths, metals and salt. It is therefore dust and must return to dust. No one would assert that man consists of a soul, bodily life, and nine different kinds of earthly substances; but all would be ready to acknowledge that earth is by no means an essential part of man. (?)

This must appear the more true, when we consider, that this external frame of man "never ceases to perish", but is constantly undergoing changes, that it is in an unceasing flow. . The gases constantly escape, and all the particles are changing.

Hence the necessity of renovating our bodies. This renovation demands new elements, wh. originally foreign to the body, must be assimilated and rendered subservient to its organism.

If then the particles of the external frame are incessantly changing, they cannot be the body itself, since new elements are every moment received and old ones excluded, and all of them are but dust. The true and genuine body must be that which retains and preserves its organical identity in all these changes, - wh. remains the same in the never-ceasing stream of matter.

The true Body

But what is this organical identity?

It is the life or power, wh. connects the gases, earths, metals and salt into one whole, wh. penetrating them, keeps them together, or dismisses some and attracts others.

No sooner does this penetrating power retire than the body becomes a corpse, and the elements fall asunder. This Power is the True Body; it is invisible, but connecting the elements according to an eternal & divine law, it becomes manifest by its productions.

We seem to have gained, then, this one idea, that the external frame is not the body, and that it is not to be opposed to the soul, but that the Life and Power, wh. connects the Elements, is the body: Again, that it is the connection of the elements that is human and not the substances themselves, and finally that these substances and elements do not remain the same, but are constantly passing away, while new ones are taking their place. That wh. is permanent in these changes, and combines the elements in this manner, is Life.

Life … All life wherever it exists is formed and organized. Form is not and cannot be the result of matter, wh. itself is chaotic and shapeless.

Form in man and throughout the Universe is

Form the result of thought. Hence life, being formed, does not proceed from matter; but it is a thought of God, accompanied by the divine will, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body. As the thought gives the form, so the divine will, resting in the thought and inseparably united with it, works as power and law in all nature.

… All nature is full of divine wisdom and reason, but it does not *possess* reason, for it is neither conscious of itself nor of anything else. … The soul develops itself like all other life in nature; and develops itself in a twofold direction; outwardly and inwardly. There can be nothing *merely* internal, but it

x must be so only in reference to itself as external. The flesh of the apple is internal only in reference to its skin, wh. is external. The internal or thinking life of the soul has its external, and this the sensitive life of the body, by wh. the soul is connected with the world. The life of the

x soul and the body is therefore *one* in its origin; a twofold expression of the same energy. … Flesh, in so far as it is merely earth, cannot feel; but in so far as this earth is connected by life, it is life in this *particular connection* that feels in a peculiar manner. ... The drops of water are to the rainbow, what the body as mere corpse is to man.

Man is Soul Only ... So it would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances, of earth and the soul; but he is soul only, and cannot be anything else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in the life of the body and internally in the life of the mind. Twofold in its development it is one in its origin, and the centre of this union is our personality. ...

.. As the plant can never pass beyond itself and become an animal, so the animal cannot by a continued development reach the nature and life of man, but it remains an animal forever. For so much only can be developed as exists according to possibility in the germ of a being; what is therefore not contained in this possibility, or germ, or origin, cannot proceed from it.

Thinking, judgment and reason, or soul in general, not being originally in the idea realized in the animal, — the animal of course differs from man by not having a soul. Though it has sensation and perception, these again must differ from those of man, as they do not include the power to judge. (?) (See acct. of dog who saved child fr. burning N. S. p.

The life of man, as it is the union of physical and psychical, is not to be considered as a higher development of animal life, differing only in degree, but it is wholly and essentially different even in its principle. It is not therefore a transition from that wh. is not human to the human; from the unconscious to the conscious. It is not the same animal activity, only clearer, more distinct and more refined, so that the whole difference is one of quantity and not of quality. Feeling however elevated & refined still remains feeling.

Difference between Soul & Body

We admit, therefore, of a difference between soul and body, but one that proceeds from and terminates in a union. As the common principle of both differs from every other in nature, so the bodily life of man differs from that of the animal. It is from its beginning and in its principle different, and does not become so at a certain stage.

Creation

This theory upholds the idea of a creation & not of emanation. God remains what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah after the universe is created. So the mind of man is not diminished however great the number of thoughts which it produces. On the other hand, neither the body nor the soul is the ground of their (its?) existence, but God himself.

X

... Man is no more a mere continuation of the animal, than the animal is merely a continuation of the vegetable. ... The animal is vis sentiens, the man natura intelligens.

Rauch.

The matter, in a living being, does not precede its form. .. Though the elements as such precede the plant, it is nevertheless the plastic power of the plant that converts them into its constituent parts. ...

The seed is already the product of a plastic power, wh. formed it, as it must produce the form that shall grow forth from the seed.

Evolution or Involution

.. The theory of evolution or involution asserted, that all forms exist from the beginning of the world, only infinitely small, all of them preformed, the one included in the other, and many millions of germs in one; – that growth is nothing else than evolution or enlargement of these preformed germs.

This theory was supported by many strange arguments; but it transferred the difficulty in question only from one place to another. For whether I view the tree in its full size or in its infinitely small preformation, here as well as there I see it already formed, and must ask, whence these forms?

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.. Blumenbach, who once taught the theory of involution, was led to discover its fallacy by further experience. He concluded that all living beings carry in themselves a plastic power, from wh. not only they themselves proceed, but wh. has a tendency to produce and to preserve those forms wh. are essential to them.

It is not the germ in the seed, from which the plant originates. This germ is already of a visible and decided form, the result of the flower. In the flower we may discover a whitish globular fluid, wh. as the flower unfolds itself, and finally fades away, becomes more solid, an when ripe, is thrown off from the mother-plant as seed. In this seed is contained the germ, the first formation of the future plant, as roots and leaves may be considered the second and third formations.

The Plastic Power

Whence then is the germ? It is the product of a plastic power, wh. is the principle of individual life and its preservation, wh. forms in the plant the seeds, the fibers and the roots, the leaves and the branches; wh. makes the roots seek for moisture, and the leaves for air, and the flower for the light of the sun, and wh. will confine the form of each individual to its species, so that the seed of the palm-tree will never grow up and become an oak, nor the acorn grow up a palm-tree.

This plastic power reigns wherever there is life... It can no more be seen with the eye, than any other power.. Its products are the forms of individual life, and consequently we must admit a plastic power.... There is, First a living motion; Secondly, a separation of the living being from the element in which it is born; Thirdly, a specific form... As the forms proceeding from the possibility (of producing such forms as the prototype of a genus necessarily demands) cannot be accidental, but must all of them represent their prototype, or the image which seems to slumber in that originally simple activity, this possibility or plastic power has been called *nisus formativus*. The same power that forms the being preserves it.

F. A. Rauch

As a transcendental philosopher Dr. Rauch belonged to the School of Hegel, and not to that of Schelling. For, his whole chapter on Pure Thinking shows that he did not, with Schelling, regard a knowledge of the essential nature of things as attainable by mere inspection, or by a rational intuition; but, with Hegel, he considered such knowledge as the result of a logical process, a generalization, or as he denominates it, Pure Thinking.

... According to Rauch's philosophy, a created substance or thing is a mere activity or power of acting, and not an inscrutable essence, with inherent qualities and accidents. (So Maine de Biran, Leibnitz, &c.) Of course, as many kinds of activity as exist, so many kinds of substances or things, are there in the universe. These, it seems, are ascertained to be four in number, viz. (1) *Mind* or soul, an activity that has self-consciousness, intelligence, and will: (2) Animal Life, a plastic power having sensation or feeling, & generating organic bodies, wh. it nourishes & matures, & then transmits itself through them to a progeny of similar activities; (3) Vegetable Life, a plastic power without feeling, wh. produces organized bodies with

J. H. Morrison — St. Paul.

roots, and leaves, and matures seeds, whereby it propagates itself; and (4) Lifeless Matter, which can act only mechanically, or by impulse, attraction, repulsion, decomposition, dispersion, combination, aggregation, &c. These constitute the created universe and all its varied Phenomena.

Jas. Murdock's *Sketches* of Mod. Philos. 1842.

St. Paul on Spiritual Body

No one who has looked carefully into St. Paul's writings, can think of him as teaching the doctrine of the resurrection of these material bodies. If he speaks of a resurrection of the body, as he certainly does, it is a spiritual body, as he asserts again and again. . .

But what is a Spiritual body? . . . The truth is that if we do not know precisely what a Spiritual body is, neither do we know any more precisely what a material body is. For aught we know, it may be, that when matter is reduced to its primary elements, it will be resolved entirely into spiritual force. As the hardest iron may be resolved into gaseous forms and float away unseen in the air, so it may be that behind all the material substances which our senses can recognize, there are vital spiritual forces underlying as their essential basis every form of matter and every species of vegetable or animal life. . . . It may be that instead of the soul being the outgrowth of the material body, this material body is the living outgrowth of the soul. When the connection between the two is dissolved, the material body wh.

depends upon the soul dies, while the soul which only takes on and uses the body as a temporary aid till it has got possession of its own spiritual powers, then lives on in its own native form and eternal life. – Rev. J. H. Morrison, in Relig. Mag. Oct. 1873.

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The Sp. Body We cannot tell how the delicate germ of life in an egg unfolds itself by the natural process of growth into a body wholly different from the egg, – a body wh. contains in itself before the shell is broken chemical substances wh. no chemical tests can discover either in the egg or in the surrounding air. So it may be that the germ of spiritual vitality in us, . . may in its regular process of growth, unfold itself into a spiritual body, while it resides within the nerves and tissues of this material form. ib.

St. Paul says: "Though our outward man is perishing, yet the *inward man* is renewed day by day." "For we know that if our earthly tenement [this mortal body] be dissolved, we have [not we *shall* have, but we have] from God a building [i.e. a body] not made with hands, eternal and heavenly [in the heavens]." That is, if our earthly tabernacle should be dissolved, we have already, not made with hands, but woven around us by the creative power of God who giveth to every seed a body, as he willed,

& proceeding from the will of God, call it life or call it force, is the substance of all matter and consequently of all ~~force.~~ Spirit; for Spirit is not a distinct creation but a result of the divine idea expressed in ~~organizations and~~ forms ‖ and organizations, ~~already having as their which~~ ‖ Thus the substance of Matter and Spirit is identical, or rather there is no spirit separate from form. But for the perpetual efflux of the divine will, ~~pervading all matter forming the substan~~ pervading all matter, the whole universe would be dissolved; and this ~~whole universe~~ efflux makes ~~as the~~ not only the soul of man but the whole universe, and ~~so~~ every orb and atom, instinct with actual life.

A proceeding from the will of God, call it life, or call it force, is the substance of all matter, ~~and~~ an ~~all~~ organized a form of matter, ~~carrying~~ suffused with the divine idea, ~~Spirit.~~ Matter, in its last ~~gives~~ makes conscious life & produces soul. analysis, whether physical or metaphysical, loses the attributes by which we know it and passes into the domain of pure spirit. ~~Matter and Spirit~~ May, in their essence, be identical; or what we call Spirit may be the result of organization and form. All forms being divine ideas, the form of Man, with its substantial life from God (immanent ~~in all matter and all Spirit~~)

an eternal [Spiritual] and heavenly body. And [v. Chap. v. 4 2d Cor.] before being unclothed we are to be clothed upon; i.e., before going out from these mortal bodies, we are to be clothed upon with our spiritual vestments." ib.

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St. Paul is always varying his images. Now it is a seed, now a body, now a garment, and now a tent or house. Yet the idea of a Spiritual body forming itself around us, now within these earthly members, and vitally connected with our Spiritual faculties, seems to me better than any other hypothesis to meet all the conditions of the various phraseology which we find in the Epistles. ib.

There are passages (in St. Paul) wh., taken by themselves, would indicate a specific time appointed for the resurrection and the general judgment. ... On the other hand there are passages wh. indicate an immediate transition, at the time of our death, from this world to the other. (See Townshend's "Facts in Mesmerism").

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What is matter but the expression of spirit? E.S.

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The soul is not a faculty or expression of the body, but rather the body, or fac. or expr. of the soul. E.S.

Montlosier Ac. to Montlosier, "l'ame humaine est une force, le corps humain est une forme."

L'univers est composé de forces et de formes.

C'est l'ame qui a formé le corps.

Whately – F. W. Newman – W. R. Greg.

Archbishop Whately on Spiritualism

At a debate (Nov. 13th, 1873) at the South-place Chapel, Finsbury, London, Mr. Herbert Noyes said, in reply to some attacks on Spiritualism, that a relative of his own, Archbishop Whately, was for many years a patron of the Mesmeric Institutions in London and Dublin; and he (Mr. N.) had heard fr. his own lips that he had cured by Mesmerism a woman who had been blind some twenty years; that he (W.) had been first convinced of the truth of Mesmerism from trying its effect on his horses.

... Mr. Noyes added that Mrs. H. Senior (who had given some remarkable tests of Spirit Communication) was a sister-in-law of Mr. Nassau Senior, and on most intimate terms with Archbishop Whately, who listened with the greatest interest to all her experiences in Spiritualism, and entirely believed in them, because he was able to judge of her capacity for observation, as he would have accepted it on any other subject.

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Toute la vie actuelle a été composée pour la mort. La mort elle-même a été composée pour la vie.

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F. W. Newman & W. R. Greg on a future life.

F. W. Newman has an article in Morley's Fortnightly Review (Dec. 1873) on "The Enigmas of Life," &c. by W. R. Greg, recently republished in this country by Osgood & Co. Mr. Greg thinks that "a renewed life hereafter" is not "almost certain" but only a "solemn hope." Mr. Newman, on the contrary, says that to *him* a future life is *not* a "solemn hope" but only a "reverential augury, an edifying speculation. 'Hope implies desire; and desire (says Prof. N.) is here very feeble. Mr. Greg seems to assume that all mankind earnestly long for a heavenly life after death, and therefore have invented bad arguments to establish it. To me it appears that there is very little desire, whether among professed Christians or others; that either poetical fancy or moral speculation, or both together, originated the conception, alike among barbarians and more civilized men." Prof. N. goes on to relate that once many years ago, in near prospect of death, "I had scarcely the feeblest desire for the heaven to which I supposed myself going. And now I have become distinctly aware that such belief as I have in a future life is purely *intellectual*. . . . Whichever alternative be true, I make sure that that alternative is in fullest harmony with the divine goodness and wisdom."

E. S. Here Prof. N. speaks obviously from his own idiosyncrasies. His view of the truth is temperamental to him. On the contrary, it will be conceded, I think, that the majority of well-balanced minds, accompanied with healthy physical organizations, have the strongest craving for a continuance of life. Prof. N.'s postulate that "the desire" for a renewed life is "very feeble" is, according to my experience and *a priori* convictions, a very great mistake. E. S.

Chas. Bonnet.

Charles Bonnet

J'admets donc l'existence de mon Ame comme celle d'une Substance immatérielle, qu'il a plu au Créateur d'unir à un Corps organisé. J'apprends donc de la contemplation de mon Etre, que je resulte de l'union de deux Substances très-différentes. Bonnet 7th vol.

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Dans cet ordre de choses je vois que je n'ai des idées que par l'intervention de mon Corps, et plus je m'étudie moi-même, plus je suis forcé de reconnoître la grande influence de la Machine sur toutes les opérations de mon Ame.

J'apprends encore de la Revelation que mon Ame sera éternellement unie à une portion de Matière; je serai donc éternellement un être-mixte.

L'intention de l'Auteur de mon Etre n'a donc pas été que je fusse un Esprit-pur.

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... Il y a hors de mon Ame quelque chose qui excite en elle des sensations indépendamment de sa Volonté. Cette chose, quelle qu'elle soit, est ce que je nomme Matière.

... Je n'affirme pas que la Matière soit en effet ce qu'elle me paroît être.

... Pour rendre raison de l'Union de l'Ame et du Corps... je m'en suis tenu a l'Influence physique, non comme au fait, mais comme à ce qui paroît l'être.

... Ainsi, quand toutes les Ames seroient exactement semblables, il suffiroit que Dieu eût varié les Cerveaux pour varier toutes les Ames. Si l'Ame d'un Huron eût pu hériter du cerveau de Montesquieu, Montesquieu créeroit encore.

(Fault having been found with this sentiment, Bonnet remarks: "J'observe d'abord, que je n'affirme point dans ce passage que toutes les Ames sont parfaitement semblables.

...Ce seroit en vain qu'on se retrancheroit à soutenir avec divers Philosophes, qu'il est une Mémoire Spirituelle, qui n'appartient qu'à l'Ame, comme il est une Mémoire corporelle, qui n'appartient qu'au Corps. ... Tout ce que je sais, c'est que l'Ame humaine n'a d'idée que par le ministère des Sens.

...L'Homme n'est pas une certaine Ame; il n'est pas un certain Corps; il est le résultat de l'Union d'une certaine Ame à un certain Corps.

J'ai osé l'avancer dans la simplicité d'un Coeur qui cherchoit sincèrement le vrai, "Quand l'Homme tout entier ne seroit que Matière, il n'en seroit pas moins parfait ni moins appellé à l'Immortalité": C'est que la Volonté toujours efficace peut conserver une portion de Matière, même très composée, comme Elle conserve une Ame indivisible.

...Si quelqu'un démontroit jamais que l'Ame est matérielle, loin de s'en alarmer, il faudroit admirer la Puissance qui auroit donné à la Matière la capacité de penser. ... J'ai donc admett admis l'existence d'une Ame immatérielle pour satisfaire à des Phénomènes que je ne pouvois expliquer sans elle.

Chas. Bonnet.

A Soul for Animals

...Pourquoi un Etre si perfectible seroit-il anéanti pour toujours, tandis qu'il possède un Principe de perfectibilité dont nous ne saurions assigner les bornes? Quelles raisons philosophiques nous imposeroient l'obligation de croire que la mort est le terme de la durée de l'Animal?

...Mais, si cette Ame a besoin d'un Corps organisé pour continuer à exercer ses fonctions, il me semble plus raisonnable de penser que ce Corps existe déjà en petit dans l'Animal, que de supposer que Dieu en créera un nouveau pour les besoins de cette Ame.

...Pourquoi cette perfectibilité de l'Animal ne comporteroit-elle point qu'il s'élevât enfin jusqu'à la connoissance de l'Auteur de sa Vie?

..Il ne faudroit pas s'imaginer que les Animaux auront dans leur Etat futur la même forme, etc. as the present.

...Ac. to Bonnet, memory has its seat in the body; therefore a soul wh. could from one body into another transmigrate would have no recollection of its previous state... But he thinks that all organized bodies may pre-exist "très-en-petit dans des germes ou corpuscules organiques. Il est donc bien vraisemblable que les Ames y préexistent aussi."

... La même progression que nous découvrons aujourd'hui entre les differens Ordres d'Etres organisés, s'observera, sans doute, dans l'état futur de notre Globe: mais, elle suivra d'autres proportions qui seront determinés par le degré de perfectibilité de chaque espèce. L'Homme transporté alors dans un autre séjour plus assorti à l'éminence de ses facultés, laissera au Singe ou à l'Eléphant cette première place qu'il occupoit parmi les animaux de notre Planète.

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Mais si tous les Etres organisés ont été préformés dès le Commencement, que deviennent tant de milliards de Germes qui ne parviennent point à se développer dans l'état présent de notre Monde?... Chacun de ces Germes renferme un autre Germe impérissable, qui ne se développera que dans l'Etat futur de notre Planète. Rien ne se perd dans les immenses Magasins de la Nature; tout y a son emploi, sa fin, et la meilleure fin possible...

Bonnet believes that the germ "préexiste dans la Femelle à la fécondation." But what becomes of this imperishable germ when the animal dies? His answer is: "Des germes indestructibles peuvent être dispersés sans inconvénient dans tous les corps particuliers qui nous environnent; can pass from one body into another, &c.

Germs, "tels que je les suppose, bravent les efforts de tous les élemens et de tous les Siècles, et arrivent enfin à cet état de perfection auquel ils ont été prédestinés.

Chas. Bonnet – Leibnitz.

In support of these views Bonnet mentions the fact that there are germs of animalcules which sustain, without perishing, the heat of boiling water, &c.

Bonnet goes on to argue in favor of a sort of sensibility for plants. Or if they are not *now* capable of this sensibility, they may become so at some future period.

"Si la Plante est sensible elle a une Ame qui est le principe du sentiment; car le sentiment ne sauroit appartenir à la seule organisation.

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M. Notre monde a été apparemment sous la forme de ver ou de chenille: il est à present sous celle de Chrysalide; la dernière révolution lui fera revêtir celle de papillon.

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Bonnet quotes fr. Leibnitz in regard to the Souls of brutes, as follows: "Mais cette conservation de la personnalité (wh. takes place in man) n'a point de lieu dans l'ame des bêtes; C'est pourquoi j'aime mieux dire qu'elles sont impérissables, que de les appeler immortelles."

.. Leibnitz further says: "Je ne vois point pourquoi il y auroit moins d'inconvénient à faire durer les atomes d'Epicure ou de Gassendi, que de faire subsister toutes les substances véritablement simples et indivisibles, qui sont les seuls et vrais atomes de la nature".

C'est toujours Leibnitz qui parle: "Je tiens que les ames et généralement les substances simples ne sauroient commencer que par la création ni finir que par l'annihilation: et comme la formation des corps organiques animés ne paroît explicable dans l' order de la nature que lors qu'on suppose une *préformation* déja organique, j'en ai inferé que ce que nous appelons génération d'un animal n'est qu'une transformation et augmentation: ainsi, puisque le même corps étoit déja organisé, il est à croire qu'il étoit déja animé, et qu'il avoit la même âme; de même que je juge *vice versa* de la conservation de l'âme, lorsqu'elle est crée une fois, que l'animal est conservé aussi, et que la mort apparente n'est qu'un enveloppement; n'y ayant point d'apparence que dans l'ordre de la nature il y ait des ames entièrement séparees de tout corps, ni que ce qui ne commence point naturellement puisse cesser par les forces de la nature." On wh. Bonnet remarks: J'ai du plaisir à voir notre grand métaphysicien adopter si clairement une *préformation organique* et une *préexistence* corrélative des âmes.

C'est avec fondement qu'il infere de cette préorganization que ce que nous appelons génération d'un animal, n'est qu'une transformation et une augmentation... Il admettoit d'ailleurs l'emboîtement des germes les uns dans les autres. Leibnitz says: "Le méchanisme suffit pour produire les corps organiques pourvu qu'on y ajoute la préformation déja toute organique dans les semences des corps qui naissent, contenues dans celles des corps dont ils sont nés, jusqu'aux semences premières; ce qui ne pouvoit venir que de l'auteur des choses infiniment puissant et infiniment sage lequel faisant tout d'abord avec ordre, y avoit préétabli tout ordre et tout artifice futur."

Leibnitz says: "Ainsi je croirois que les âmes qui seront un jour âmes humaines, comme celles des autres espèces, ont été dans les semences and dans les ancêtres jusq' à Adam, et ont existé par consequent depuis le commencement des choses, toujours dans une manière de corps organisé, en quoi il semble que M. Swammerdam, le R. P. Mallebranche, M. Bayle, M. Pitcarne, M. Hartsoeker, et quantité d'autres personnes très-habiles soient de mon sentiment. Et cette doctrine est assez confirmée par les observations microscopiques de M. Leewenhoek et d'autres bons observateurs."

Leibnitz says: "Je crois avec la plupart des anciens que tous les génies, toutes les âmes, toutes les substances simples créés sont toujours jointes à un corps, et qu'il n'y a jamais des âmes qui en soient entièrement séparées. J'en ai des raisons *a priori*".

Chas. Bonnet.

Substance
&
Being
&
Matter

Les substances ne nous sont connues que dans leur rapports à nos facultés: des êtres doués de facultés différentes, les voient sous d'autres rapports. Mais tous les rapports sous lesquels les substances se montrent aux différens êtres, sont très-réels, parce qu'ils découlent de l'essence même des substances, combinée avec celle des êtres qui les apperçoivent. Il m'est très indifférent qu'il y à quelque part dans l'univers un être qui voie la matière tout autrement que je ne la vois: il me suffit que ce que j'en vois soit clair, immuable et très-distinct de l'idée sous laquelle la substance pensante s'offre à moi.

Je n'affirmerai pas que les attributs par lesquels la matière m'est connue soient en effet ce qu'ils me paroissent être. C'est mon âme qui les apperçoit: ils ont donc du rapport avec la manière dont mon âme apperçoit: ils peuvent donc n'être pas précisement ce qu'ils me paroissent être. Mais, assurément, ce qu'ils me paroissent être résulte nécessairement de ce qu'ils sont en eux-mêmes et de ce que je suis par rapport à eux. Comme donc je puis affirmer du cercle l'égalité de ses rayons, je puis affirmer de la matière qu~~e~~ elle est étendue et solide, ou pour parler plus exactement, qu'il est hors de moi quelque chose qui me donne l'idée de l'étendue solide.

X

Chas. Bonnet.

Les attributs à moi connus de la matière sont donc des effets; j'observe ces effets, et j'en ignore les causes. Il peut y avoir bien d'autres effets dont je ne soupçonne pas le moins du monde l'existence; un Aveugle soupçonne-t-il l'usage d'un prisme? Mais je suis au moins très-assuré que ces effets qui me sont connus ne sont point opposés à ceux que je connois. Si donc j'apperçois au dedans de moi des choses qui renferment une opposition évidente avec les attributs que je connois à la matière, je puis affirmer sans risquer de me tromper, que ces choses ne découlent point de quelqu'autre attribut secret et qu'elles sont des effets d'une Cause très distincte de la matière.

Ainsi, ces facultés que je reconnois m'appartenir, parce que je les exerce à chaque instant et que j'ai une conscience claire de mes propres perceptions; ces facultés, dis-je, l'entendement, la volonté, la liberté, sont des attributs d'un sujet qui ne m'est pas mieux connu que la matière. Ce sont donc encore des effets dont j'ignore la cause. L'ignorance de la cause me porteroit-elle à révoquer en doute l'existence des effets? mettrois-je en question si j'ai un entendement, une volonté, une liberté, uniquement par la raison que je ne connois pas le sujet où ces facultés résident? Ce serait douter de ma propre existence. Je puis donc raisonner très-juste sur les facultés de mon âme, et ignorer profondément l'essence de mon âme. ... En un mot la science de l'âme comme celle des corps repose également sur l'observation et l'expérience.

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C'est là (dans le cerveau) que tous les sens vont rayonner. Mais tout le cerveau ne participe pas à ces mouvemens: l'anatomie tente de nous découvrir quelle est la partie de ce viscère qui les reçoit et où ils paroissent se terminer. Cette partie serait donc le siège immédiat du sentiment, le centre de toutes les impressions sensibles. Ce centre n'est pas un point où ces impressions aillent se confondre; nous avons le sentiment distinct de plusieurs impressions simultanées, et ce sentiment est toujours un et simple. Comment Concilier la simplicité et la clarté de ce sentiment avec l'étendue et avec la mobilité? Ces deux objets que je vois distinctement agissent sur deux points différens de mon *Sensorium*; le point qui reçoit l'action de l'un, n'est pas le point qui reçoit l'action de l'autre; Car les parties de l'étendue sont distinctes les unes des autres; l'étendue ne peut donc avoir le sentiment un et simple de deux choses distinctes. Je compare ces deux objets, et de cette comparaison il naît en moi une troisième perception encore distincte des deux autres: c'est donc un troisième point de mon Sensorium qui est affecté; et j'ai de même le sentiment un et simple de ces trois impressions simultanées. . . .

Le sentiment L'étendue matérielle ne compare donc pas; car le point où tomberoit la comparaison seroit toujours très-distinct de ceux que les objets comparés affecteroient. Il ne pourroit donc en résulter un sentiment unique, un *Moi*. . . . Le sentiment du *Moi* ne réside donc pas dans la substance matérielle.

C'est ainsi que nous sommes conduits à admettre qu'il est en nous quelque chose qui n'est pas matière, et à qui appartiennent le sentiment et la pensée. Nous nommons cette chose une *Ame*, et nous disons que l'âme est une substance immatérielle, pour désigner l'opposition que nous remarquons entre ses facultés et les propriétés de la substance matérielle. Ces deux substances ne nous offrent rien de commun; et pourtant elles sont unies, et l'Homme résulte de leur union. Nous devons renoncer à pénétrer ce mystère: l'ame ne peut se connoitre elle-même; elle ne connoît que par le ministère des sens; et comment des sens matériels lui donneroient-ils la perception d'elle-même? Elle ne connoît pas plus la matière, qu'elle ne se connoit elle-même: elle ne la voit qu'à travers un milieu; elle n'en juge que dans le rapport à ses sens. Nous n'appercevons donc des deux cotés que des effets, des résultats; et les principes, le comment, restent enveloppés dans une nuit profonde. . . .

L'homme, formé de deux substances, n'étoit point appellé à la Spiritualité pure; et nous savons qu'il sera éternellement un être mixte. . .

Ce n'est point parce que je crois l'âme un être plus excellent que la matière, que j'attribue une âme à l'homme; c'est uniquement parce que je ne puis attribuer à la matière tous les phénomenes de l'homme.

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En general, on est très convaincu de l'existence du corps; on ne l'est pas si générálement de celle de l'âme. La supposition que l'âme existe n'est cependant gratuite; elle est fondée sur l'opposition qui est entre la simplicité du sentiment et la composition de la matière.

Ce Moi qui apperçoit, compare,

raisonne, &c. Ce *Moi* qui a des notions d'étendue, de division, de mouvement, &c., ce *Moi* qui se modifie de tant de manières differentes, est toujours un, simple, indivisible. . . .

Comme je sens que j'existe, parce que j'ai la conscience de ma modification actuelle, je sens pareillement que j'ai la volonté de mouvoir certaines parties de mon corps, et que cette volonté s'exécute.

J'admets donc que mon âme est douée d'une *activité* qui se modifie diversement: j'entends par cette activité la capacité qu'a mon âme de produire en elle et hors d'elle ou sur son corps certain effets. . . . Je suppose que le corps agit sur l'âme.

. . . Je parle des Corps comme existans, parceque j'ai l'idée des corps. Il m'importe fort peu que je me trompe, ou que je ne me trompe pas sur cette existence. Ce que je reconnois ici pour évident, c'est que l'idée que j'ai du corps diffère essentiellement de l'idée que j'ai de l'âme.

. . . Le papillon et la chenille ne composent qu'une même unité.

Sous la forme de chenille l'insecte n'avoit que douze yeux: sous celle de papillon il en a des milliers.

Sous la forme de chenille l'insecte

avoit des dents et broutoit un aliment grossier; sous celle de papillon il a une trompe fine, et pompe le miel des fleurs.

Sous la forme de chenille l'insecte n'avoit point de sexe; sous celle de papillon il a un sexe, et goute les plaisirs de l'amour.

L'insecte acquiert donc sous sa dernière forme d'autres organes, et par conséquente bien d'autres sensations.

... Avant les découvertes de Newton avoit-on soupçonné que la lumière est un corps très-composé – un rayon solaire est un faisceau de sept rayons diversement colorés et immuables – et les élémens de chaque rayon sont essentiellement différens des élémens de tous les autres.

Spirit Body

Il me semble donc que je puis inférer de ces faits la possibilité que Dieu fait une machine organique avec une matière analogue à celle de la lumière, et dont les élémens soient assez variés pour fournir à la composition d'un grand nombre de parties essentiellement différentes.

.. Je conçois donc que c'est par cette petite machine éthérée, que les objets agissent sur l'âme et que l'âme agit sur son corps.

Je ne chercherai point à deviner comment les sens communiquent avec cette petite machine; si cette communication se fait uniquement par l'entremise du fluide nerveux, dont la nature paroit analogue à celle des élémens de cette machine; ou si cette communication s'opère par les extrémités solides des filets nerveux, dont l'assemblage compose les organes des sens. Au fond, il importe peu à mon but de décider cette question.

Ainsi, quelle que soit la manière de cette communication, les fibres du siège de l'âme qui correspondent avec les sens en reçoivent certaines déterminations qui constituent le physique de la mémoire ou du souvenir. (Bonnet believes memory is dependent on a brain).

La mort rompt cette communication du siège de l'ame avec les sens et des sens avec le monde que nous connoissons. Mais la nature du siège de l'âme est telle, qu'elle peut le soustraire à l'action des causes qui operent la dissolution du corps grossier. Dans ce nouvel état, l'homme peut conserver son Moi, sa personnalité. Son ame demeure unie à une petite machine dont quelques fibres ont retenu des déterminations plus ou moins durables.

4 … La marche de la nature ne se fait points par sauts. Elle prépare de loin et dans une obscurité impénétrable les productions qu'elle expose ensuite au grand jour. Si elle a placé dans la chenille

le germe du papillon, dans la graine le germe
× de la plante, qui en doit naître; pourquoi
n'auroit-elle pu placer dans le corps humain le germe d'un corps qui lui succèdera?

(Bonnet is hampered in his theory by obsolete notions of the resurrection of the body &c. and an attempt to conform to the orthodox notions of his day in respect to an intermediate state, &c.)

Les phénomènes de la sensibilité et de l'activité nous ont conduit comme par voie de conséquence naturelle à conjecturer que le siège de l'âme est formé d'une matière analogue à celle du feu ou de la lumière. Les parties de cette petite machine qui ont été préparées pour la vie à venir et qui n'exercent point ici bas leurs fonctions, sont donc formées de la même matière.

Bonnet's Germ Theory. . . . Une saine philosophie nous apprend à penser qu'il n'est point dans la nature de vraie génération; mais, que les corps qui nous paroissent etre engendrés, ne font que se développer, parce qu'ils existoient déja tout formés en petit des germes.

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Chrysalis × Ce n'est pas le corps visible de la Chenille qui se convertit en papillon; c'est un autre corps organique, d'abord invisible, qui se développe dans celui de la Chenille.

Chas. Bonnet.

Leibnitz Says: "Il n y a point de transmigration par laquelle l'ame quitte entièrement son corps et passe dans un autre. x Elle garde toujours, même dans la mort, un corps organisé, partie du précédent, quoique ce qu'elle garde soit toujours sujet à se dissiper insensiblement et à se reparer et même à souffrir en certain tems un grand changement. Ainsi au lieu d'une transmigration de l'âme, il y a transformation, enveloppement ou développement et enfin fluxion du corps de cette âme."

Quoted by Bonnet:— x "Dieu ne récompense donc point; il ne punit point, à parler métaphysiquement: mais il a établi un ordre en conséquence duquel la vertu est source du bien, le vice source du mal."

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L'opinion commune qui condamne à une mort éternelle tous les etres organisés, à l'exception de l'homme, appauvrit l'univers. Elle précipite pour toujours dans l'abîme du néant une multitude innombrable d'etres sentans, capables d'un accroissement considérable de bonheur, et qui en repeuplant et en embellissant une nouvelle terre, exalteroient les perfections adorables du Créateur.

Chas. Bonnet.

Germe Ce mot (germe) ne désignera pas seulement un corps organisé réduit en petit; il désignera encore toute espèce de préformation originelle dont un *tout* organique peut résulter comme de son principe immédiat.

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Les plantes se developpent comme les animaux: il y a chez celles-là, comme chez ceux-ci, un principe secret d'impulsion qui se retrouve dans chaque partie et qui préside a l'évolution.

Il est prouvé que l'*irritabilité* est le principe vital dans l'animal. C'est l'irritabilité qui est la véritable cause des mouvemens du cœur. Nous ignorons encore le principe vital de la plante; peut-être y en a-t-il plusieurs subordonnés les uns aux autres.

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Il est vraisemblable que les animaux sont appellés à revêtir un jour un autre état qui perfectionnera et ennoblira toutes leurs facultés. J'ai assez fait sentir que les moyens physiques de ce perfectionnement peuvent exister actuellement dans l'animal et qu'ils ont pu y exister dès le commencement des choses. On comprend que je veux parler de ce germe impérissable auquel je conçois que l'âme est unie, et qu'elle ne doit point abandonner. C'est cette âme unie de tout tems à ce corps invisible, qui constitue, dans mon hypothèse, la véritable *personne* de l'animal. Tout le reste n'en est donc que l'écorce, l'enveloppe ou le masque.

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The Spiritual Body

Combien est-il manifeste que la Souveraine puissance a pu unir dès le commencement l'ame humaine à une machine invisible et indestructible par les causes secondes et unir cette machine à ce corps grossier sur lequel seul ~~à~~ la mort exerce son empire!... une telle préordination que le cerveau actuel en contint un autre, sur lequel le premier fit des impressions durables, et qui fût destiné à se developper dans une autre vie...

La célerité prodigieuse des pensées et des mouvemens de l'âme, la célerité des mouvemens correspondans des organes et des membres paroissent indiquer que l'instrument immédiat de la pensée et de l'action est composé d'une matière dont la subtilté et la mobilité égalent tout ce que nous connoissons ou que nous concevons de plus subtil et de plus actif dans la nature.

Nous ne connoissons ou nous ne concevons rien de plus subtil ni de plus actif que l'ether, le feu élementaire ou la lumière. Etoit-il impossible à l'auteur de l'homme de construire une machine organique avec les élémens de l'ether ou de la lumière, et d'unir pour toujours à cette machine une âme humaine? Assurément aucun philosophe ne sauroit disconvenir de la possibilité de la chose; sa probabilité repose principalement sur la célérité prodigieuse des opérations de l'âme et sur celle des mouvemens correspondans du corps.

... Si donc l'homme doit conserver sa personnalité dans un autre état; si cette p. dépend essentiellement de la mémoire; si celle-ci ne dépend pas moins des déterminations que les objets impriment aux fibres sensibles et qu'elles retiennent; il faut que les fibres qui composent le véritable siège de l'âme participent à ces déterminations, qu'elles y soient durables, et qu'elles lient l'état futur de l'homme à son état passé.

Si l'on n'admet pas cette supposition philosophique, il faudra admettre que Dieu créera un nouveau corps pour conserver à l'homme sa propre personnalité ou qu'il se révélera immédiatement à l'âme.

... Pour que notre connoissance intuitive pût nous conduire à la certitude sur cet état futur réservé à l'homme, il faudroit que nos sens ou nos instrumens nous démontrassent dans le cerveau une préorganization manifestement et directement relative à cet état: il faudroit que nous pussions contempler dans le cerveau de l'homme le germe d'un nouveau corps, comme le Naturaliste contemple dans la chenille le germe du papillon.

Mais, si ce germe du corps futur existe déja dans le corps visible; si ce germe est destiné à soustraire la véritable personne de l'homme à l'action des causes qui en détruisent l'enveloppe ou le masque, il est bien évident que ce germe doit être formé d'une matière prodigieusement déliée, et telle à peu près que celle d l'êther ou de la lumière.

Or, est-il le moins du monde probable
x que nos instrumens seront un jour assez perfectionnés pour mettre sous nos yeux un corps organisé formé des élémens de l'ether ou de ceux de la lumière?

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x La raison de mon existence est hors de moi.

Un être qui existe par sa propre nature ou dont l'essence est d'exister, est un être qui existe nécessairement.

Les déterminations ou les attributs de l'être nécessaire sont donc immuables.

J'ai la plus parfaite certitude que je change à chaque instant. La raison de mon existence n'est pas en moi; je suis donc un être contingent.

L'univers aussi porte tous les caractères de la contingence.

... Puis donc qu'une chaine d'êtres successifs ne peut exister par soi, il faut qu'il y ait hors d'elle une cause de son existence.

Ce n'est pas que j'apperçoive une liaison nécessaire entre ce que je nomme une cause et ce que je nomme un effet; mais, je suis obliger de reconnoitre que je suis fait de manière que je ne puis admettre qu'une chose est, sans qu'il y ait une raison pourquoi elle est et pourquoi elle est comme elle est et non autrement.

... La cause de l'univers existe donc par Soi; son essence est d'exister, et tout ce qui est est par elle.

(Il a déduit de la considération du mouvement la necessité d'un premier moteur.) (J'ai la plus grande certitude que le mouvement n'est pas essentiel à la matière).

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The Spirit Body

Le corps spirituel, formé probablement d'élémens semblables ou analogues à ceux de la lumière, n'exigera point ces réparations journalières qui conservent et détruisent le corps animal. Ce corps glorieux que nous devons revêtir subsistera, sans doute, par la seule énergie de ses principes et de la profonde méchanique qui aura présidé à sa construction. Il y a bien de l'apparence encore, que ce corps éthéré ne sera pas soumis X à l'action de la pesanteur comme les corps grossiers que nous connoissons. Il obéira avec une facilité et une promptitude étonnantes à toutes les volontés de notre âme, et nous nous transporterons d'un monde dans un autre avec une facilité et une peut-être égale à celle de la lumière. Sous cette économie de gloire nous exercerons sans fatigue toutes nos facultés, parce que les nouveaux organes sur lesquels notre âme déploiera sa force motrice seront mieux proportionnés à l'énergie de cette force, et qu'ils ne seront point assujettis à l'influence de ces causes perturbatrices qui conspirent sans-cesse contre notre economie actuelle. Notre attention saisira à la fois et avec une égale force un très grand nombre d'objets plus ou moins compliqués; elle les pénétrera intimément; elle en démêlera toutes les impressions partielles, en découvrira les ressemblances les plus légeres, et en déduira sans effort les résultats les plus généraux. Notre génie sera donc proportionné à notre attention; car j'ai montre que l'attention est la mère du génie.

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In mesmerism we have a promise that transcends this life and the purposes of our present organization.

Townshend.

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Townshend.

Newton says: "The effluvia of a magnet can be so rare and subtile, as to pass through a plate of glass without any resistance or diminution of their force, and yet so potent as to turn a magnetic needle beyond the glass."

And this effect of magnetism is but one of the actions of electricity. Townshend's Mesmerism p. 273.

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It is only when mysteriously united to a body that spirit is brought into relationship with place or extension. ib.

The needle that has become a magnet has undergone no change which any mortal sight is fine enough to appreciate, has acquired no weight which can be detected by our earthly senses. ib. p. 283.

We pass a magnet over a needle – we see the needle move – we infer that the effect is produced by a magnetic current or medium – a something wh. propagates motion from the magnet to the needle. This something we cannot indeed behold, yet do we believe in it.

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There are more intuitions, or (as Kant calls them) "cognitions *a priori*" than we suppose. What *first* taught the mind the connexion between the sign and the object? Plainly an intuition; for it is self-evident that we cannot advance to new knowledge but by the aid of previous knowledge. But where is this previous knowledge to begin? . . . Thus it appears that we cannot but concede the existence of a first knowledge, which came to us in a totally different manner from any other, about wh. we could neither have pondered nor reasoned. ib. p. 321.

Bonnet.

Chas. Bonnet says (Essai Analytique, Chap. 5):— Un organe qui communique avec tous les ſens et par lequel l'âme agit ſur toutes les parties de ſon corps ſoumises à ſon empire, est, ſans doute, un organe prodigieusement composé. Il est, en quelque sorte, l'abrégé de tous les organes, un ſystême nerveux en raccourci. Les ramifications de tous les nerfs doivent aller aboutir à cet organe ou avoir avec lui la communication la plus étroite. Le siege de l'âme ſervit ainsi un centre où tous les nerfs iroient rayonner.

Mais les nerfs ſont mols, ils ne ſont point tendus comme les cordes d'un instrument: les objets y exciteroient-ils donc des vibrations analogues à celles d'une corde pincée? Ces vibrations communiquèroient-elles à l'instant au siege de l'âme? La chose paroît difficile à concevoir. Mais, si l'on admet dans les nerfs un fluide dont la subtilité et elasticité approchant de celles de la lumière ou de l'éther, on expliquera facilement par le secours de ce fluide, et la celerité avec laquelle les impressions se communiquent à l'âme et celle avec laquelle l'âme exécute tant d'operations différentes.

× See Townshend p. 342

(See latter part of this translated in Townshend's Mesmerism, p. 342.

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Sterne says: "The ancient philosophy materialized spirit, and the modern, in order to be even with it, has spiritualized matter. What extremes are men liable to run into who depart one line from common Sense. (See Townshend, p. 347.)

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I recognize only two grand divisions in nature, namely, of cogitative and incogitative – that which thinks and that which thinks not. Townshend. p. 347. Yet that, in a different sense there may exist a medium between sensible objects and the mind, I trust to demonstrate is not impossible.

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Eclecticism.

Janet Il n'y a donc qu'une seule manière d'expliquer la diversité des systèmes sans tomber dans la déclamation et dans l'intolérance : c'est de supposer que chacun de ces systèmes représente un des aspects, une des formes de la vérité. Cet aspect des choses, saisi par un esprit supérieur, est devenu pour lui l'univers tout entier. Il a tout ramené à un principe unique, il en a fait découler par une déduction arbitraire. On sait à quel prix les esprits systématiques obtiennent ces belles unités, dont la logique est irréprochable : c'est tantôt par des mutilations de la réalité, tantôt par des hypothèses nouvelles venant étayer et compliquer l'hypothèse fondamentale. Souvent aussi la réalité est plus forte que le système et s'y fait sa place. De là des incohérences, des contradictions que l'on dissimule comme on peut, et par de nouvelles machines. . .

Ainsi la méthode éclectique est entrée aujourd'hui dans la philosophie et n'en sortira plus. . . Mais l'eclecticisme absolu, comme la science absolue, (et ce serait la même chose), n'est qu'en Dieu et n'est pas en nous.

On ne peut échapper à cette vérité évidente, que "tout système est étroit et erroné;" ni à cette autre non moins évidente, "que la raison ne peut comprendre le tout des choses sans être elle-même ce tout." Et cependant que deviendrait la philosophie, s'il n'y avait plus de système?

Paul Janet.

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Pantheism Incontestablement il y a du vrai dans le panthéisme. Personne ne peut nier que Dieu ne soit en toutes choses d'une certaine manière. Des choses qui seraient absolument hors de Dieu seraient sans Dieu. Ainsi Dieu est partout, Dieu est en tout, est Deus in nobis. Voilà le vrai du panthéisme. D'un autre côté pourtant, il y a des créatures, il y a des individus, il y a des forces indépendantes. Si l'on n'admet pas cela, Dieu est tout; si Dieu est tout, tout est Dieu; si tout est Dieu, il n'y a pas de Dieu. Maintenant comment ces deux vérités peuvent-elles se concilier? (He does not claim that eclecticism does this: "Je n'hésite point à le le dire, tout système est une erreur, et l'éclectisme lui-même, en tant que système est une erreur. Pour tout concilier, il faut tout savoir: pour enchainer toutes les vérités, il faudrait être au centre de la vérité même.) P. Janet.

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Guizot Or M. Guizot croit pouvoir établir démonstrativement ces trois propositions qui composent toute son apologétique chrétienne: 1. Il y a des

Guizot – Paul Janet.

problèmes naturels et universels qui se posent nécessairement dans toute âme humaine; 2d la science ne résout pas ces problèmes; 3d. la religion, c'est-à-dire le christianisme, les résout. . . .

Quels sont ces problèmes? . . C'est l'origine et la destinée de l'homme, l'origine et la fin de l'univers; c'est la liberté et la Providence, et leurs rapports; c'est le mal, c'est le salut.

Pourquoi la douleur? pourquoi la prière? pourquoi tant de misère? tant de grandeur? P. Janet.

These problems have always existed. Must they continue to exist. The positivist school thinks not. They must not be posited, since we have not the means to resolve them. They must be rooted from the heart, and we must confine ourselves to the study of the world as it is. But this school discusses them nevertheless, thus proving that they are indestructible.

Cousin reduces the various systems of philosophy to four: sensualism, idealism, scepticism, mysticism.

Les grands systèmes philosophiques de notre tems sont: le spiritualisme, le rationalisme, le positivisme, le panthéisme, le matérialisme, le scepticisme.

Les trois états de Comte (theologic, metaphysic, positive) ne sont pas successifs, mais toujours simultanés. L'esprit humain subsiste toujours tout entier.

Pantheism Le rêve de panthéisme, c'est l'unité universelle. De l'unité de la vérité, il conclut à l'unité de l'être; il confond l'idée et la réalité, la science et l'existence, et abolit tous les êtres en les concentrant dans un seul, lequel n'est plus qu'une notion impersonelle, un nom stérile qui tombe à son tour dans le néant. La conséquence inévitable du panthéisme, c'est l'idolatrie humaine, l'anéantissement de toute personnalité, de toute individualité, de toute liberté. Fondé sur un méthode arbitraire, niant résolument l'expérience, le panthéisme vient échouer devant la conscience et les instincts éternels du cœur humain. Telle est du moins cette espèce de panthéisme, que l'on peut appeler idéaliste, où Dieu se réduit à l'idée de l'être universel, c'est-a-dire à une pure abstraction.

Une autre forme plus concrète, plus conséquente et plus simple est le panthéisme matérialiste, en d'autres termes l'athéisme, solution claire et commode en apparence; mais qui, au lieu d'expliquer le problème, le supprime. Le problème c'est la complexité, la dualité de l'être humain, physique et moral, âme et corps.

x Le matérialisme lui-même commence par reconnaître cette distinction. Matière et force, dit-il: donc la force est autre chose que la matière; puis il confond ce qu'il a distingué et croit avoir expliqué le problème, en considérant comme inséparables deux éléments distincts. Au fond, le matérialisme, comme le panthéisme, explique tout par une abstraction.

Paul Janet — Guizot.

Il reste encore un grand système : c'est le scepticisme. ...Suivant M. Jouffroy, l'homme croit par instinct et doute par raison.

...Aux obscurités, aux contradictions, aux lacunes des solutions philosophiques, M. Guizot oppose la clarté, la fécondité des solutions chrétiennes.

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Pos. Positivisme. Guizot says: "Le matérialisme est le fond des idées de cette école, et quand elle ne se dit pas matérialiste, c'est qu'elle est inconséquente et pusillanime."

Janet says: "Le positivisme, dans son esprit, dans sa vraie idée, dans la pensée d'Aug. Comte, son fondateur, se distingue essentiellement du matérialisme."

Elle ne nie rien, elle n'affirme rien ... Ce qu'il y a d'établi, c'est que les deux bouts des choses nous sont inaccessibles, et que le milieu seul, ce que l'on appelle en style d'école le *relatif*, nous appartient." Littré.

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L'apologétique chrétienne n'ait aucune prérogative, aucun avantage sur la philosophie, et n'est elle-même qu'une sorte de philosophie. Janet. . . .

Si maintenant vous affirmez l'incontestable supériorité du christianisme sur toutes les autres religions, vous n'aurez d'abord rien prouvé; supériorité ne signifie pas vérité absolue.

... Lorsque M. Guizot nous dit: la philosophie ne résout pas les problèmes; la religion les résout, nous pourrions tout aussi bien renverser les termes, car la religion résout les problèmes pour les croyants, et la philosophie les résout pour les philosophes. Paul Janet.

Socrate dit: "Sachez quelle est la nature et la grandeur de la divinité, qui peut à la fois tout voir, tout entendre, être presente partout et prendre soin de tout ce qui existe!" Janet.

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La création est démontrée, suivant M. Guizot, par ce fait capital que le monde n'a pas toujours été tel qu'il est; la vie a commencé sur la surface du globe; les espèces animales ont aussi commencé; l'homme a commencé également. Or, à moins d'admettre que la vie est le résultat des forces de la matière, et que l'homme, comme toute espèce animale, est le produit d'une lente élaboration des siècles, on est obligé d'avoir recours à la puissance surnaturelle du Créateur; mais d'une part la doctrine de la génération spontanée, de l'autre la doctrine de la transformation des espèces, sont des hypothèses arbitraires, repoussées par la science. Donc la création est nécessaire. (M. Guizot ici fait reposer le dogme fondamental de la religion sur une opinion toute scientifique!) Paul Janet.

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Cicero de Divinatione

I find indeed no people or nation, however civilized and cultivated, or however wild or barbarous, who have not deemed that there are antecedent signs of future events, and some men capable of understanding and predicting. Cicero, trans. by Coleridge. Friend p. 391.

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Bacon So far are physical causes from drawing men off from God and Providence, that on the contrary, the philosophers employed in discovering them can find no rest, but by flying to God or Providence at last.

Bacon's Advancement of Learning, p. 143.

The magnetic influence or stream is not palpable, as is a current of water, or of air; nor is it visible like the former; nevertheless it proves its reality plainly enough by giving a regular figure to loose particles of iron, and by sustaining a mass of steel in contact with the magnet. Phys. Theory, Taylor's p. 195.

The possibility and the probability of the existence near us of invisible sentient beings may be stated in another manner. p. 196 ib. See Grove's remark on Sp. existences.

The theory of a spiritual body is distasteful to advocates of the resurrection of the natural body inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the same. See De Puchesse, Immortalité, p. 266.

We here assume the abstract probability that our five modes of perception are partial, not universal means of knowing what may be around us. Taylor's Phys. The. p. 186.

Nothing is more dangerous than to indulge notions which tend to make us think our tastes and principles more refined and elevated than those of the Creator and Ruler of the Universe. See Manichean notions. See Schopenhauer & Hartman, as quoted by Strauss. (See Taylor's Phys. The. p. 181.) The prejudices of a somewhat morbid spirituality might bind us (says Taylor, see p. 181) to distaste the animated world around us as God's work:.. and thus it is conceivable that the realities of the upper world, when first they open upon minds imbued with prepossessions of this kind, may excite a recoil and an amazement, such as may try the principles of piety. ib.

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The soul is the life-principle, fulguration, monad, which proceeding from the Source of mind becomes the principle of individualization, and growth in the ~~particles of bodies adapted to receive it — in the~~ corporeal vesicles fitted to be animated by it and to form interior and exterior bodies for the moulding, development and use of the human and immortal person. E.S.

. . . There is a disposition among certain refined Cartesians to sneer at the evidences through spiritual phenomena as coarse, unspiritual, unworthy of God. (Quote S. Johnson, Bartol &c.) So the ancient Manichean doctrine regarded this visible world as unworthy of God; and in modern times, Schopenhauer has said (See p.) and Hartman has said (See p.). The question is not whether these phenomena are acceptable to refined and squeamish minds but whether they are true. E.S.

Christ's Resurrection.

"After that he appeared in another form" ~~Luke~~ Mark XVI, 12. "But their eyes were holden that he should not know them". Luke XXIV, 16. Here too he must have appeared in another form.

X "O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken". ib. 25. Apply to this to parallel confidence in words of mediums.

"And he vanished out of their sight". ib. 31. Perfectly conformable with the modern phenomena.

"Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. And when he had thus spoken he showed them his hands and his feet. .. He took it and did eat thereof. .. While he blessed them he was parted from them and carried up into heaven. Luke, Chap. 24. (Not one word as yet showing it was the same body that was in the sepulchre).

St. John. Mary Magdalen knows not that it is Jesus – takes him for the gardener. Jesus saith, Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father. ... When the doors were shut came Jesus and stood in the midst. .. He showed unto them his hands and his side. He breathed on them. ... Eight days after came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in their midst. ... Saith to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my hand. ... Again showed himself ~~at~~ the Sea of Tiberias. .. Jesus stood on the shore.

But the disciples knew not that it was Jesus. . . He saith to them "Cast the net on the right side of the ship, and ye shall find." . . The disciple whom Jesus loved saith unto Peter, It is the Lord. . . . Jesus saith unto them Bring of the fish that ye have caught. And they drew the net to land full of great fishes, 150. Jesus saith, Come and dine. Taketh bread & giveth to them and fish likewise. Saith to Simon Peter, Lovest thou me more than these? Feed my lambs. . . Feed my sheep. Feed my sheep. Verily, verily, &c. See v. v. 18, 19. . . . Follow me. &c.

Not a word here to make us believe that Jesus appeared in the old body of flesh.

Acts 1, 9. He is taken up, and a cloud received him out of their sight. Acts II, 31: "He seeing this before spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither did his flesh see corruption. (Reference to David & the fruit of his loins _ See v. v. 30, 31, &c. Chap. 2 Acts.
Ac. to St. Paul, Chr. appeared to the apostle Peter.

Janet Janet says: "The problem for materialists consists in reconciling the personal identity of the mind with the perpetual mutability of the organized body. . . Materialists have never taken much trouble to solve this problem; and yet it is not clear that the identical can result from the variable or the one from the compound."

See p. 139 Janet's Mat. of the Day.

The unity of the ego is an undoubted fact. Where will you place remembrance in an object that is ever changing. The mystery is not explained by the identity of vibrations any more than by the persistence of form.

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M. Bouiller. (See E. Scherer's Melanges, p. 160). "Son livre (B's) Du principe vital et de l'âme pensante, est à la fois un examen lucide de la question et une histoire des discussions auxquelles elle a donné lieu. Reste à savoir si la solution à laquelle l'auteur se rattache est destinée à clore les débats. L'âme, selon lui, l'âme qui pense, le principe raisonnable, est en même temps le principe de la vie et de toutes ses manifestations. Ainsi posée, la question me paraît sans issue. . . La vérité est qu'il n'y a pas deux âmes dans l'homme, on pourrait dire qu'il n'y en a pas même une, mais qu'il y a un homme, un être organisé, dont la pensée est l'une des fonctions, et dont l'ensemble de ces fonctions constitue la vie.

[Thus man, ac. to M. Scherer, is simply a result of physical organization, &c. May not M. Bouiller, however, be right? What is the principle of life, the soul, in seeds? Is it not the vivifying power from the sun, the heat and light sent into beginnings, initiatives, placed in the earth as in a womb, and fitted for its reception?

And so the life, the soul, the reasonable principle in man — may it not be ~~mediately~~ a transmission mediately ~~from the cosmic life~~ through the sun of our system?, from the supreme cosmic life? If it be objected, that the Sun may wax old and perish, I reply, Do you then deny an eternal, a spiritual principle to the sun which shall survive all changes of form? Think you the Sun is a dead ball of fire? Does the little flower it vivifies live, while the source of its life is dead?

"All the forces in the earth may be deduced from the Sun", says Büchner. We have no objection to accepting this, for there remains the question whence came the Sun's force? And how do we know that it is not spiritual, deific, in its origin?

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"We cannot scientifically contend with belief," says Virchow; "for science & faith exclude each other." True; but the arrogant blunder of the scientists is in assuming that the Spiritualist believes merely, and does not know; when the truth is he knows *his* phenomena just as much the Chemist knows *his*. It is not science but # faith says Moleschott which supports the idea of a personal continuance after death. Unprejudiced science is compelled to reject the idea of an individual immortality." But Spiritualism can show that science *does* support the idea. "Physiology" says Vogt, decides definitely against individual immortality.

Mr. Rudolph Wagner says that though the moral law requires the hypothesis of an individual soul, there is nothing in the last results of physiology to lead him necessarily to acknowledge a distinct soul.

x Dumas, the Chemist, says: "Les Plantes et les Animaux dérivent de l'air, ne sont que de l'air condensé, ils viennent de l'air et y retournent." Liebig, in his Chemical Letters eloquently expresses the same idea. According to Anaximenes, air is the Beginning of things. All things are produced from it; all resolved into it; all nourished by it.
See Lewes p. 7.

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According to Diogenes of Apollonia the air is a vital force, a soul, living and intelligent

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It is manifest that Origen, in his reply to Celsus, appeals to spiritual phenomena in support of Christianity. Ueberweg says: "He (Origen) finds his proofs of Christianity in the fulfilled prophecies of the Old Testament, in the miracles which were daily performed on the sick, and on persons possessed by evil spirits, through the reading of the Gospel, &c.

Celsus opposed to faith in the resurrection of the body the doctrine of the nothingness of matter and of the future existence of the soul alone.

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To mock at philosophy, what is that but to philosophise? Pascal.

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Is strong belief, nay, a belief almost amounting to knowledge, of a future life necessarily conducive to morality? Not at all. Look at the Italian brigands — at savages &c. Neither is the absence of belief necessarily conducive to immorality. (Give philosophy of subj.)

An enthusiastic Darwinian, Mr. John Fiske, relieves the juvenile sprightliness of his animosity to spiritualism by denouncing it as totemism. Then changing his metaphor he makes it a weed, which springs up where science is absent. When we consider that among the scientific men, who have admitted the main facts of Spiritualism, are such men as Alfred R. Wallace, Camille Flammarion, Prof. De Morgan, Herman Fichte, &c. Mr. Fiske's temerity may seem somewhat hasty and blind. E. S.

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Buckminster It is an historical fact that the Rev. Joseph Buckminster, who died in 1812, just before his death announced that his distinguished son, the Rev. J. S. Buckminster of Boston, was dead. It was afterwards ascertained that the son had breathed his last about the moment his father made the announcement. And it shd. be remembered there were no telegraphs or railroads in those days.

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Ghosts Melancthon wrote: I have myself seen ghosts, and I know many trustworthy persons who affirm that they have not only seen them, but even carried on conversations with them…" (De Anima Recogn.: Wittemb. 1595, p. 317), and Luther said nearly the same; Calvin and Knox also expressed similar convictions. Schele de Vere's Modern Magic, p. 9. (1873) Putnam, G.P., N.Y.

Schele De Vere.

This soul is not, as materialists maintain, merely the sum of all perceptions obtained by the collective activity of bodily organs — a conclusion which would finally make it the product of mere material atoms, subject to constant physical and chemical changes. Schele de Vere p. 5.

There is overwhelming evidence that the soul may, at times, act independently of the body. ib.

Witchcraft was neither purely artificial, a mere delusion, nor can it be accounted for on a purely natural basis. ib. The essential part in it is the magic force, which does not belong to the natural but to the spiritual part of man. ib. p. 23.

The Odyssey mentions numerous cases of the evocation of spirits. In the "Persius" of Aeschylus the spirit of Darius, father of Xerxes, is called up and foretells all the misfortunes that are to befall poor Queen Atossa. ib. p. 45.

The oldest Magi, the wise men of Persia, considered disembodied spirits as deceased human beings. . . .

. . Perhaps they recalled Dr. Hart's assertion that our own Society for the Advancement of Useful Knowledge had, in 1855, refused to hear a report on Spiritualism, preferring to discuss the question: "Why do roosters always crow between midnight and one o'clock?" . . In the same manner Herr Humboldt refused to examine the question.

Schele de Vere.

Schele de Vere shows a very imperfect acquaintance with modern Spiritualism. He says: "That there are no spirits at work in these phenomena requires hardly to be stated; .. all that is told is but an echo of the more or less familiar views of men. .. The visions of hands, arms, and heads, which move about in the air and may occasionally even be felt, are either mere hallucinations or real objective appearances, due to a peculiar condition of the air, and favorably interpreted by the predisposed mind.(!!) ib. p. 62. Hence, also, our own continent is, for its superior dryness of atmosphere, much more favorable to the development of such phenomena than that of Europe. ib.

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Outsiders had expected that at least an intercourse with departed spirits might be secured, and thus the immortality of man might be practically demonstrated. But this also has not yet been done. What then can we learn from modern magic? Only this: that there are evidently forces in nature with whose character and precise intent we are not yet acquainted, and which yet deserve to be studied and carefully analyzed. ib.

... Hence all great thinkers have readily admitted the existence of miracles: a Locke and a Leibnitz as well as, more recently, a Stahl and a Schopenhauer. ib. p. 93.

Dreams .. Thus Balaam prophesied: "He hath said, which heard the words of God and knew the knowledge of the Most High, which saw the vision of the Almighty, falling into a trance, but having his eyes open."

... For dreams did not lose their importance at the coming of Christ. To his reputed father "the Angel of the Lord appeared in a dream", bidding him to take Mary to his wife; again he was warned in a dream "not to return to Herod," and the Lord spake "to Paul in the night by a vision" more than once, as he was by a dream also sent to Macedonia.

... Daniel had his secret "revealed in a night vision" but such a favor was denied to Saul, for "the Lord answered him not, neither by dream nor by Urim, nor by prophets." To Solomon, on the contrary, "the Lord appeared in a dream by night" many times. ib.

... Even our great Franklin, with his eminently practical mind and well known aversion to every kind of superstition, firmly trusted in views which he believed to have come to him in dreams. ib.

(See Cicero's account (in De Divin.) of the two men who were traveling from Arcadia to Megara. There one stayed at an inn while the other went to stay with a friend. The latter dreamed of his friend's urging him to come to his help as the innkeeper was about to murder him. This dream was repeated; but the 2d time the friend added, it was too late, as he had been murdered, and his body would in the morning be carried out of the city, hid under a load of manure. The dreamer goes at an early hour to the city gate, stops the driver of a load of manure, and asks what he has hidden under it. The driver flies, trembling. The body of the murdered man is found, & the innkeeper executed. ib. p. 98.

..St. Basil dreamed of Julian's, and immediately made the news known to the people.

Melancthon tells us that he was at a convent with a certain Dr. Jonas, when letters reached him requesting him to break to Dr. J. the sad news of his daughter's death. M., at a loss how to do it, by an instinctive impulse asks if Dr. J. ever had any remarkable dreams. The latter replied, he had dreamt during the preceding night of his return home & of the welcome he had got from all his family except his oldest daughter who had not appeared. M. then told him this daughter was dead. ib. p. 99.

...The German poet Gustav Schwab rec'd the first intimation of the French revolution of 1848 thro' a remarkable dream wh. his daughter had the night preceding Feb. 24th.: the streets of Paris filled with excited crowds, the barricades and the bloody encounters... Several days after news came of the expulsion of the Orleans family &c.

Dreams ...Melancthon, in his work on the Soul, divides dreams into common dreams, void of importance; prophetic dreams, arising from the individual gifts of the sleeper; divine dreams; demoniac dreams, such as the witches' Sabbath.

Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Machiavelli, Boccacio, Thomasius, and even Kant have all repeatedly admitted the existence of what we familiarly call ghosts. ib.

Kant on Spirits

Kant says: "Immaterial beings, including the souls of men and animals, may exist, though they must be considered as not filling space but only acting within the limits of space." He admits the probability that ere long the process will be discovered by which the human soul, even in this life, is closely connected with the immaterial inmates of the world of spirits, a connection wh. he states to be operative in both directions, men affecting spirits and spirits acting upon men, though the latter are unconscious of such impressions "as long as all is well." In the same manner in which the physical world is under the control of a law of gravity, he believes the spiritual world to be ruled by a moral law wh. causes a distinction between good and evil spirits. The same belief is fully discussed by French authors, De Mousseaux, De Mirville, &c. ib.

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... The Catholic Church has never absolutely denied the doctrine of ghosts. (v. St. Matt. xxvii. 52).

X ..St. Augustine mentions saints by whom he was visited.

X Calmet (Benedictine Abbot) (18th cent. . . .) says: "Apparitions of ghosts would be more readily understood if spirits had a body; but the Holy Church has decided that angels, devils, and the spirits of the departed are pure immaterial spirits."

Bengel (German) on the contrary: "Probably the

Schele de Vere.

apparitions of the departed have a prescribed limit and then cease; they continue probably as long as all the ties between body and soul are not fully dissolved."

Spirit Body . . . The idea of such an "ethereal body" is very old, and has never ceased to be entertained. Thus, in 1306, already Guido de la Torres, who died in
+ Verona, appeared during eight days to his wife, his neighbors, and a number of devout priests, and declared, in answer to their questions, that the spirits of the departed possessed the power to clothe themselves with air, and thus to become
Bayle perceptible to living beings. . . Bayle also, in his article on Spinoza (note 2) advocates the possibility, at least, of physical effects being produced by agents whose presence we are not able to perceive by the use of our ordinary senses.

Lessing Even so eminently practical a mind as Lessing's was bewildered by the difficulties surrounding this question, and he declared that "here his wits were at an end."

Goerres Another great German writer, Goerres, in his "Christian Mystic" (iii. p. 307), not only admits the existence of ghosts, but explains them as "the higher prototypal form of man freed from the earthy form, the spectrum relieved of its envelope, which can be present whenever it chooses within the prescribed limits of its domain." ib. 159.

Simonides . . . Valerius Maximus relates of Simonides, the poet, th. he was about to enter a vessel for a voyage when he saw a dead body unburied on the shore.

he delays his departure to bury the corpse. The following night the spirit of the man appears to him and advises him not to sail on the next day. He obeys the warning and escapes shipwreck and loss of life. He commemorates the event in his verses.

.... Phlegon, freedman of Emp. Hadrian, tells in his "De Mirabilibus" the well-known story of Machates and Philinnion, wh. Goethe reproduces in his Bride of Corinth. p. 162.

ellfield ... A famous jurist, Counselor Hellfeld in Jena, an hour before midnight was on the point of signing the death warrant of a cavalry officer. His clerk was present. All at once they both heard heavy blows fall on the window as if the panes were struck with a cavalry whip. The judge delays his action, substitutes a minor punishment, and ere the year closes another criminal is caught who volunteers the confession that he was the perpetrator of the crime for which the soldier was punished. p. 164. ib.

... St. Augustine mentions the farm of a certain Hesperius as disquieted by loud noises till the prayer of a pious priest restored peace. 165.

tone-throwing The Cath. Ch. has a St. Cesarius, who purified in like manner the house of the physician Elpidius in Ravenna, which was filled with evil spirits & only admitted the owner after he had passed thro' a shower of stones. 164, 5.

.. Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon, relates that the baths at Chaeronea were haunted by the ghost of Damon, who had there found his death.

.. Egypt has its haunted houses in nearly ev. village.

Haunted houses

In Cairo there are a great number, while in Tunis whole streets were abandoned to ghostly occupants. In Nankin a great mandarin owned a great building wh. he could neither occupy nor rent, because of its evil reputation. At last the Jesuit Riccius offered to take it, and then the trouble ceased. 170. ib.

. . . The Duke Charles Alexander of Wurtemberg, of unholy memory, died at the town of Ludwigsburg, perhaps by murder. For years afterwards the palace was the scene of most violent disturbances; even the sentinels, powerful and well-armed men, were bodily lifted up and thrown across the parapet of the terrace. At other times the whole building appeared to be filled with people; doors were opened & closed, lights were seen in the apartments, and dim figures flitted to and fro. Large detachments of troops under the command of officers, specially selected for the purpose, were ordered to march through the palace more than once, on such occasions, but never discovered a trace of human agency. (Kerner. *Bilder*. p. 143). ib. p. 176.

Clairon

. . . For Mlle. Clairon's account (authenticated by police of Paris) see p. 175 Schele de Vere.

Removal

. . . *The complete removal of persons by an unseen power.* The idea of such occurrences must have been current among the Jews, for when "there appeared a chariot of fire and horses of fire . . . and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven" (II Kings ii. 11), the sons of the prophets did not at once resign themselves, but sent fifty strong men to seek him, "lest peradventure the Spirit of the Lord hath taken him up and cast him upon some mountain or into some valley" (v. 16). In the New Testament the same mysterious removal is mentioned in the case of Philip, after his interview with the Ethiopian, whom he baptized. "The Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip, that the eunuch saw him no more," and "Philip was found at Azotus" (Acts viii, 39, 40).

Throwing Stones . . . Cotton Mather tells of case of Geo. Walton at Portsmouth, 1682. Invisible hands threw such a storm of stones against his house that the door was burst open, though the inmates when hit by the stones felt only a slight touch. Then the stones began to fly about inside, and to destroy the window-panes from within; when picked up by some of the witnesses, they proved to be burning hot; they were marked and placed on a table, whereupon they commenced to fly about once more.

Wesley . . . See John Wesley on disturbances at his father's house at Epworth Rectory. Dr. Priestley says of these: "It is perhaps the best authenticated and the best-told story of the kind."

These phenomena took place in 1716; consisted in sounds of an incessant walking about, sighing and groaning, cackling & crowing; a hand-mill was set whirling about by invis. hands, and the Amen with wh. W's father ended the family prayer was ac. by a noise like thunder. A faithful watch-dog sought refuge with men, and barked furiously as if intensely agitated.

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Seeress of Prevorst In Mme Hauffe's case (v. Kerner), plates & glasses, tables and chairs were violently thrown about in the house in which she lived; a medicine phial rose slowly into the air & had to be brought back by one of the bystanders, and an easy chair was lifted up to the ceiling, but came down again quite gently.

Phelps of Stratford Con. '. . Once, on returning from church, he found that all the doors of his house, which he had carefully locked, were open & everything in the lower room in confusion. In the upper story a room was found occupied by eight or ten *persons* diligently reading in an open Bible, wh. each one held close to his face. They were bundles of clothes cunningly arranged to rep. human figures. Everything was cleared away and the room locked; but in three minutes the clothing, wh. had been put aside, disappeared, & when the door was opened the same scene was presented. For seven months the house was haunted by most extraordinary phenomena; noises of every kind were heard by day as well as by night; utensils & window-panes were broken before the eyes of numerous witnesses by invisible hands, and the son of the house, eleven years old, was bodily lifted up and carried away to some distance. The most searching inquiry led to no result. (See Dr. P's letter to E. S.)

Schele De Vere.

Phenom. in Java

The people of the W. part of Java believe in spirits & their constant com. wi. men. The throwing of stones, &c. by invisible hands is common, & is called Gandarua. A German, Assistant-Resident at Sumadang, in Dutch serv., some 30 yrs. ago (1843) had a wife who had taken a fancy to a native child ten yrs. old. This child's dress wd. be all at once covered with betel-juice; stones would fall fr. ceiling at her feet. Phenomenon occurred so often, lady applied to a neighboring native sovereign who sent a force of armed men; but the red spots appeared & the stones fell as before. A Moham. Mufti came, but on his opening the Koran it was hurled to one side & the lamp to another. A Major Michiels was sent by the Gov.-Gen. at Breitenzorg to investigate. House surrounded by an armed force. Major took the little girl on his knees; but her dress was soon covered with red spots & the stones flew about as before. No one injured. Stones were picked up till they filled a huge box; were wet or hot, as if just picked up fr. road. A sheet of linen was stretched fr. wall to wall so as to form an inner ceiling under the real ceiling; & now not only stones but fruit fr. surrounding trees, freshly gathered, & mortar fr. the kitchen fell into the newly formed tent. Furniture disturbed, tumblers & wine-glasses tossed about &c. King Wm. II (of home gov't) ordered an investigation. But no explanation was got; only the fact was asc. that sim. phenom. had been often observed in other parts of isl. & were consid. com. by natives

Schele De Vere.

Doubles

Pythagoras had, ac. to popular report, appeared to num. friends before he died.

St. Augustine states that he himself had appeared to two persons who had known him only by reputation. At another time his form appeared to a famous teacher of eloquence in Carthage, & explained to him several most dif. passages in Cicero's writings.

A. Moritz, in his "Psychology" relates the case of a distinguished diplomat, whose pet-dog became restless, & suddenly dip. noticed a white vapor rise by his bedside, & assume the outline & even the features of dip's. mother. He espec. noticed a purple ribbon in her cap. He jumped out of bed, but she fled & vanished, leaving a bright glare at the place of disap. It was found, that at that hour, 10 A.M., the old lady had been very ill, thought she was dying, and had thought so anxiously of her son & sister, that her first qu., on recovery, was wh. she had not been visited by them. She wore that day, cont. to habit, a purple ribbon in her night-cap. De Vere p. 200.

... See case in Owen's Footfalls of Bdry. Bruce on merchant vessel, &c.. Cases by Stilling... Ac. of Michael Mercatus & Marsilius Ficinus, rel. by Henry More. De V. says of it: One of the oldest well authenticated cases of the kind occurred at the court of Cosmo de Medici in 1499... They had agreed that he who shd. die first shd. appear to the other.

Mercatus
Ficinus

Schele De Vere.

Ficinus had died in Florence at the very moment Mercatus had seen him in Rome. De Vere says: Our authority for this remark. &c. is the Cardinal Baronius who knew Mercatus & heard it from his own lips; but the dates wh. he mentions do not correspond with the annals of history. He places the event in the year 1491, but Michael de Mercati was papal prothonotary under Sixtus V. (1585–90) and could not, therefore, have been the friend of Ficinus, who was one of Savonarola's adherents.

Schopenhauer ... Schopenhauer, the eccentric philosopher, mentions a sick servant girl in Frankport on the Main, who died one night at the Jewish hospital. Early the next morning her sister and her niece, who lived several miles from town, appeared at the gate of the institn. to make inquiries about their kinswoman. Both, tho' living far apart, had seen her distinctly during the preceding night, & hence their anxiety. p. 213 ib.

Arndt ... E. M. Arndt, the famous poet, relates that one day in 1811 his aunt Sophie appeared to him, holding in her arms two little boys, which he held out to him as if she wd. say, 'Take care of them.' The next day he got the news that his aunt had died at the hour she appeared to him. p. 213.

Wieland .. Wieland relates an extraordinary case. p. 214.

Oberlin ... Oberlin declares, in his memoirs, that for nine years he had constant interviews with his deceased wife.

... Rambouillet (marquis) and a marquis of Preci had agreed to inform each other of their fate after death. Rambouillet appeared to Preci while the latter was lying

ill of a fever, told him he had been killed in a skirmish the day before, and showed him the fatal wound in his thigh still bleeding. A few days later the mail brought news of R's having fallen in battle as he had described. He had told Reci he wd. fall in his first battle. This was fulfilled, as P. fell in his 1st fight near St. Antoine.
(Petaval, Causes Célèbres
xii. 269.

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Schubert. ... The parents of the well known writer Schubert were exceptionally endowed wi. magic powers of this kind. p. 217.

Higher Sp. Power ... There is a higher spiritual power within us wh., often slumbering and altogether unknown, or certainly unobserved, during life, becomes suddenly free to act in the hour of death. It acts not consciously but by intuitive impulse.

Double ..If... we call the vision a "double"; in German a "Doppelgänger."

Villiers ... Lilly, Baxter & Clarendon all relate the remarkable warnings wh. preceded the murder of Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. To an old & attached friend, one Parker, the Duke's deceased father appeared holding a knife in his hand, with wh., he sd. his son wd. be murdered. Parker related the circ. but the D. wd. give no heed to it. A few days after Lieut.-Felton assassinated the duke wi. precisely such a knife as Parker had seen in his visions.

Schele De Vere

Phosporic Lights. The human body, even in ordinary life, is capable of giving out luminous undulations; and science teaches that in disease they appear quite often. Dr. Phipson mentions the case of a woman in Milan, during whose illness a so-called phosphoric light glimmered about her bed. Dr. Marsh, in his "Evolution of Light from the Human Subject", says: "About an hour and a half before my sister's death we were struck by luminous appearances proceeding from her head in a diagonal direction. We had candles brought, fearing she herself wd. perceive the luminosity," & th. it might disturb the tranquillity of her last moments."

Dr. Donovan in the Dublin Medical Press, 1870, relates the case of Harrington, an Irish peasant, whom he attended for phthisis, and in whose case mysterious lights wd. be seen every night in his cabin. The subj. attracted much attention. On three nights Dr. D. witnessed them. "Once," he says, "I perceived a luminous fog resembling the aurora borealis; and twice I saw scintillations like the sparkling phosphorescence exhibited by sea-infusoria. From the close scrutiny I made, I can with certainty say, that no imposition was either employed or attempted." p. 256, 7.

Explained by De V. as an efflux or escape of the nerve-force, transmuting itself into luminosity as it leaves the body. Mme Hauffe saw the nerves as shining threads. Other Somnambules see the breath as a faint luminous mist. . . See the Cases of Reichenbach's patients.

"It is his angel" = it is a phantom rep. his living body.

Schele De Vere.

Hauffe. Mme. Hauffe was apparently unable to distinguish between real visions in a trance and the mere offsprings of her imagination. . . .

Dr. Kerner himself heard many spirits, but saw only one, and that only as "a grayish pillar". He saw Mrs. H's boots pulled off by invisible hands while she was lying almost inanimate in a trance on her bed.

Divination . . . Plato, Plutarch, and Pythagoras, Cicero, and even Porphyrius all adm it without hesitation the power of divination, & speak of its special vigor in the moments preceding death. 272. Melancthon ascribed warning dreams to the prophetic power of the human soul.

Henry IV. . . . Richelieu tells us in his Memoirs that the Prévost des Maréchaux of the city of Pithiviers was one night engaged in playing cards in his house, when he suddenly hesitated, fell into a deep musing, and then, turning to his companions, said solemnly: "The King has just been murdered!" It proved that on that same evening, at the same hour of 4 P.M., Henry IV had really been murdered.

Xavier . . . Xavier had caused a fleet to be sent from Sumatra against the Malacca pirates. He had fallen down unconscious at the foot of the altar, where he had been fervently praying, and when he came out from his trance he related every detail of wh. had occurred, at a distance of 200 Portuguese leagues; the engagement & a great victory with

cv.

a loss of only three lives. He further told the very day & hour when the official report wd. be rec'd. (Orlandini l. vii. ch. 84). De V.

Swedborg ... Swedenborg's vision of the great fire at Stockholm is too well authenticated to admit of doubt.

Zschokke Zschokke gives his acct. of his own gifts as a seer. (A man of unblemished character who died in 1850, universally regretted.) See his acct. p. 295.

Dodd Rev. Mr. Dodd's adventure, in wh. he saves a man fr. committing suicide.

Goethe ... Goethe's grandfather predicted both a great conflagration and the unexpected arrival of the German Emperor; and a dream informed him beforehand of his own election as alderman and then as mayor of his native city.

Henry IV. ev. ... Henry IV of France felt his death coming, ac. to the unanimous evidence of Sully, L'Etoile, and Bassompierre, & sd. before he entered his coach on the fatal day: "My friend, I wd. rather not go out to-day; I know I shall meet with misfortune."

... Mr. Martin has gathered all that cd. be learnt of second sight in the Shetlands, in a work of great interest.

Homer ... Homer makes dying Hector warn Achilles of his approaching end; and Calanus, when in the act of ascending the funeral pile, replies to Alexander's question if he had any request to make: "No, I have nothing to ask, for I shall see you the day after to-morrow." And on that day the young Conqueror died.

Cazotte ... Cazotte's famous prediction is confirmed by Wm Burt (who was present) in his "Observations on the Curiosities of Nature." The story is told by La Harpe (not the tutor of the Russian Emperor). See p. 329 De V. La Harpe died in 1823, with well-estab. char. He was of high social standing. pp. 328, 9.

... The so-called temple-sleep of the Greeks was almost identical with modern somnambulism.

Mesm. in China ... For nearly 1100 yrs. the Chinese have believed in an inherent power possessed by every human being, & wh. they call yu-yang, wh. is identical wi. a universary yu-yang. Ac. to this view, every one, endowed wi. the proper ability, can dispose of his own yu-yang & diffuse a portion of it over others, so as to cure their infirmities.

X ... (In clairvoy. somnamb.) The simp. explanation is that it is not the eye wh. (always) sees nor the ear wh. hears, but that images & sound-waves are carried by these organs to the great nervous centre, where we must look for the true source of all our perceptions. If in magnetic sleep the same images & waves can be conveyed by other means, the result will be precisely the same as if the patient was observing with open eyes & ears. p. 408.

... Thus persons have seen by means of almost every part of the body.

Transference of Senses A lady treated by Despine thus heard with the palm of her hand & read by means of her finger-tips; but she wd. ascribe her sensations to the nat. senses; flowers laid near her fingers caused her to draw in air thro' nostrils & exclaim How sweet! And if objects were placed ag. the sole of her foot, she wd. often exclaim: "What is that? I cannot see it distinctly!"

... The highest magic phenom. con. wi. magnetic sleep consist in the perception of hidden things & in the infl. ex. over persons at a distance. Only a few of these can be exp. by nat. causes. The senses (external) at times cease to operate & man, for a time, becomes endowed wi. a higher power.

... Hufeland says that in the mag. sleep persons can see the interior of the bodies of others. The clairvoyant Alexis once saw through the clothing of a visitor a scar; he pronounced it to be the effect of a dog's bite, and then stated all the facts attending the accident, &c.

... Prediction of death of King of Wurtemberg. (See Planchette p.).

Gustav. Vasa Another case is that of the Swedish King, Gustavus Vasa, assassinated 1792 by Ankarstrom. Ac. by his physician he once called as Count Haga upon a patient, treated by Aubry, a ~~patient~~ pupil of Mesmer. She recognized him at once, told him that his life was in danger, that he wd. be murdered. The King was deeply impressed. (A. Gauthier. Hist. du Somnamb. ii p. 246). 415.

Language of Somnambules All magnetisers note the improvement in the language of patients. Humble peasant women have used the most elegant forms of their native language; travelers have recovered the use of idioms once known to them but long forgotten. Radnick mentions a young girl who, when magnetized, always fell back into Welsh, wh. she had spoken as a child but had long since forgotten.

.. Insensibility to impressions from without is another phenomenon wh. magnetic sleep has in common with many other conditions.

Cloquet Surgical operation in magnetic sleep. See Planchette. (When Dr. Warren of Boston asked Dr. Cloquet why he had never repeated the experiment, the Dr. replied that the prejudice ag. mesm. in Paris was such that he dared not do it.) Dr. Forbes reports two cases of amputation in magnetic sleep, wh. were successful, and sim. successful experiments have been made in England & in India.

.. Schopenhauer ("Parerga," etc. I. p. 246) Schopenhauer mentions that a consumptive patient in Russia directed, in her magnetic sleep, the attending physician to put her for nine days into a state of syncope. He did so. She enjoyed perfect rest, & by this means recovered.

.. Abercrombie mentions the case of a girl who when awake was stupid, awkward in her movements, and unable to appreciate music; somnambulic she became clever and showed amazing information & great musical talents.

Aristotle on Somnamb. .. Somnambulism is mentioned in Aristotle & its symptoms correctly reported by him. He states that the sufferers rise in their sleep, walk about & converse, that they distinguish objects as if they were awake, ascend trees, pursue enemies, perform tasks, & then quietly return to bed. 424.

... In somnambulis the eyes are generally closed or the balls turned up; & in the rare cases in which they are open they generally see nothing.

See Naesmith for cases of somnamb.

Cases of scholars who, sorely puzzled by difficult problems, gave them up before retiring, & then, in the night, rose in a state of somnamb., and solved them easily, are not uncommon. 428.

... The convulsionnaires at the grave of the Abbé Paris, Cemetery of St. Medard, 1727.

... Filippo Neri, Ignatius Loyola, and the founder of the order of Dominicans remained suspended in the air for hours & days; one of them, the Carmelite monk P. Dominicus, in the presence of the king and queen of Spain and their whole court. (Calmet p. 153).

Cases of stigmatization. The annals of the Church
X abound with cases. ... There are men who
X can, by an energetic effort of will, cause red
X spots, resembling inflammation, to appear in
+ almost every part of the body. In extreme
cases this power extends to the production of
syncope. St. Augustine mentions a number
of such cases. (De civit. Dei l. xiv. ch. 24).

See remarkable case of Col. Townshend. p. 456. (Cheyne, Encyc. Malad. London 1733 p. 307).

See case of Francis of Assisi (stigmatization).

Filippo Neri (cases of levitation). Lifted up together wi. chair on wh. he sat. Frequently. He died in 1595, 80 yrs. old, on the day and at the hour he had long before foretold.

... Nor is there any reason why the soul in man should not be able, by its higher powers, to perceive & to consort with souls detached fr. mortal bodies. .. Man, after death, continues to live a soul, with all the peculiar powers wh. make up our spiritual organism.

... All the higher faculties of human nature — all the powers that makes us Man — are visibly independent of that mere structural organization in which ... many of the animals surpass us. Ed. Rev.

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Elliotson + Schopenhauer

Elliotson and Schopenhauer, though both unbelievers, were yet convinced of the marvels of mesmerism, somnambulism, &c. Elliotson was converted to a belief in a future state by the phenomena he witnessed through Home.

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Gerald Massey Jan. 1874.

Two theories of man's origin. One depicts him as descending fr. God to the devil; the other as ascending fr. dust to God in the fulfilment of a glorious destiny. .. It was as a law-breaker man came to recognize a law-maker. The perfection of man's nature will be to learn his utter dependance on the divine love. How did the invisible world first make itself known? By becoming visible itself.

Parsons — Geo. Henry Lewes.

Substance Ac. to Swedenborg material substance and spiritual substance are two forms or modes of the one substance wh. flows forth from its Divine origin, and takes one or the other of these forms, to provide for man a body and a world, first in this beginning of life, and then in the life wh. follows this. Parsons p. 20

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That wh. underlies matter & is its substance flows forth from the Divine substance. But mind causes, or rather co-operates to cause, the form, shape, incidents & appearance, under which we give to this substance the name of Matter. This is not a false appearance. But of the reality we can know nothing but from the action of mind. The exceeding import. lies in the rational belief it permits us of a body, a home, and a world, when we leave this world. If material subst. is but the effluence fr. the Divine, caused to affect us in a certain way in this world, the same effluence may provide a sp. body and a sp. world (See Parsons, 15, 16).

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Lewes According to Lewes, both Life and Mind are processes, or, under another aspect, functional products. Neither is a substance; neither is a force. ... The Vital X Force manifested by an Organism may be likened to the mechanical force manifested by a Machine, which is a pure abstraction, ... No philosophic biologist now tries to reach and modify a vital force, but only to reach and modify those biostatical conditions which, when considering them as causes, and condensing them all into a single expression, he calls Vitality or the Vital Forces. . . .

The same is true of Sensibility. Vitality and Sensibility, Life and Consciousness, are abstractions having real concretes. They are compendious expressions of functional processes conceived in their totality, & not at any single stage. A function is the activity of an organ. And since Function is a conception wh. is in its very nature distinguished from the material conditions, obviously both Life and Mind are terms which designate phenomena that are immaterial, the two conceptions of Matter and Motion, although correlative, being mutually exclusive. In so regarding them, however, we are not to conclude that this exclusion justifies the Spiritual hypothesis of Life and Mind. This hypothesis is simply the reintroduction of an unknown kind of Matter to serve as the Substance, in lieu of the known Matter which is presented by the Organism. Who does not see the contradiction of requiring a substance for that which by its definition is not substantial at all, but pure dynamism?

We cannot be sufficiently on our guard in the use of abstractions, & especially against our tendency to confound ideal separations with real separations. It is this tendency which keeps up the tradition of Mind existing apart from Life, and following other laws. We separate for convenience mental phenomena from other vital phenomena and then again separate mental phenomena from neural phenomena; this done, we overlook the real identity, and do not see that every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the two being as the convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere, distinguishable yet identical), and that every neural phenomenon involves the whole Organism; by which alone the influence of the body on the mind, and of the mind on the body, can be explained.

... Psychologists do not keep in view the speciality of the psychological theatre, nor allow for the continual presence of those *sentient conditions* implied in the general term Soul. The spiritualists are prone to split up the sentient organism into independent Faculties, dividing it into Sense, Understanding, Reason, Volition, &c. The materialists split it up into independent Organs. Thus both Schools – th. wh. affirms the unity of the Soul in its Spiritual Substance, & th. wh. affirms the dependence of the Soul on its cerebral substance – practically deny their principle when they come to treat mental phenomena in detail.

... In a vital organism every force is the resultant of all the forces.

.. Mind is only one of the forms of life, and Life is not an entity but an abstraction expressing the generalities of organic phenomena.

... The demonstration that thinking is *Seriation*, and that a series involves Time, disproves the notions of ultimate unity and simplicity applied to a Thinking principle. G. Lewes's Problems of Life & Mind, p. 144.

Geo. Henry Lewes.

Animals ... That animals have sensations, appetites, emotions, instincts, and intelligence—that they exhibit memory, expectation, judgment, hope, fear, joy—that they learn by experience and invent new modes of satisfying their desires, no philosopher now denies.

.. To say that man was endowed with a Rational Soul, inhabiting the organism yet independent of it, and altogether distinct from the Vegetative Soul which ruled the body, seemed an easy way of accounting for all the observed facts.

Untenable as this hypothesis is, I am disposed to regard it with more favor, in some respects, than the crude Materialist hypothesis; for I too hold that the superiority of human Intelligence is due to the presence of an important factor, one wholly wanting in the animal. p. 153.

.. The differences are not of degree, but of kind, the germ of infinite variations.

... The Spiritual hypothesis endows man with a Soul of Spiritual Structure. p. 154.

... Yet the Spiritual hypothesis is scientifically untenable.. It is the introduction of an *unknown* to take the place of the *knowable*.

... To seek for *an* organ of the mind is not less preposterous than to seek for *an* organ of the Life. 160.

... The sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but a variable mechanism wh. has a history... The Sensitive Subject is no *tabula rasa*: it is not a blank sheet of paper but a palimpsest.

Geo. Henry Lewes.

... Our perceptions are evolutions; and having necessarily a history at their back, it is clear that all perceptions are modified by pre-conceptions, all conceptions by pre-conceptions. Hence mental diversities. 162. ... These forms are congenital modifications, and are *a priori* because congenital.

... There are congenital aptitudes wh. cause us to respond in certain ways to certain stimuli.

... The laws of intellectual progress are to be read in History, not in the individual experience. We breathe the social air: since what we think, greatly depends on what others have thought. The paradox of to-day becomes the commonplace of tomorrow. The truths wh. required many generations to discover and establish, are now declared to be innate. 174.

... The Reasoned Realism of this work denies altogether the assumed distinction between noumenon and phenomenon – except as a convenient artifice of classification by which the *unknowable otherness of relations* is distinguished from the *knowable relations*.

... The external world exists, and *among* the modes of its existence is the one we perceive.

.. The subjective aspect has so predominated that Psychology has almost lost its hold of the objective world. .. The object is necessarily object-subject; and the subject is equally subject-object.

× ... Fechner regards material and psychical as the convex and concave of the same curve.

× ... The Laws of thought, or more accurately, the Mental Forms are connate, and so far *a priori*.

.. If we can show that all our knowledge arises from, and is limited to, the reactions of the Organism under stimulus, the qu. reduces itself to the point whether over & above the Organism known as a Complex of physical, chemical, & vital conditions, × there is also a Spiritual Organism interfused through this, & bringing Spiritual properties to Cooperate with vital properties.

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Soul We have no experience from which the Simplicity of the Soul's Substance can be a necessary conclusion analogous to the conclusions of Science. It is founded on the negation of Matter. We imagine that it must be whatever Matter is not. But negations give no positive data.

Kant on the Soul Kant says: "Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance is of no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience sensuously or *in concrete*. The notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that wh. internal or external experience supplies."

That it (the Soul) is a substance at all ought first to be established.

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Thomas Young "We see forms of matter", says Thomas Young, "differing in subtilty & mobility under the names of solids, liquids, & gases; and above these are *semi-material* existences wh. produce the phenomena of electricity & magnetism, and either caloric or an universal ether; higher still perhaps are the cause of gravitation and the immediate agents in attractions of all kinds, wh. exhibit some phenomena apparently still more remote *from all that is compatible with material bodies*; and of these different orders of beings the more refined and immaterial *appear to pervade freely the grosser*. It seems therefore natural to believe that *the analogy may be continued still further* until it rises into existence absolutely immaterial and spiritual."

On the above, Lewes says (while admitting Young's "greatness as an investigator"), — "Did Young ever attempt to verify the sensible meaning of *semi-material* existences?" (All that Young evidently meant was subtler, more attenuated). "Had he done so he must have seen that they could only be either bodies of greater tenuity than those from wh. they are distinguished — or bodies one-half material, the other half non-material. In the first case they are sensibles or extra-sensibles, and subject to all the canons of sensible experience; in the other case they are unthinkables, no definite conception of such hybrids being possible. . . . Semi-material bodies are contradictions; like loud circles, or red tastes, they cannot be united in thought. To pass, as Young does, from material solids to gases, and fr. gases to bodies that are semi-material, and from these to bodies that are wholly spiritual, is as rational as to pass from one term of a series of numbers to a number wh. is an integer *plus* blue, and from this blue integer to a pure blue, and thence to no Color at all. Young professes to be guided by analogy. Yet this analogy has its conditions.

[The fact whether Young was at fault or not depends altogether on the fact whether his conceptions of "Spirit were the same" as those of Mr. Lewes. E. S.]

"In Nature," says J. R. Mayer, "there are two kinds of causes between wh. Experience tells us of no intermediate link. The one kind Comprises those causes wh. are ponderable and impenetrable, *i.e.*, Matter. The other kind Comprises the causes wh. are without these properties, *i.e.*, Forces, wh. are named the Imponderables. Forces are therefore indestructible, variable, imponderable objects."

On this Lewes remarks: "The objection to such a separation of Force from Matter is twofold: It misrepresents the fact of both being pure abstractions; and it transforms a logical into a physical distinction, thus creating two entities, and replunging Speculation into that Scholasticism from wh. the emergence was so laborious. It reintroduces the old Dualism in wh. Matter is passive, destitute of qualities though capable of receiving Motion, capable of housing qualities, and of becoming the temporary tenement of wandering Forces. In this scheme, qualities are merely superadded, and are consequently capable of being separated. The dream of the Alchemists was to effect this separation . . . .

Newton – Pathetic Death.

Mayer's conception is one that can lead only to confusion. The same must be said of all attempts to give expression to the Supra-Sensible." p. 274
"Within the sphere of the Sensible, with its Extra-sensible extensions, there is more than enough to occupy us." ib.

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Newton
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Newton imagined that there might be "a most subtle Spirit", "electric and elastic", pervading & lying hid in all gross bodies; "by the force & action of wh. Spirit the particles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and cohere if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this Spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles."

Lewes, p. 52.

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Jan. 14. 1874. The newspaper of to-day mentions the case of a boy, called "the baby violinist," who died the other day. He was six years old. At a time when he shd. have been in bed, he was made to play before large audiences music wh. excited & thrilled him. He looked exhausted one day, and the manager told him to stay at home. That night as the lad lay in bed with his father, the latter heard him say, "Merciful God, make room for a little fellow" – and with this strange & touching prayer the baby violinist died. See Advertiser (Boston).

Light.

By F. W. Bourdillon.

The night has a thousand eyes,
And the day but one,
Yet the light of the bright world dies
With the dying sun.

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The mind has a thousand eyes,
And the heart but one,
Yet the light of a whole life dies
When love is done.

London Spectator.

In German

Tausend Augen hat die Nacht,
Ein's nur giebt dem Tage Licht,
Doch erlischt der Welten Pracht
Wenn der Sonne Glanz gebricht.

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Tausend Augen hat der Geist,
Ein's nur hat das Herz dabei,
Doch ein ganzes Leben reiszt
Mit der Liebe Tod entzwei.

Tuke.

See Schele de Vere On Stigmata

Stigmata The singular phenomena of stigmata arise from the mind's influence on the capillary circulation through the vaso-motor nerves. None has treated the subject in a more luminous manner than M. Alfred Maury who forcibly observes that ecstatic mysticism, including these remarkable appearances, is "the most striking proof of the influence of the Imagination on the body, and is truly a miracle in the sense of being one of those marvelous effects of the laws of thought, whose secret escapes us and whose extent confounds us." He admits the fact of stigmatization, and explains its occurrence, so far at least as the reference of the phenomena to a certain group of psycho-physical facts may be regarded as an explanation, by a consideration of the influence of dreams upon the skin.

In mentioning those cases in which persons have dreamed that they received blows or wounds, and in the morning have found marks of inflammation on the body, and wh. sometimes, in the course of a day or two, become ulcers, he observes that "just so with visionaries, under the power of the Imagination, by the concentration of the attention, the blood is directed to the place where they fancy they are affected." (xxxv, 1855). Influence of the Mind on the Body, by Daniel Hack Tuke M.D. &c. Phil. H. C. Lea 1873. Republication.

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The organ of mind is but the outgrowth and ultimate development of the tissues and organs of wh. the body is composed; it not only unites them in one common bond, but is, in truth, a microcosm of the whole. Ac. to Swedenborg the likeness or image of the greatest is represented,

Tuke.

as in a mirror, in the least, and of the least in the greatest, and he adds: "Nor can anything be turned over in the mind that, if it please, may not be portrayed *in the extremes*, by means of the fibres; for instance, in action by the muscles. Nay, the very minds & inclinations or affections that excite the principles, shine out upon the face of actions, & gleam through, however they are concealed; showing that *the fibre is the cerebrum continued*. . . There is a likeness of the brain in every fibre. . . Cerebrum & cerebellum are universally present in the body by means of the fibres."

If, then, the development of the minutest germ or cell in the body be a representation of the same principle that works in the formation of the organ of mind; if this organ consists of, and is an outgrowth from, such cells; and if the brain be the grand centre wh. is in immediate relation with the structures & tissues wh. have preceded it, then – the mind must be expected to act on the muscular tissue & thro' the bloodvessels on the vascularity &c. of the Sensory Ganglia.

ib. Last 4 lines altered & condensed.

Cloquet

. . . Cloquet removed a woman's breast during the mesmeric sleep (she being able to converse, but insensible to pain) so far back as 1829. It is said that no fatal case from psychical anaesthesia has occurred. ib.

Psychical anaesthesia

No one doubts (who has studied the history of anaesthetics in all forms) th. whether by inducing a profound & peculiar sleep, or by merely rendering the patient insensible to sensorial impressions related to a certain idea or train of ideas, severe as well as trivial operations may be performed without any pain. ib.

Richardson on a nervous ether

In his "Theory of a Nervous Ether", Dr. B. W. Richardson suggests that there exists, in addition to a nervous fluid, a gas or vapor, pervading the whole nervous organism, surrounding, as an enveloping atmosphere, each molecule of nervous structure, and forming the medium of the influences transmitted from a nerve-centre to the periphery, and from the periphery to a nerve-centre.

. . . Arago is stated to have arrived at the following among other conclusions (in reg. to electric girl): That, under peculiar conditions, the human organization gives forth a physical power, wh., without visible instruments, lifts heavy bodies, attracts or repels them ac. to a law of polarity, overturns them, & produces the phenomena of sound. p. 337. ib.

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Tylor

Mr. E. B. Tylor, in his "Primitive Culture", is in error in supposing that the influence of Swedenborg has had anything to do with "the Spiritualistic renaissance" (as E. B. T. calls it) of our day.

Mr. Tylor also falls into the error of supposing that among the lower races of men the figures of the dead seen in dreams and visions goes far to account for the comparative universality of their belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body.

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The soul, as recognized in the philosophy of the lower races, may be defined as an ethereal surviving being. . . That this soul should be looked on as surviving beyond death is a matter scarcely needing elaborate argument. E. B. Tylor's Prim. Cult. v. 2. p. 20.

E. B. Tylor.

The evidence tends towards the opinion that the genuine savage doctrine of the future life either involves no moral retribution, or accepts it only at a rudimentary stage. ib. p. 83.

. . . Yet he who believes that his thread of life will be severed once and forever by the fatal shears, well knows that he wants a purpose and a joy in life, which belongs to him who works for a life to come. ib. 98.

In Asia manes-worship comes to the surface in all directions. The Chinese, the Hindu worship their ancestors.

. . . Among the Indians of N. America the Sioux will say, "Spirits of the dead, have mercy on me" Schoolcraft. ib. 331.

. . . The modern Parsi prays: "Of my sins which I have committed against the ruler Ormazd, against men, and the different kinds of men. . .. Deceit, contempt, idol-worship, lies, I repent of. .. All and every kind of sin which men have committed because of me, or which I have committed because of men; pardon, I repent with confession". ib. 339.

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Levitation The miracle of rising and floating in the air is one fully recognized in the literature of ancient India. .. This prodigy became an attribute of Christian saints. St. Philip Neri used to be raised several yards from the ground during his rapturous devotions. So Loyola, St. Dominic, St Dunstan, St. Theresa. Calmet relates instances. (St. Francis also).

E. B. Tylor.

The Spirits would release the Davenport boys (mediums) from their cords however carefully tied about them. Now the idea of supernatural unbinding is very ancient, vouched for as it is by no less a personage than the crafty Odysseus himself, in his adventure on board the ship of the Thesprotians:

"Me on the well-benched vessel, strongly bound,
They leave, and snatch their meal upon the beach.
But to my help the gods themselves unwound
My cords with ease, though firmly twisted round."

ib.

..The belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance. ib. 1. 384.

The conception of a personal soul or spirit among the lower races may be defined as follows: It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapor, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind to flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things. ib. 387.

Capt. Jonathan Carver obtained from a Cree medicine-man a true prophecy of the arrival of a canoe with news next day at noon.

J. Mason Brown, traveling with two voyageurs on the Coppermine River, was met by Indians of the very band he was seeking, these having been sent by their medicine-man, who, on inquiry, stated that "He saw them coming, and heard them talk on their journey." ib. 403.

The North Am. Indians held ever animal to have its spirit.

Modern idea of the Soul

. . . In our own day and country the notion of souls of beasts is to be seen dying out. Animism, indeed, seems to be drawing in its outposts, and concentrating itself on its first and main position, the doctrine of the human soul. This doctrine has undergone extreme modification in the course of culture. It has outlived the almost total loss of one great argument attached to it, — the objective reality of apparitional souls or ghosts seen in dreams and visions. The soul has given up its ethereal substance, and become an immaterial entity, "the shadow of a shade." Its theory is becoming separated from the investigations of biology and mental science, which now discuss the phenomena of life and thought, the senses and the intellect, the emotions and the will, on a groundwork of pure experience. There has arisen an intellectual product whose very existence is of the deepest significance, a "psychology" which has no longer anything to do with soul. The soul's place in modern thought is in the metaphysics of religion, and its especial office there is that of furnishing an intellectual side to the religious doctrine of the future life.

Such are the alterations wh. have differenced the fundamental animistic belief in its course through successive periods of the world's culture. Yet it is evident that, notwithstanding all this profound change, the conception of the human soul is, as to its most essential nature, continuous from the philosophy of the savage thinker to that of the modern professor of theology. Its definition has remained from the first that of an animating, separable, surviving entity, the vehicle of individual personal [experience], existence. The theory of the soul is one principal part of a system of religious philosophy, which unites, in an unbroken line of mental connexion, the savage fetish-worshipper and the civilized Christian. The divisions wh. have separated the great religions of the world into intolerant and hostile sects are for the most part superficial, in comparison with the deepest of all religious schisms, that wh. divides Animism from Materialism.

E. B. Tylor v. 1, p. 453.

Agassiz – Ray – Brown.

Agassiz on Immortality of animals

Agassiz, with much power and beauty, advocates the thought that animals as well as men have a future life. Alger, p. 36 (Agassiz Contributions to the Nat. Hist. of the U. S. vol. 1. pp 64-6

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I. Ray

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Dr. I. Ray, in his "Contributions to Mental Philosophy" (1873) says: Belief in Spiritualism in any shape is more a matter of temperament than of evidence and reason. .. I do not mean to convey the idea that the facts of Spiritualism are entirely the creation of fancy or of fraud. Many of them are susceptible of proof, and are attested by evidence that places them beyond a reasonable doubt. They indicate the existence of agencies, certainly, that have not yet been admitted into the philosophy of the schools. .. It is surprising that physicians, especially, with such well-recognized affections before them as catalepsy, somnambulism, ecstasy, and double consciousness, should jump to the conclusion that all the facts of Spiritualism and Animal Magnetism are utterly anomalous & impossible. (p. 272.)

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Sleep

J. F. Balfour Brown, in his "Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity," says: "Sleep is, in many cases, local, as it were, and while a man's eyes are shut his sense of touch may be exalted. .. The albatross is said to sleep on the wing."

... In cases of pure somnambulism the waking consciousness of the individual knows nothing of the experiences of the sleeping consciousness. It is as if there were two memories.

... Combe mentions the case of a porter who in a state of intoxication left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober could not recollect what he had done with it. But the next time he got drunk he recollected where he had left it. Dumas' novel of "The Physician is founded on the phenomenon of double consciousness.

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Immortality Facultative There are many who share the belief of Archbishop Whately (v. his Scripture Revelations of a Future State) – that immortality is a gift reserved only for those who shall be found worthy of it; the eternal death spoken of in the New Testament being the final extinction of the sinner. (I think Whately's subsequent acquaintance with Spiritualism must have cured him of this presumptuous conceit.)

× Tacitus thought that immortality might be conferred as a special reward on great souls.

M. Charles Lambert has published a work in which he takes the ground that immortality is *facultative*; that it depends on ourselves to extinguish or develop the immortal germ. (v. Caro's "L'Idée de Dieu," p. 327. (Forsyth, Robt. held this view)

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Bonnet In his work "La palingenesie Philosophique," Bonnet "has advocated the immortality of the souls both of men and animals, and carried the idea of development in nature to such an extent as to imagine that plants may become animals, animals men, and men angels." – Morell.

Tucker The vulgar notion of a resurrection in the same form and substance we carry about at present, because the body being partaker in the deed ought to Share in the reward, as well requires a resurrection of the sword a man murders with or the bank-note he gives to Charitable uses.

Abraham Tucker.

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Locke Locke says to Stillingfleet: "The soul hath no greater Congruity with the particles of matter wh. were once united to it, but are so no longer, than it hath with any other particles of matter." Alger. p. 501.

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Bonnet It may be that within man's material system lurks an exquisite spiritual organization, invisibly pervading it and Constituting its vital power. This ethereal structure is disengaged at last from its gross envelope. This theory of an inner body is elaborately wrought out in Bonnet's "Palingénésie Philosophique." ib. p. 507.

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Lange, &c. Or it may be that there is in each one a primal germ, a deathless monad, wh. is the organic identity of man.. This Spirit-germ, born into the present life assimilates and holds the present body around it, out of the materials of this world; born into the future life, it will assimilate and hold around it a different body out of the materials of the future world.. Each Spirit will be clothed fr. the material furnished by the world it resides in. ib. 507.

St. John – Locke – Wm Graham.

The immortality of the soul was as firmly believed then (before Christ) as it is now; and the same virtues were supposed to secure happiness in a future state.

J. A. St. John. Note to Locke's Reasonableness of Chris. p. 197.

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Locke is in error when he says: "Before our Saviour's time, the doctrine of a future state, though it were not wholly hid, yet it was not clearly known in the world."

ib. 198.

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The Evolution Theory.

Wh. seeks to trace back all this beautifully ordered and infinitely diversified Universe, as well as the aspiring soul of man, to a common rude origin in protoplasmic germs with a mysterious principle of development. . . The Materialist solution is none at all. Without the conception of Thought or Will, to say the primitive germs had a principle of development presents no intelligible meaning to the mind. It rolls the whole mystery of creation apparently into a short phrase; but it just happens to be meaningless, unless we show a conception under it, which this theory seeks to eliminate. It restates the mystery we knew existed; but this time it is made to appear more mysterious than before, because we can give no meaning to the statement that inert matter can possess a principle of development. If it do, it is not matter.

p. 7. "Idealism: an Essay, Metaphysical and Critical, by Wm Graham, M.A. of Trin. Col. Dublin. London: Longmans, Green, & co. 1872.

Hegel — Wm Graham.

Hegel

By thought alone Hegel tries to explain not only all present phenomena, but all the past presented by Man and Nature; the history of both being but Thought, conscious or unconscious, in its successive stages of progress; the last stage on which we and Nature now stand, and which we now constitute, being Man and Nature as they now are. But as Nature for Man is his conscious interpretation of her by Reason, and what she is beyond what Reason sees in her is zero, we may say only Reason or conscious Thought exists. In fact, with Hegel, Thought, which alone exists, has two senses, conscious and unconscious; it was unconscious in Nature before Man ever appeared on the earth, and it is now conscious in man.

... Yet Nature must have existed in geologic periods long before Man as unconscious Thought. And this unconscious Thought is for conscious Thought inconceivable, and therefore in one sense non-existence, but in another sense existence.

... Thought, at first, was alike different from what we now regard as Mind and what we now regard as Matter, for consciousness is an accident, not an essential of Thought; and this pure Thought possessed within itself a principle of development into the endless aspects and individualities of Mind and Matter, all of which are manifestations of it, from the insentient dust beneath our tread by insensible gradations to the sublimed Spirit of Man, which broods over the mystery, while aspiring to an immortality of its individual being. Pure thought gave the created existence to things, but conscious thought gives them now their second and intelligible which is also their real existence.

Pure thought — this pure essential thought — first substantiated itself in (and by so doing made) the matter of the earth and sun and stars, and gave them law and harmony; then infused itself under, and burst into life in, the vegetable world; became by further development incarnate as well as sensitive in animals; and lastly, as its highest sublimation, awoke as conscious spirit in Man. In him it passed through the successive stages of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, common Reason, up to the illumination of the Philosopher, the Poet, in whom it shines as the true and steady light, which alone knows the Universe, and which by knowing makes the Universe a World of Truth, and Beauty, for themselves and the rest, out of materials which are dull and dark and non-existent for other eyes. ib. p. 25.

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These two — Hamilton and Mansel — were a sort of moral police — our philosophical coast-guards — to keep off German Pantheism, like the Rinderpest of to-day, from English shores. ib. p. 26.

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Berkley If, as Berkely said, our sense-apprehension of the external world *is* the external world, the next question of Hume and Positivism was inevitable. Is not Mind or Spirit equally, our inner sense-apprehension of it? But Berkeley had given an answer by anticipation, when he affirmed, "I am conscious that I am not my ideas, but something different."

Hegel does not believe in a higher conscious spirit than the human.

Hegel on Immortality

. . . Some of Hegel's disciples attempt to demonstrate, on Hegelian principles, the immortality of the individual soul. And against Mansel we must place Hegel's own words: "Is it not the case, that in this Philosophy the Spirit is elevated above all those categories which involve decease, destruction, etc., to say nothing of other equally express declarations." . . . I am inclined to agree with Stirling, that of any Philosophy which has appeared, the pre best proof of our immortality can be deduced from Hegel's principles, and there is nothing in them against the existence of the individual hereafter, any more than now; in spite of the conclusions which Michelet and Feuerbach have actually drawn from them, and which Mansel thinks they might draw from them. For if the Individual can exist *now*, consistently with being part of the Absolute, it could do so hereafter. If the Many can exist now and yet be but modes of the One, they could equally be so in any future time. . . . Nor is Free Will abolished on Hegel's principles.

Besides the Idealistic theories making Something mental the sole existence, having Matter for its modes (Berkeley's and Hegel's) there is at present an opposed system, which regards Matter as the single and first existence, from which it explains Mind as one of its modes or properties, as heat, electricity, or chemical action; but admittedly a very unique property, since it is self-conscious, while none of the other properties possess this very peculiar feature.

In the Idealistic systems, Consciousness as with Berkeley, or Thought as with Hegel, is the one Reality and binds together and projects its own sensations, thus making them seem external objects. Here objects are made by mind and exist by being known.

Materialism In the Materialistic system Matter is the prius, and throws out mind in the course of ages as an accident attaching itself to its higher and more complex forms, but (and here is the difficult fact for this system to explain) having the quite singular power of mirroring in itself, and thereby first revealing, all the other forms and powers of Matter as well as itself. In this respect, it is confessed, indeed, it differs from any of the other properties of Matter, such as heat in a substance, or vitality in an organism, or even instinct in the lower animals; as it alone is conscious both of itself and them. . . .

Idealism Idealism . . . cuts at the root of this Materialism. For whether we take the Theological Idealism of Berkeley, in which Matter is only the perception of it by the human or divine Mind; the Sense-idealism of Mill in which it is a "permanent possibility of sensations;" or the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, in which it is a manifestation of thought; in all it exists only as far as it is known; the manner in

Idealism

which it becomes accessible to our faculties is its existence. With Berkeley, what is over and above our sensations received from supposed Matter, is the creative energy of God, with Hegel the Creative energy of Thought, and with Mill a possibility of Sensations. In all it exists, only as known, and has no existence as an entity apart from Sensation or Thought.

Can Matter think?

... I know of no great thinker except Locke who believed in Matter as an entity *per se*, and who yet supposed it might think; .. and there is no absurdity in supposing what is called Matter might think; it is no more than supposing lodged under external bodies a faculty which we know is under Man's; but even if there were it would be no argument for Materialism. It would only mean that Matter which now exists for some Mind or for our Mind would then exist for its own mind besides, but still would have no other conceivable existence save its apprehension by mind. .. But Matter has no existence except as apprehended by mind; and it has no mind of its own, since there are no signs of its having existence as an independent mental entity any more than as a material one.

. . .

That Matter as an entity *per se* can exist, & can itself think, or produce thought in me, is a wholly unmeaning proposition. But that what we call Matter, without being an entity distinct from Mind, was first, & evolved Thought is not so apparently unmeaning. Indeed it is a theory wh. many scientific men hold, even those who disclaim Materialism in the grosser sense.

Evolution Modern Physical Science tries to trace unbroken continuity from protoplasm to Man; from molecular and chemical action up to the energy of the Soul: .. and that Mind is only the last and most elaborate evolution, because a function of the most complex and highly finished form of Matter, the human organism.

Spencer ... Herbert Spencer repudiates Materialism while maintaining the gradual Development theory. It seems easier to him, however, to translate so-called Matter into so-called Spirit, than to translate so-called Spirit into so-called Matter, (which latter, indeed, he says, is wholly impossible.)

Evolution Theory. ... As a metaphysical theory the Evolution hypothesis explains nothing. Berkeley's theory explains; so does Hegel's. With both, Mind is and was the universe, but with Hegel it was at first unconscious, with Berkeley conscious. Berkeley, in placing Conscious Spirit first, seems to me to reason, if not more deeply, yet more strictly from analogy than Hegel, as it is the only thing we really know, with Berkeley & even wi. Hegel, to be causative.

... Berkeley thinks things would be dissolved by the dissolution of all Consciousness.

Substance ... Locke affirms (Book I., ch. IV) that we have no clear idea of Substance; nor can we have it by Sensation or reflection. Berkeley says we can have no idea of Material Substance at all because there is indeed no such thing ... The attributes exist only

Substance through perception of our minds, and do not require an external support. ... Locke asserts that we have no ideas of either Material or Spiritual Substance. ... Hume affirmed that not only we have no idea of substance, bodily or spiritual, but on Locke's principles, reasoned strictly upon, there is no such thing.

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Berkeley's Idealism Berkeley, by denying the existence of Matter.. avoided the Contradictions in the very notion of matter — escaped those wh. gave birth to Skepticism, and destroyed the creative power supposed to be lodged in Matter, which had produced dogmatic Materialism both in ancient and modern times. On B's principles Skepticism of the external world is impossible, as the extremest Skeptic cannot doubt his own sensations; and Materialism with a resulting blind and brutal Atheism is impossible after the Chimæra of Matter is destroyed — of Matter wh. supported it.

... Leibnitz asks: "Quid vero si tota haec brevis vita non nisi longum quoddam Somnium esset nosque moriendo evigilaremus?"

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God Is it not, however, just as easy to Conceive of a Self-existent God, manifesting himself in creation, as of self-existent or ever-existent matter endowed with properties which result in the universe? After all, is it not as much an affair of language or words as anything else? Dr. Strauss does not, so far as we can see attempt to account for his existent

Strauss—Abbott—Swedenborg.

matter; others do attempt to account for it by a pre-existent God, who, so far as we are concerned, manifests Himself or is known to us, through matter. J. A. A. on Strauss. Index Jan. 22. 1874.

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If all forces are demonstrated to be one there can be no limiting force; and the illimitability or infinity of force is demonstrated. The power in Nature will thus be proved to be one and illimitable — an infinite unit like space or time; and this infinite Power, operating throughout infinite space and infinite time, and manifesting itself by invariable law tending to one intelligible end (Evolution) is the God of Science, of whom all Nature (including man) is the constant manifestation comprehensible more or less by all intelligent beings. F. E. Abbott Index Jan. 15. 1874

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Swedenb. on Soul

Ac. to Swedenborg man is an imperishable spiritual body placed for a season of probation in a perishable material body; every moment receiving the essence of his being afresh from God; an organized form pervading the physical body; an eternal receptacle of life from God. "Constant influx of life" supersedes the popular idea of a self-contained spiritual existence. But this influx is conditioned by its receiving organ, the immarcessible (unwithering) inner body. ... No materialistic logic can disprove the existence of an ethereal form contained in, animating, and surviving the visible organism. Alger, p. 634.

Drossbach holds that memory is an indefeasible quality of the soul-atom, — the reason why we do not remember previous lives being that the present is our first experiment. ib.

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See Locke p. 547 for Loubère's experience in Siam as to the Pagan notions on the immateriality and immortality of the soul.

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Beneke on the Soul

Beneke believes that empirical psychology tends to corroborate the belief in the continued existence of the soul after death, not because the soul is a "simple" being — wh. doctrine Beneke holds to be but a prejudice, incompatible with a sound empirical psychology — but because of the "energy of the primitive faculties" in which the spiritual nature of the soul is grounded. ... Power or faculty is the operative factor in any process. The faculties are not mere possibilities, but possess within the soul the same degree of reality which the developments, rendered possible by them, have as conscious phenomena. The faculties are the elements of the substance of the soul itself; they are not inherent in a substratum distinct from themselves. A thing is only the sum of its own combined forces.

... In view of the nature of certain fundamental processes Beneke defines the soul as "a perfectly immaterial being, consisting of certain fundamental systems (of forces) which not only in themselves, but also in combination with each other, are most intimately one or constitute one being." Ueberweg.

D. A. Hamilton.

God No argument is valid but this: The begun had a beginner. The free will of man is the only thing in existence that can be proved to have had a beginning; he therefore who began the free will of man must have created it, and he who could create a free will must have been himself an almighty and self-existent free will.

Rev. D. A. Hamilton, D.D. Autology &c 1873 Lee & Shepard

Substance A blind and essential force holding qualities in inherence and the essential impenetrability of nature constitute the substance of matter.

... The substance of the mind must be a force sufficient to hold the qualities of the mind in inherence, and it must be impenetrable, just as we know the same things of matter; but by the aid of consciousness we know more. By consciousness the mind knows that it is a self, that it is self-conscious, that it is conscious it is conscious; it knows that it knows.

Now in the two parts of this compound sentence, "I am conscious that I am conscious," we have the affirmation of a self-affirmed consciousness and a self-affirmed substance, and that this substance is a self-conscious self. Here subject and object, knowing and being, meet and are identical.

Furthermore, this self must be either the substance of the mind in which qualities inhere, or it must be a quality of the mind inhering itself in some substance. *Consciousness claims the self as a substance, a self conscious substance in which the qualities of the mind inhere.*

The substance of the mind differs therefore from the substance of nature in that it is a self-conscious

Substance Substance; a self, conscious that it is conscious, knowing that it knows; i.e., a self-seeing essence, a self-knowing substance.

... Reason always infers a substance or essence where we find a quality. .. Since it affirms a self, consciousness affirms a whole self and not a part of one. It affirms therefore both essence and qualities, both the self and the essence of self, as well as the self and the qualities of self... The veracity of consciousness is pledged for the fact that the essence of the mind is a self, not only, but a known essence, a self-conscious essence, an essence seeing itself. Consciousness, then, knows the self, both as substance and quality.

... Consciousness must first see itself before it can see anything else – Kant to the contrary notwithstanding.

.. Impenetrability not a quality of matter or of the mind, but an element in the substance of each.

... The self is thus the substance in which the qualities or faculties inhere. A quality or faculty is only a part of me, and if lost is no part of me; but the permanent and abiding substance in which all these qualities inhere, that is the essential me, the ego, or self.

Consciousness .. Self-consciousness cannot by its own nature be a quality, but must be an essence; for it is conscious of itself, and this self-consciousness does not refer to any higher source, but directly and clearly to itself. ... The eye sees but it does not see itself. Self-consciousness is self-seeing in its own nature. The Subst. of the mind is a self-conscious force.

D. H. Hamilton.

Mind & Matter

Mind and matter are essentially different & distinct from each other, both in substance and in qualities; for the mind has in it spirit, life and force, while matter has in it only force. The substance of the mind is also a self-conscious spirit, life, and force, a self which holds the faculties of the mind in conscious inherence, while the substance of matter is a mere unconscious force. Obviously, therefore, the substance of the mind is not only cognizable, but distinguishable from the faculties that inhere in it.

Will

... The will is the essence of the mind and identical with the self. The essence of the personality is in the will.

Immortality.

... If there is any proof of a uniform law of demand and supply in the fact that the stomach being formed for food, food is provided for it, or in the fact that the lungs being formed for inhaling air, air is provided for them; or if the formation of the eye betokens light and objects to be seen, the ear sound, the taste flavor, the smell odor; and if there is any proof of a uniform law in these things, then also in the crying out of the affections of the heart, every one of them, after an immortal life, there must be proof that there is an immortal life provided for that heart.

The Soul in Space

... Something analogous to body and to the senses must belong to souls or spirits as well as to beings in this world... The soul occupies space just as does the body. ... Spirit has all that life and force have; but they have not, and cannot have, what it has.

Spirit is not nature, not matter, force, life, body, form, although it has all these.

Spirit, life, and force have ever a tendency to take on form or matter. . . . Matter covers spirit, life and force, and is their body and object. . . But the simple entity of Spirit, life, and force, and, especially the fully developed soul with all its elements, forming first a self, then a will, and then a complete personality, has already objectivity and impenetrability, and thus essential body, form or matter. Yet matter has its peculiarity in this: it is the form, screen, covering, and instrument of Spirit, life, and force, which they take on, and change, and use, and lay off again.

The Soul-Body

Spirit

. . . Spirit may pass through much or all that is material, but it will, still, not be through it but only through holes or pores in it. It must not be concluded, however, that Spirit is material, because it is real and not a phantom. Spirit is impenetrable because it is an entity, or a Something, and not a nothing. Spirit is as real as body itself, and it does not cease to be spirit because it is impenetrable.

Spirit is the human mind made up of its own peculiar and sui generis elements: essential activity, es. intelligence, es. self, es. Self-law, es. liberty, all combining to produce essential free will. Then this es. free will, as substance, developing further into the qualities of affections, intellect, & conscience, completes itself into a personality.

D. H. Hamilton:

Matter

Matter is that, from centre to circumference, which makes any entity occupy space and time; but it is more particularly the body to the soul, the body in which a force acts; as the wire to electricity, the needle to magnetism, and the pole star to attraction. Thus matter belongs to everything, for everything has a body; the soul has both an earthy and a spiritual body.

Soul in Body

. . . The Consciousness having affirmed the soul's being, irrespective of the body, and whether the body exists or not, now affirms that it is within a body, and that that body is a part of itself. The consc. affirms that the body is a vital growth upon the soul, a covering which is ever forming upon it, and is ever rising out of its own spirit, life, and force, as the skin grows upon the body; and that the body springs as much and as necessarily from the life of the soul as the skin does from that of the body.

Body an utgrowth of Soul

The consc. affirms that the body is a part of the soul in the same way that the skin is a part of the body; that is, the body is a part that grows upon the soul and out of its own life, and that wears off and is changed perpetually for a succeeding one. As the skin is worn off by attrition, and replaced by another from within, so the whole body may slough off from the soul, and be succeeded by another body, formed from within, which shall be adapted to the world which the soul inhabits.

The Consciousness affirms this: that while a body is always a necessary growth upon the mind, still this mortal body may be put off for a "Spiritual body," as Paul says, at any time; and that the change of the body does not imply the death of the soul any more than the change of the skin implies the death of the body. . . . Who shall say that a body may not grow out of and on to the soul in another world, just as it grew out of and on to the soul in this world?

Affirmations of Consciousness

. . . The Consciousness affirms:

1. That the mind is embodied.
2. That it is inside, and has control of, a physical & material body, wh. has life & force.
3. That this body, while vitally connected with the mind, is yet distinct from it.
4. That the soul has an existence of its own, having Spirit, life, and force, and that it takes on the body as a habitation, protection, and an instrument of use, and as a phenomenal mode of existence. . . So that there is a real unity and an actual identity of the soul and the body in one being, life, and consciousness.

Soul not of same nature as body

. . Thus is the soul identical with the body not by reason of its being of the same nature nor by reason of having always the same body, but by reason of its power & tendency to be perpetually growing and taking on a body. (We say growing & taking on, but do not affirm by what means the soul takes on body, whether by growth, accretion, or crystallization. Yet we see no difficulty in either. . . Spirit nature has in it, not only Spirit, but also life & force; it can therefore accomodate itself to the forms of both brute life & inanimate nature.

D. H. Hamilton.

The embryo soul embodies itself in the embryo body, and both grow together to maturity.

The nature of man contains in its elemental state spirit, life, and force; while that of animals and plants have only life and force, and no development can ever make them spirit.

Proof of God ... The being of man as a begun being, as an effect, is proof of the being of God; the nature of man as free, affectional, rational, and ethical, is the proof that man has a begun existence, outside of nature, and also a proof that the Beginner of man must be a free, affectional, rational, and ethical Being; and thus that man has God's nature in him, and is of the nature of God, and is consequently immortal in his nature.

Man's immortal. Proofs of ... The proof of man's immortality is not a subject of testimony, nor of historical evidence. No experiment can prove it, for this is, in the nature of the case, impossible; no revelation can prove it, for this would be only testimony. If man is immortal, that immortality must lie in his own nature; for no other evidence of it, or proof of it, can possibly be reliable.

God's works finite ... God's works, however great, are still finite. Space is finite. Eternity is finite. Positive and effective possibility lies in the personal power of God, and not in anything exterior to him: that possibility is an element of God's personality, wh. is the only true infinite & absolute. Eternity simply means a number of years so great that we cannot count them. ... God and

God infinite his works cannot be added together. God is
Creation finite not a unit to wh. another unit may be added. But God is a person, while the universe of worlds is but *thing*. . God's person is alone and *sui generis* in its absolute infiniteness and infinite absoluteness; all else is the finite.

. . If God could be supposed to be alone in the universe, he might be conceived as unknowable and unconditioned; but the moment he creates he puts it in the power of intelligent beings to find him out, and to know both that he is and what he is; i. e., he by creating reveals just so much of his nature and person as are requisite to produce those things.

When, therefore, we find an object that had a beginning, the fact will prove a beginner, no matter what the object may be; and if, in addition thereto, the object have personality, the fact will prove that the beginner was a person also.

Causation . . Each particular *free* cause is ultimate in its nature in that it is free, and reposes, as in the regress of human parents, in a free personal cause. Thus thro' the medium of free cause we reach over the bridgeless nothingness that lies (as a shoreless and fathomless sea to mere *necessary* cause), and lay hold on the absolute beyond. . . Where do human personalities go when they disappear? It is not proved that they go away from others, or cease to be, because they go away from us.

Baden Powell.

Baden Powell on Spiritualism

The late Prof. Baden Powell, in his essay on the Spirit of the Inductive Philosophy seems to intimate an inclination to believe that Spiritual phenomena will yet be recognized as a part of the domain of nature, and become a subject for philosophical investigation. In the present state of science, he remarks, Of all subjects that on which we know least perhaps is the connection of our bodily and mental nature, the action of one on the other, and all the vast range of sensations, sympathies, and influences in which these affections are displayed and of which we have sometimes such extraordinary manifestations in peculiar states of excited cerebral or nervous action, somnambulism, spectral impressions, the phenomena of suspended animation, double consciousness, and the like. . . If then some *peculiar manifestations* should appear of a more extraordinary character, still less apparently reducible to any known principles, it could not be doubted by any philosophic mind that they were in reality harmonious and conspiring parts of some higher series of causes as yet undiscovered. The most formidable outstanding apparent anomalies will be found to merge in great and harmonious laws, and the claims of order, continuity, and analogy, eventually vindicated.

V. Chambers's Encyclopædia, under "Spiritualism".

Dr. K. Rosenkranz

Hegel On Immortality. (see Graham's remarks)

In two places Hegel speaks of immortality, in treating of the Egyptian religion and of the resurrection of Christ. He extols the Egyptians for having conceived so profoundly the thought of immortality, and of the latter he remarks that immortality is a quality of mind which is already present, and need not first be mediated by death. We can form absolutely no conception of a condition after death; but since in thinking and willing we sustain a negative relation to nature, we cannot prove that our consciousness must be annihilated by the death of the organisms. It is among the most unhappy errors of mankind that they have expected the truth of spirit, the so-called eternal life, as a Beyond, or something which begins after death. He every where inculcates that we are now and here in the midst of the absolute, and that we degrade the state and the church when we condemn ourselves to a state of religious tutelage, or of unhappiness, or admit the sentiment that we are in need of compassion.

A miracle, ac. to Hegel, is impossible: since ethical organization, which is possible only in so far as natural and moral‡ law becomes invested with an inviolable existence, would thereby be destroyed. That which should be religion must in content be absolute, eternal truth for the whole universe. Hegel rejected the now prevalent disbelief of natural science in the existence of spirit. He declared himself opposed to atheism and Spinozism.

Whether he believed in immortality in a carnal sense as family egoism wishes, cannot be doubtful. This he rejected as well as belief in a God who is made only the obedient executor of terrestrial interests, x wh. impose upon the heart the piety of eudaimonism.

If I make myself a cause of something, I must have confidence in the presupposed effect. If this could not be avoided by a natural chance, but could be clandestinely attained by the arbitration of a God, all ethical freedom would be destroyed. That which should be religion, &c. (v. foot of p. 244) Belief in the rectitude of a casual event is not religion. The philosopher who conceives God as the absolutely universal substance, as absolute subject, brings feeling and imagination into his thought, and becomes neither unfeeling nor unimaginative.

Dr. K. Rosenkranz on Hegel's Phil. of Religion
Translated in St. Louis Journ. of Spec. Phil.

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Butler, in his Analogy, remarks that the manner in which we receive impressions in sleep is evidence of an additional sense. "We find we are possessed of a latent, and what would otherwise be, an unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them". p. 65.

"The startling reality of the events we spin out of our own consciousness in dreams is wonderful even in health."

Michael Angelo believed in supernatural dream-warnings. Luther left Florence suddenly after "a prophetic vision of Duke Lorenzo, who appeared in gray and dusty apparel, portending troubles wh. truly came to pass."

Aeschylus makes Prometheus declare, among his other services to the race, that he was the first who discriminated among dreams those destined to be true visions."

Porphyry wonders why this gift should show itself in sleep when the intelligence is weakest.

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Agassiz To think of Agassiz as dead is impossible; his grand, joyous sense of immortal existence, even when his physical frame was palpably giving way under the exertions of his tireless mind, will be remembered by all who had the happiness to know him. .. Nobody who ever had the good luck to look into his cordial eyes, radiant with intelligence and beneficence, can believe the preposterous nonsense of materialism. Com. in Boston Globe. Jan 26 1874

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Materialism says the human mind knows nothing that is not got through the senses; and as the senses give no proof of a Divine Mind, of Spirit, or a future state, all those things are to be ignored.

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Hegel Ac. to Hegel, there is one Absolute Substance pervading all things. That Substance is Spirit. This Spirit is endued with the power of development; it produces from itself the opposing powers and forces of the universe. All that we have to do is to stand by and see the process going on. The process is at first the evolution of antagonistic forces; then a mediation between them. All proceeds by triplicates; there is the positive, then the negative, then the mediation between them, which produces a higher unity. This again is but the starting-point for a new series. And so the process goes on, from stage to stage, until the Absolute Spirit has passed through all the stadia of its evolutions, and is exhibited in the highest form in the Hegelian system of philosophy. The system comprises three departments: Logic, Natural Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Spirit.

See Hegel in Hedge's "Prose Writers of Germany."

Lavater Among the dying I have observed some who have been the reverse of noble or great during life, and who, some hours before their death, or perhaps ×
some moments (one was in a delirium) have shown an inexpressible ennobling of the Countenance. . . . I saw it break through and shine through the ruins of corruption. . . Yes, glorious God! still art thou there, in the weakest, most fallible men!

Lavater in ib. p. 202.

Of the many dead persons I have seen, I have uniformly observed that sixteen, eighteen, or 24 hours after death (ac. to the disease), they have had a more beautiful form, better defined, more proportionate, harmonized, homogeneous, more noble, more exalted than they ever had during life.

May there not be, thought I, in all men an original physiognomy, subject to be disturbed by the ebb and flow of accident and passion, and is not this restored by the calm of death, as troubled water, being again left at rest, become clear!

Lavater, ib. p. 202.

Nature

Nature considered materially is the complex of all the objects of experience. Kant.

Noumena + Phenomena

If the senses represent something only as it appears, this something must surely be also a thing in itself, and the object of a non-sensuous intuition; that is, of the understanding. In such cases there must be a cognition possible, in which no sensibility can be found, and which alone possesses absolutely objective reality, viz., by which objects are represented to us as they are; whereas, on the contrary, in the empirical use of our understanding, things are only cognized as they appear. Kant.

. . . This transcendental object (noumenon) can not be at all separated from the sensuous data, because then nothing remains by which it would be thought. [This = x then) is no object of cognition in itself, but only the representation of phenomena under the concept of an object in general, which is determinably by the diversity of the phenomena. Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers. By John P. Mahaffy, A.M. Vol. III. Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic. p. 222.

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Sensibility and its sphere (viz., that of phenomena) are restricted by the understanding to this, that they shall concern not things per se, but only the way in which things appear to us according to our subjective constitution. ..

The very word phenomenon indicates a reference to something, the immediate representation of which indeed is sensuous, but which in itself, even without this constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is based) must still be something; that is, an object independent of our sensibility. ib. p. 224.

Now from this originates the concept of a noumenon; .. not a positive or definite cognition of any particular thing, it only signifies the thought of something in general, by abstracting from all the form of sensuous intuition.

.. But over and above this I must have some reason for assuming another sort of intuition than sensuous, to wh. such an object could be given; otherwise my thought, though~~t~~ not self-contradictory is void.

We have not been able to demonstrate that sensuous intuition was the only possible one whatever, but merely that it was so for us; but neither were we able to prove that any other kind of intuition was possible; & although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, the question still remains to be settled — whether it is anything then but the mere form of a concept; and whether, when such abstraction is made, any object at all is left. [Here is the question of absolute idealism explicitly raised; and the following paragraph proceeds not to solve it dogmatically, but merely to show that no possible data can be found for settling the question. There being such total absence of proofs, may not the necessary suggestion of noumena by phenomena be allowed some weight?] Mahaffy.

The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is the transcendental object; that is, the totally undetermined thought of *something* in general. Kant. This cannot be called the *noumenon*; for I do not know what it is in itself, and have no concept of it at all, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is, accordingly, of the same description for all phenomena. p. 224.

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Substance Of anything in general, I may say it is substance, so far as I distinguish it from the mere predicates and determinations of things.

Now in all our thinking the *Ego* is the subject, in which thoughts inhere merely as determinations, and this *Ego* cannot be used to determine anything else.

Consequently, every one must necessarily consider himself as the Substance, and his thoughts as the accidents, of his existence, and determinations of his condition. But what use can I make of this notion of a Substance? That I, as a thinking being, exist permanently; that I cannot naturally either originate or pass away — this I cannot at all infer from it, and yet it is the only use of the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, with which I could otherwise very well dispense.

We are so far from being able to conclude these properties from the mere pure Category of Substance, that we are obliged to start from the permanence of an object *derived*
X *from experience*, if we wish to bring such an object under the empirically applicable Concept of Substance. Now, in the proposition (syllogism*) we are discussing, we have not taken any experience for our basis, but have concluded simply from the concept of the relation wh. all thought has to the *Ego*, in wh. it inheres, as its

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* 1st *Paralogism of Substantiality*. That of wh. the representation is the absolute subject of our judgments, and wh. consequently cannot be used to determine anything else [as predicate], is *Substance*.

I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute* subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be used as the predicate of anything else.

Therefore I as a thinking being (soul) am Substance.

common subject. Neither could we, supposing we desired to do it, establish such a permanence by any safe observation. For the Ego is present indeed in all thoughts; but there is not the least intuition connected with this representation, to distinguish it from other objects of intuition. We may then indeed perceive that this representation is ever recurring in every act of thought, but not that is the fixed and permanent intuition in which thoughts (being transient) alternate.

It follows, that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology only palms off upon us a pretended discovery, by setting up the continual logical subject of inherence. Of this latter we neither have, nor can have, the least knowledge, because consciousness is the only thing which makes all our representations thoughts, and wherein all our perceptions must be found, as their transcendental subject; and beyond this logical meaning of the Ego, we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which lies as substratum at the basis of this [representation of self] as well as of all other thoughts. The proposition, then, the Soul is a substance, may be allowed to stand, provided we keep in mind that this notion leads us no farther at all, nor can it teach us any of the usual conclusions of sophistical psychology; for example, its permanence through all changes, and even after death. It denotes then a Substance only in Idea, but not in Reality. Kant pp. 227, 228.

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Belief in a future world, in a prolonged or renewed existence after death, is sincerely held by ninety-nine out of every 100 among us — yet those 99 habitually act and feel as if they had forgotten the doctrine, or had never entertained it. [Gregg's "Enigmas of Life". Mr. G. does not state the case quite accurately. Believers are not so numerous as he would make out.]

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It is not for the unbelieving to say to the believing man of science, "Who created your Creator?" because the latter could at once retort, "Whence the matter you endow with such potentiality, and whence the laws to which you give the intelligence of a lawgiver? Qu. Rev. Jan. 1874.

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In Notice of "Protoplasm, or Matter & Life, with some Remarks on the Confessions of Strauss, by Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.R.S. 3d edition," in London Quarterly Rev., Jan. 1874.

To call all the material of organism, whether living or dead, protoplasm, sheds no light whatever on the question, What is life? or on the relation of the life-force to the physical force. It may mislead.

... Dr. Beale demonstrates that life-force is not correlated with physical force. He appears to us to prove that neither observation

Beale

nor experiment by any manipulation of any known physical forces or treatment of non-living matter can originate or develop one particle of bioplasm, can produce in the laboratory or point out in nature as the result of physico-chemical agencies the activity and peculiarities which are the essential differentia of living matter or living beings. The whole of the argument of the vol., as against Huxley, Tyndall, H. Spencer, and the defenders of the physical theory of life, revolves on this proposition.

Beale denounces Bastian in a contemptuous note, and refers to Virchow and other physicists as sufficient vouchers for the absurdity of spontaneous generation. He shows, nothing can be more reckless & dogmatic than the way in which a clique of scientific Materialists are forcing their assertions on credulous readers by dint of audacious assertion and scientific prophecy of what the physicists yet to be will prove.

He boldly calls out for the living God as the only adequate explanation of the phenomena – attacks the psychology of Spencer and Bain – and says of Strauss, he has accepted as physical fact what is the most crude and ill-digested speculation.

ib. Jan. 1874.